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CAMPUS ACTIVE SHOOTER EVENTS 
 
Major Field: FIRE AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ADMINISTRATION 
 
Abstract: This research uses available secondary data from two incidents on college 
campuses to analyze survivor behavior in response to campus-based active shooter 
events. The study employs a qualitative inductive design using grounded theory 
methodology within a multiple case study strategy. Themes in survivor behavior develop 
across the cases. The study results in the development of a data-grounded Active Shooter 
Behavioral Response Model (ASBRM), which traces the behavioral response of 
survivors from incident recognition to implementation and reassessment of protective 
behaviors. The model details environmental cues, social cues, and social interaction 
leading to information gathering activities that result in protective behavior 
implementation and reassessment. The model shows similar characteristics to models 
developed to explain behavior in other event types. The theoretical assessment of the 
ASBRM shows the application of the emergent norm theory of collective behavior with 
consideration for ecological factors that affect the operation of the model.  
 
The study advances four findings related to survivor behavior in campus active 
shooting events. (1) Survivor response is social rather than asocial and includes helping 
behavior between survivors consistent with research findings in other disaster event 
types. (2) Survivors process environmental cues, social cues, and engage in social 
interaction to define the situation, gather information, and implement and reassess 
protective behavior choices within a framework that maintains and extends social and 
organizational roles. (3) Survivors implement protective behaviors that include taking 
cover on the floor, running to evacuate, running to shelter, hiding, using available 
resources to barricade themselves, locking door, turning off lights, and barricading doors. 
(4) Survivors show group level interaction for confirmation of environmental cues and 
processing of additional incident cues that lead to: (1) implementation of protective 
actions and (2) the division of tasks for information gathering and implementation and (3) 
reassessment of protective behaviors. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM, DEFINITIONS,  
AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
 Active shooter events on college campuses in United States cause loss of life and 
shatter feelings of safety and security associated with the higher education setting. The 
U.S. Department of Education’s 2012 Digest of Educational Statistics shows that more 
than 21 million students attend more than 4,500 degree-granting institutions that employ 
nearly 3.7 million faculty and staff (Snyder & Dillow, 2012). As a result, these 
institutions make a significant portion of society vulnerable to attack by active shooters. 
A 2010 joint report by the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), U.S. Department of Education 
(DOE), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identify 272 incidents of targeted 
violence on America’s campuses since 1900 (Drysdale, Modzeleski, & Simons, 2010). In 
general, active shooter events are increasing in frequency and lethality (Blair & Schweit, 
2014; Blair, Martaindale, & Nichols, 2014; Blair, Nichols, Burns & Curnutt, 2013; Blair 
& Martaindale, 2010; Newman & Fox, 2009). With each event, calls for reforms in 
policy and training dominate public discourse on the issue.  
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The research problem comes to the forefront when developing response policy, plans, and 
preparedness guidance for campus Active Shooter Events (ASEs). Policies for 
preparedness and emergency response develop with underlying assumptions about human 
behavior. The question arises: Are the assumptions used in developing these policies and 
guidance for ASEs based in scientific knowledge? Essentially, do proposed plans, 
procedures, and training reflect the actual behavioral response of victims and survivors or 
do false assumptions inform policy development?  
 The focus of this study is on the actions of victims and survivors in the seconds 
and minutes following the commencement of a campus attack. It examines the immediate 
aftermath and resultant actions, interactions, and behaviors in sociological terms. This 
research is critical, as the better we understand this critical time-period, the better that we 
can establish effective policies and adequate training to assist victims and survivors. The 
significance of the research lies in its ability to inform planning and response 
assumptions. Dynes (1993) advises that “planning will be no better than the assumptions 
and understandings about human behavior in disaster” (p. 179). This research seeks to 
explore human behavior in response to ASEs to provide empirical evidence to improve 
plans, training, and policy for campus ASEs.  
Many studies and reports of ASEs focus on the shooters, the timeline of events, 
motivations for the attack, and the performance of responders. These studies and reports 
at best present a fragmented understanding of these perspectives. The victim and survivor 
perspective is largely absent. In contrast, this study advances scientific insights on the 
premise that the motivation for the event is unknown at the time and essentially 
inconsequential to the victims and survivors. The actions of the shooter and responders 
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are important as they relate to the behavior of those present, but analysis will not directly 
focus on those elements. This is not an after-action review, but a focused empirical 
examination of victim and survivor behavior in response to the introduction of an active 
shooting event to a college campus.  
 The introduction of an active shooter to a campus setting changes the social 
situation. Park and Burgess (1970) describe basic social interaction in an everyday 
example: 
When people come together anywhere, in the most casual way, on the 
street corner or at a railway station, no matter how great the social 
distances between them, the mere fact they are aware of one another’s 
presence sets up a lively exchange of influences, and the behavior that 
ensues is both social and collective. It is social, at the very least, in the 
sense that the train of thought and action in each individual is influenced 
more or less by the action of every other. It is collective in so far as each 
individual acts under the influence of a mood or state of mind in which 
each shares and in accordance with conventions which all quite 
unconsciously accept, and which the presence of each enforces upon the 
others. (p. 381) 
Here, Park and Burgess describe the social and collective influences on behavior in a new 
social situation. This study focuses on the social situation that emerges on a college 
campus with the introduction of an active shooter and the subsequent emergency 
response. Essentially, do survivors socially organize to address the problem or do they 
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engage in panic flight? How do interactions develop and how do they influence actions? 
The goal is to understand the actions of survivors in reaction to the threat of an active 
shooter and the ensuing social and collective behavioral response. The types of behavior 
exhibited by survivors and the decision process that leads to action are critical for the 
development of effective response policy. This study addresses a research gap as no 
direct empirical findings on victims and survivors in response to campus ASEs exist.  
Schweit (2013) captures the importance of this time-period for responders in a 
recent FBI Bulletin article. She identifies:  
Responding officers must recognize that in more than half of mass-
shooting incidents where a solo officer arrived on the scene—57 percent—
shooting still will be underway, with 75 percent requiring law enforcement 
personnel to confront the perpetrator before the threat ends. And, one-third 
of those officers will be shot as they engage. (Schweit, 2013, para. 2) 
Schweit’s statement indicates that, in many cases, responding public safety officials still 
face the hazard of the shooter. Because of the introduction of the active shooter, survivors 
will be engaged in reactive behavior when responders arrive. Effective response depends 
upon accurate understanding of the actions of survivors prior to and during the 
organizational response. An empirical understanding of the reaction of survivors in an 
ongoing incident is important for informing the actions of the responders arriving on the 
scene. Accurate assumptions lead to effective response.  
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Defining Active Shooter Events 
As the academic community has not produced substantive research on the 
survivor response to active shooters, definitions are limited to the practitioner focus. The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines an active shooter as “an individual 
actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area; 
in most cases, active shooters use firearms(s) and there is no pattern or method to their 
selection of victims” (DHS, 2013, p. 2). This definition excludes incidents that begin as 
targeted violence. Incidents of targeted violence are “violent incidents where both the 
perpetrator and target(s) are identified or identifiable prior to the incident” (Reddy et al., 
2001, p. 157-158). In its 2012 study on active shooters, the New York City Police 
Department (NYPD) uses the DHS definition but extends it to include “cases that spill 
beyond an intended victim to others” (NYPD, 2012, p. 1). Blair and Schweit (2014) also 
modify the definition by removing the term “confined” and extending the term individual 
to individuals. A strict interpretation of the original DHS definition excludes active 
shooter incidents that begin with a specific intended victim, those perpetrated by more 
than one individual and those that occur outside of buildings. This study uses the 
modification to the DHS definition by Blair and Schweit (2014) and the NYPD (2012). 
An Active Shooter Events (ASE) is defined as “individual(s) actively engaged in killing 
or attempting to kill people in a populated area; in most cases using firearms(s) and 
includes attacks that may begin with a specific intended victim, but extend to include 
others.” 
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Defining Campus Active Shooter Events 
 Identifying the boundaries of the study requires a specific definition of the 
location of the event. This study examines campus Active Shooter Events (ASE). The 
term campus can connote very different meanings. The definition has two elements. The 
first is the broad category of the location. The second is its specific location 
characteristics. This study defines the broad category of the location to the campus of a 
degree-granting institution in the United States. Degree-granting institutions are:  
postsecondary institutions that grant an associate’s or higher degree and 
whose students are eligible to participate in the Title IV federal financial 
aid programs. Degree-granting institutions include almost all 2- and 4-year 
colleges and universities; they exclude institutions offering only 
vocational programs of less than 2 years duration and continuing 
education programs. (Snyder & Dillow, 2012, p. 279) 
The restriction to degree granting institutions excludes institutions that provide only 
career and technical programs of less than two years and do not lead to a degree. 
Defining the population to include only degree-granting institutions provides some 
consistency in the location type and the policies under which they operate. The Digest of 
Educational Statistics (2012) identifies 4,589 granting institutions in the United States.  
The second definitional element of the campus ASE is the specific location 
characteristics. It is necessary to define the elements of a campus of a degree-granting 
institution. This research uses the definition of campus as outlined in the Jeanne Clery 
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Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (Clery Act). The 
Clery Act defines a campus as: 
(I) any building or property owned or controlled by an institution of higher 
education within the same reasonably contiguous geographic area of the 
institution and used by the institution in direct support of, or in a manner 
related to, the institution’s educational purposes, including residence halls; 
and 
(II) property within the same reasonably contiguous geographic area of the 
institution that is owned by the institution but controlled by another 
person, is used by students, and supports institutional purposes (such as a 
food or other retail vendor).  
Defining Victims and Survivors 
The term victim as it is used herein describes those killed by the perpetrator. The 
term survivor includes those who are present at a campus ASE, may or may not have 
been injured, and take some type of protective action. Protective actions include escaping 
from the area, hiding/choosing to remain silent or still, closing doors, locking doors, 
moving furniture, and verbally and/or physically confronting the perpetrator. Extending 
the term survivor to include those who take protective action and are not injured is not 
intended to diminish the sacrifice of those seriously injured, but simply to catalog the 
actions of those present. The inclusive term allows for ease in description, negating 
constant differentiation. The study targets those present and their individual and 
collective actions in response to the campus ASE. While physical and social location in 
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relation to danger is a key issue, the general term will be inclusive of all those present 
who take protective action.  
Focus on Victims and Survivors 
The approach of this study is a departure from the ASE literature examined in the 
following chapter. The limited research focuses on the perpetrator and/or organizations 
and policy. A survivor-centric focus is essentially absent from empirical research on 
ASEs. This study uses a survivor-centric approach consistent with studies in the field of 
disaster sociology to address this research void.  
The following chapter uses extensive studies of survivor behavior in other event 
types as a proxy for the study of ASE events. Empirical studies of the behavioral 
response to fires, bombings, and other emergencies provide the theoretical basis and 
methodology for the study of ASEs. Studies of these events using the sociological 
concept of collective behavior and the Emergent Norm Theory (ENT) provide the means 
to explore behavior in ASEs. The following chapter reviews the findings of these studies 
and their outlines their applicability to the ASE environment. The chapter also examines 
limited research on ASEs to provide context and characteristics for these events.  
Research Questions 
This opening chapter frames the study’s focus on survivor reactions to campus 
ASEs. The second chapter further develops the research questions, which are presented 
below as a starting point, with the basis for the questions refined in the following two 
chapters. As no empirical studies of survivor behavior in response to active shooting 
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events exist, this research is unique. With the research context provided by a review of 
disaster sociology studies, the research questions for this study include: 
1. What are the processes involved in collectively defining the socio-behavioral 
response to ASEs? 
2.  How do social interactions and social organization emerge among survivors 
in a campus ASE? 
3. What type of protective behaviors do survivors of campus ASE exhibit?  
4. How do decisions for protective behavior arise among survivors in ASE? 
The questions guide inquiry into the socio-behavioral aspects of the campus ASE. 
These questions seek to fill a research gap for incident response to active shooter events. 
As previously identified, this topic has not been subject to previous research. The results 
of the research inform the assumptions on human behavior, which is critical for the 
development of effective policy and practice for preparedness and response to campus 
ASEs.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The reaction of survivors to ASEs has not been the subject of previous empirical 
research. In general, research exists on disparate aspects of school shooting events in 
multiple fields of study. Muschert (2007) identifies that “to date there is no unified body 
of knowledge about such events.” (p. 60). This statement remains true eight years later. 
As such, this chapter reviews the limited ASE findings pertinent to the research questions 
of this study. This chapter uses the Disaster Research Center (DRC) C-Model to organize 
the review of literature. As such, the examination of ASEs literature focuses on the 
chronology, characteristics, and conditions (independent variables) affecting outcomes. 
As the survivor response to ASEs has not been the subject of previous research, the 
majority of the review centers on disaster sociology research that targets behavior in 
other event types. The findings related to behavior in these events serve as a proxy for 
understanding human behavioral reactions in ASEs.  
This chapter begins with an overview of the concepts and theory used to inform 
behavioral research on disasters. Second, it briefly reviews the DRC C-Model. The third 
section, with several sub-sections, extensively reviews behavioral findings of disaster 
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research relevant to the study of ASEs. The final section reviews the limited research 
focused on ASE events that provide context to the study.   
Collective Behavior, the Emergent Norm Theory, and Disaster Studies  
 As described, the reaction of survivors to ASE events has not been the subject of 
previous study. As a result, this section of the review focuses on the theory used to study 
behavior in similar event types. The focus remains on the theoretical level. It examines 
the sociological concept of collective behavior, the Emergent Norm Theory (ENT) and its 
development through additions over time. The following sections examine specific 
findings of studies that employ the described and other similar theoretical constructs.  
Generally, collective behavior is a field of sociology that “focuses on sequences 
and patterns of interaction that emerge in problematic situations” (Lang & Lang, 1968, p. 
556). These interactions occur within a collectivity. A collectivity is a group of people 
“who have a sense of solidarity by virtue of sharing common values and who have 
acquired an attendant sense of moral obligation to fulfill role-expectations” (Merton, 
1957, p. 299). Problematic situations are “those in which participants lack adequate 
guides to conduct” (Lang & Lang, 1968, p. 556). In his chapter on collective behavior 
and disaster research, Wenger (1987) draws the distinction between general sociological 
study of collective behavior and its use in the study of disasters. Wenger argues that the 
field developed from studies concerning nontraditional, non-institutionalized behavior or 
emergent behavior focusing on crowds, social movements, public behavior, and cults. 
The emergent norm perspective then became the key theoretical approach informing 
sociological research of disaster events.  
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The Emergent Norm Theory (ENT) developed in contrast to earlier approaches to 
collective behavior. Early approaches, the contagion and convergence perspectives, 
assumed some manner of homogeneity in participant characteristics. Contagion proffers 
that homogeneity of behavior spreads through the collectivity similar to the spread of a 
communicable disease. The convergence approach assumes latent homogeneity that 
surfaces in the presence of the group. Smelser (1962) also advances the “value added” 
approach to collective behavior. This approach argues that six factors: (1) structural 
conduciveness, (2) structural strain, (3) a generalized belief, (4) precipitating events, (5) 
mobilization for action, and (6) social control activities are necessary for collective 
behavior. Lewis (1972) uses the value-added approach to identify and examine the 
“hostile outburst” at the National Guard shooting at Kent State (p. 95). Wenger (1987) 
identifies “value-added” as macro approach to collective behavior within the contagion 
and convergence orientations. The key difference between ENT and other approaches 
resides in its recognition of the collectivity as a heterogeneous group of actors. The ENT 
approach contrasts, as it proposes that individual differences remain, but unanimity 
comes in response to an event that falls outside of existing norms for behavior.  
ENT views behavior as a function of norms. In circumstances where existing 
norms are not sufficient to guide behavior, new norms emerge from a process of 
interaction. ENT focuses on “the conditions and sequences under which a new special 
rule comes to be recognized and accepted as the basis for coordinated response” (Turner, 
1964, p. 394). In this view collective behavior comes about when “the situation is 
ambiguous and to some degree unstructured; the participants do not initially share clear-
cut, pre-existing expectations as to how they should behave; the outcome of the episode 
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appears uncertain” (Turner & Killian, 1972, p. 79). How they should behave develops out 
of the interaction process. Based on symbolic interaction (Blumer, 1969), the process 
results in a collective definition of the situation and norms for behavior.  
Figure 2.1 details the ENT interaction process. The process begins with a 
precipitating event in a setting that affects people with diverse motivations and personal 
characteristics. First, the affected collectivity engages in a “milling” process (Turner & 
Killian, 1987), which they describe as a physical and verbal process where: “people ask 
each other questions about what they have seen and heard and answer with bits of 
information, guesses, and theories. In communicating they move about first talking to one 
person, then another” (p. 55). The key questions their behavior implicitly addresses 
include: (1) what is happening? (2) what should be done?(3) who will act first? (Turner & 
Killian, 1972). 
Keynoting is the next stage in the process. In this stage, keynoters provide a 
definition of the situation (Thomas, 1928) and a suggested course of action that the group 
evaluates. A succession of keynoters may provide alternatives, giving a number of 
potential courses of action for selection. As a result of the milling and keynoting process, 
“the emergent definition of the situation and a proposed line of action begins to take 
normative character” (Turner & Killian, 1972, p. 89).  
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Figure 2.1. The Emergent Norm Process. This figure shows the emergent norm 
process as developed from descriptions by Turner & Killian (1987).  
Evans (1969) is critical of the collective behavior field describing it as “long on 
taxonomy and speculative explanation and short on demonstrable propositions and 
formulas that would allow any kind of prediction” (p. 2). Tierney (1980) is also critical of 
analysis in the ENT perspective. She describes problems in clarity and testability, 
particularly its definitional element as the presence of an emergent norm (Tierney, 1980). 
Berk (1972) notes that the focus on conditions and consequences leads to gaps in 
recognition of the core characteristic behaviors. Weller and Quarantelli (1973) seek to 
close these gaps and advance a model of collective behavior as an enhancement to ENT. 
The model, Figure 2.2, includes elements of social relationships (existing or emergent) to 
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distinguish between institutionalized and collective behavior. The model distinguishes 
collective behavior as a result of emergent social relationships, emergent norms, or both. 
Weller and Quarantelli (1973) explain that “social organization not only ‘contains’ social 
action, it also provides a foundation of social norms and relationships upon which action 
is built” (p. 675).  
 
Figure 2.2 Socio-Organizational Dimensions of Collective Behavior. In Weller, J. & 
Quarantelli, E. (1973). Neglected characteristics of collective behavior. American 
Journal of Sociology, 79, 665-685.  This figure shows the relationship between enduring 
and emergent social relationships and norms. 
 The addition of social organization as a concept with the ENT collective behavior 
paradigm increases measurable elements. The addition of structural elements addresses 
concerns raised over the testability of ENT concepts. In the third edition of their 
landmark work, Turner and Killian (1987) explicitly include social structure as a defining 
element. Turner and Killian (1987) explain that it was implicit in earlier conceptions of 
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ENT, but make it explicit in their most recent edition. In subsequent research, observable/ 
testable elements included social organization. For example, Neal and Philips (1988) 
define collective behavior as “the development of emergent norms and/or emergent social 
structures in a relatively spontaneous situation” (p. 233). Collective behavior and ENT 
provide a method to describe and explain behavior in times of collective stress. The 
sections that follow show many studies that examine events similar to ASEs using 
collective behavior and ENT.  
The Disaster Research Center (DRC) C-Model 
This literature review uses the DRC C-Model as a framework (Quarantelli, 1987; 
2002; Phillips, 2014). The C-Model developed from disaster fieldwork and the effort to 
build complete case studies of events. The model consists of four elements: conditions, 
characteristics, consequences, and chronology. Table 2.1 describes the model elements as 
originally developed by Quarantelli (1987) and described by Phillips (2014).  
Table 2.1  
 
Disaster Research Center C-Model  
Element Description/ Example 
Characteristics What are the features of the individual, organization, or community? 
Chronology How did the event or process unfold over time? (story of the event) 
Conditions 
What pre-existing contexts produced physical and social vulnerability? 
What kinds of social, economic, environmental or political factors 
influenced how the event unfolded? How did factors impact the 
outcomes? (critical independent variables) 
Consequences 
What are the obvious and less obvious outcomes of the event, 
interactions, processes or decisions? (These may be manifest, latent, 
positive, and/or negative) 
Source: Phillips, B. (2014). Qualitative Disaster Research. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
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The following review of relevant disaster research in other events types seeks to 
identify the conditions (independent variables) that affect behavior in disaster. In the 
absence of ASE specific behavioral research, behavior expectations developed from 
studies of similar events is the only option. Later sections of this chapter review the 
limited ASE specific research. The review segments the research by location type to 
focus on the K-12 campus environment, college campus environment, and research that 
cuts across ASE events in all locations. The purpose is to develop understanding about 
the basic chronology and characteristics of ASE events.  
Conditions Affecting Active Shooter Events (ASEs): 
Disaster Research Findings 
 For more than sixty years, disaster research has studied human behavior in 
response to events such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, fires, and more 
recently, terrorism. Initial post-World War II research sought to understand the human 
reaction to disaster as a proxy for the effects of nuclear war (Fritz & Williams, 1954; 
Fritz & Marks, 1957). Similarly in this study, we review behavior-based studies of 
disasters as a proxy for ASEs. This is not without issue. First, Quarantelli (1981a) 
describes the term disaster as a sponge word or concept without a consensus definition. 
Two volumes seeking a definition failed to reach consensus (Quarantelli; 1998; Perry & 
Quarantelli, 2005). One of the key issues in defining disasters is the problem of scale 
(and of which variables) (Quarantelli, 2008). The debate focuses on the application of 
findings to events of larger scale (i.e. drawing distinction between disaster and 
catastrophe). For ASEs, the question of scale also applies. Second, disaster researchers 
also question the applicability of findings to conflict-crisis events (Quarantelli, 1993; 
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2008). ASEs are conflict-based events. As a result, both issues affect the study of ASEs 
and the application of previous research findings. With this understanding, the review of 
conditions proceeds in two sections. The first section and associated sub-sections, 
Collective Behavior in Disaster: Research Findings, examine studies that specifically 
target behavior in response to threatening conditions where the survivors are immediately 
present. The second section, Disaster Warnings and Evacuations: Research Findings, 
reviews summary works from the large body of research on warnings and evacuations. 
Both elements are present in an ASE. Survivors may react to the initial event where they 
directly receive environmental or social cues or to official warnings broadcast in the 
campus environment.  
Collective Behavior in Disaster: Research Findings 
 Studies of collective behavior in disaster use qualitative, quantitative, and mixed 
research methods. This section reviews research findings using all three methods. In 
addition to findings, the review of quantitative studies also focuses on the design and 
conceptualization of dependent and independent variables or conditions related to 
collective behavior in disasters. The review centers on studies designed specifically to 
target collective behavior. Secondarily, the discussion includes studies that contain 
collective behavior as an element, despite a focus on other aspects of events. The review 
begins with a discussion of the general structure of disaster studies that target collective 
behavior. It continues with reviews of major studies of the field. 
 Researchers generally construct studies of collective behavior in disasters to 
identify one of two basic behavior sets. The research generally examines a social 
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situation in disasters to determine if the human response is social or non-social in nature. 
A social or pluralistic (Giddings, 1920) response is characterized by behavior within 
existing or developed norms, some type of social organization, and enactment of role 
expectations. The non-social or breakdown response manifests in panicked, irrational, 
competitive behavior with the goal of “self-preservation at all costs” (Johnson, Feinberg, 
& Johnston, 1994, p. 168). The non-social response ignores patterns of behavior expected 
by social norms (Quarantelli, 1957). Just as the term disaster is overused and subject to 
interpretation, so is the term panic. Quarantelli (1981b) describes panic in sociological 
terms as “social relationships and expectations are disregarded…the strongest ties of a 
primary nature, such as close family members, may be shattered and the most socially 
expected behavior patterns may be ignored” (p. 9). Panic behavior is the target, feelings 
of extreme fear that do not manifest in overt measurable behavior are not panic per se. 
Quarantelli (1957) describes a  of measurable panic behavior as: 
fairly well divested of all or almost all of his socially acquired 
characteristics. He is thought of as behaving in a completely irresponsible 
or antisocial manner, blindly trampling over people in a way analogous, if 
not completely similar, to the way animals act in a wild and chaotic 
stampede. The fleeing is visualized as irrational and nonfunctional or 
maladaptive to the dangerous situation. The uncritically acting participant 
is conceived as having little awareness of how or why he is running, or 
often because of his emotional state of terror, what he is running from. (p. 
188) 
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Quarantelli’s conception is generally termed as non-rational flight or panic flight. The 
classics of disaster research describe panic and non-rational flight as extremely rare in 
disasters. Personal misunderstanding and media frames of disaster perpetuate myths of 
non-social response to disasters (Wenger, Dykes, Sebok, & Neff, 1975). These continue 
today in the post-9/11 terrorism-centric environment (Tierney, Bevc & Kuligowski, 2006; 
Tierney, 2003).  
Despite the reported rarity, panic flight and/or partial breakdown in social 
behavior can and does occur. Quarantelli (1954) describes the conditions for panic to 
develop “as a result of a feeling of possible entrapment, a perception of collective 
powerlessness, and a feeling of individual isolation in a crisis situation” (Quarantelli, 
1954, p. 275). Quarantelli (1954) describes the social interactions that can lead to a non-
social response in that “the more progressive the crisis, the greater the possibility that 
interaction with others will lead to a definition of the situation as one involving potential 
entrapment” (p. 274). Also through interaction, “the responses of the others, however, 
indicate that they, too, are powerless or have even suffered the consequences, panic 
becomes probable” (Quarantelli, 1954, p. 274). The characteristics of active shooter 
events provide the possibility to meet Quarantelli’s conditions for panic.  
More likely are the mid-range conceptions that developed in response to the rarity 
of panic behavior as conceptualized by Quarantelli. In order to explain group-level 
processes, some gradation developed within the research between the extremes of the 
social and non-social responses. Quarantelli (1981b) notes, “panic may be at the extreme 
end of some behavior continuum” (p. 20). Johnson and Feinberg (2001) advance a 
sequential breakdown of social bonds. They explain that “status relations should 
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breakdown in a sequential fashion, with the primary ties such as within nuclear families 
breaking down last, if at all, and the requirements of the citizen role – the norm of civil 
behavior, even to strangers being the first to break down” (Johnson & Feinberg, 2001, p. 
3).  
Mawson (1980) and Sime (1983) advance an affiliative model of flight behavior. 
In their conception, flight may occur toward the danger in an effort to reunite with those 
with whom individuals have the closest social bonds. Affiliation also extends beyond the 
group to the familiarity of the place (Sime, 1985). This conception advances that greater 
threat leads to a more social and less individualistic response. Drury, Cocking and 
Reicher (2009) argue for the application of a self-categorization model to groups that 
develop in emergencies. The self-categorization model advances:  
that feeling and acting with others as part of a group…operates through 
self-categorizations (definitions of what makes us unique) to shared 
collective self-categorizations (definitions that classify us with 
others)…categorizing oneself with others tends to heighten perceptions of 
similarity and unity with others…shifts from ‘me’ to ‘we’ means greater 
commitment and loyalty to the group. (Drury et al., 2009, p. 71)  
These mid-range explanations provide greater clarity to group-level process in 
response to life-threatening emergencies (Aguirre, Torres, Gill & Hotchkiss, 2011). One 
of the unique problems to this area of study is addressing the unit of analysis. The group 
or individual level of analysis creates issues for study design and the application of 
theory. While ENT focuses on the group level, it requires individual interaction. The 
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affiliative model and self-categorization model operate more on the psychological rather 
than sociological side of behavior. Studies also apply similar designs to the 
organizational level. For example, a study reviewed in following sections applied 
organizational emergence concepts (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1968) down to the enactment 
of individual employee roles (Johnson & Johnston, 1989). Studies focus on different 
analytical levels, but result in cross-applicability of findings.  
Collective behavior in fires: Studies of the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire.  
The most studied single disaster event for collective behavior is the 1977 fire at 
the Beverly Hills Supper Club (BHSC) in Southgate, Kentucky. Estimates vary in the 
number of total patrons at the club when the fire started,  2,200 and 2,400. Ultimately, the 
fire resulted in 165 deaths. At least five empirical studies examine separate aspects of the 
event or utilize different methods to understand behavior in response to the fire (Johnson, 
1988; Johnson & Johnston, 1989; Johnson, Feinberg & Johnston, 1994; Feinberg & 
Johnson, 2001; Cornwell, 2003). The studies use the same data source: transcripts of 
interviews conducted by Kentucky State Police in the investigation of the fire. The 
multiple studies show a convergence in behavior related findings with application of 
different methods.  
The first empirical study of the fire by Johnson (1988) is a seminal qualitative 
work in the disaster field. Johnson uses qualitative methods to analyze the interview 
transcripts. Using Quarantelli’s (1954) conception of panic, Johnson finds “no 
evidence...of family members abandoning each other in order to facilitate their own 
survival…in fact there are instances of both family members and friends assisting others 
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when to do so constituted a threat to their own lives” (Johnson, 1988, p. 24). The findings 
indicate that social bonds are important in preventing non-social competition during the 
evacuation (Johnson, 1988).  
Johnson and Johnston (1989) examine employee occupational roles during the fire 
and evacuation. As previously described, role fulfillment is a core element of social 
organization and collective behavior. The results show that during the fire, employees’ 
extended occupational roles consistent with the expectations of their daily role (Johnson 
& Johnston, 1989). Servers were more likely to engage in person-centered helping 
activities within their work areas only, showing responsibility toward customers they 
served (Johnson & Johnston, 1989). The findings also show gender disparity in activities. 
Males were more likely to engage in fire control activities and females were more likely 
to engage in person-centered helping. Management was also more likely to instruct 
female employees to leave the building. Johnson and Johnston (1989) describe that 
“despite their lack of training, the employees at Beverly Hills effectively directed 
evacuation from the building, and employees followed directions when received” (p. 49). 
The findings show no evidence of social breakdown or panic among employees only role 
extension to necessary pro-social helping activities. 
Johnson, Feinberg, & Johnston (1994) examine social response based upon social 
bonds and entrapment threat. The quantitative study tests three models of expected 
behavior to include the social and breakdown models described above. The final model, 
the severe threat model, combines the social and breakdown models. The model proffers 
that social response continues until the point of severe entrapment threat, and then social 
breakdown begins. The study tested the three models using a seven-factor social response 
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index as the dependent variable. A six-category variable identified social bonds. An 
ordinal variable measured entrapment threat coded from no threat to severe threat (0-4). 
The results show a connection between social bonds and social response, providing 
support for the social model. When controlled for location within the club, the 
researchers find evidence to support the severe threat model in the Crystal Room. The 
Crystal Room faced the most severe threat of entrapment. Johnson, Feinberg, and 
Johnston (1994) find decreasing social responses when threat increases. This supports 
Quarantelli’s conception of panic in situations with increasing threat of entrapment. This 
research reinforces ecological aspects of location in relation to threat as a factor in social 
response behavior.  
As described above, Feinberg and Johnson (2001) present a model for sequential 
breakdown of social ties (based on social bond strength). They show the first to 
breakdown is the general citizen role and the last is the familial role. In between they 
describe “breakdown is expected to occur in the other relationships: occupational roles, 
age or gender roles, secondary group ties, and weaker ties to primary group members 
such as less closely related family members and friends” (Feinberg & Johnson, 2001, p. 
271). They test three models with survival rates as the dependent variable. The models 
include the social and breakdown models described earlier and a third partial breakdown 
model. The independent variables include family ties, age, gender roles (escorted or 
escorting), and status (employee or guest) with adjustment for risk (proximity to exits). 
The analysis focuses on those present in the largest venue, the Cabaret Room. Each 
model contains expectations concerning survival rates. For example, the maintenance of 
social order model would show similar survival rates for males and females. The inverse 
25 
 
would be true for the complete breakdown model. Feinberg and Johnson (2001) find 
evidence to support the social organization model in survivorship rates. They caveat the 
finding with the following: 
We are not arguing that all the norms inherent in the organizational model 
held throughout the evacuation process…those norms influenced enough 
of the occupants…for a sufficiently long period as the evacuation began 
and continued, so that any breakdown in the social order-if it occurred-
happened so late in the process as to have no observable consequence for 
survival…social organization-specifically roles and status relations-endure 
even during the flight from calamitous fires. (Feinberg & Johnson, 2001, 
p. 293)  
Cornwell (2003) authored the final in a series of studies examining the Beverly 
Hills Supper Club Fire. Cornwell (2003) uses multivariate analysis to examine fatality 
risk for those with primary ties (blood, marriage, or dating relationships) to determine if 
social bonds (quantity & strength) increased risk of death. He finds that fatalities occur in 
blocks, groups either survived together or died together as a function of the strength of 
the social bonds between them (Cornwell, 2003). In addition, Cornwell (2003) finds that 
ecological factors such as the location where evacuation begins also influences the 
fatality risk of the group. This finding is discussed below in Cornwell (2001). 
Beyond Beverly Hills: Collective behavior in other disaster events.  
The BHSC fire is one of the most researched single disaster events. Studies of 
additional events and event types advance our understanding of the behavioral reactions 
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to disaster. In contrast to the review above, organized around a single event, the 
remaining review develops around key themes in findings from empirical studies of 
disaster events. The list of events, in Table 2.2, is not exhaustive, but illustrative of a 
range of events with empirical findings related to collective behavior in disasters. This 
section discusses findings related to the themes of helping behavior, role maintenance/ 
extension, pre-existing social relationships, risk perception and prior knowledge of 
disaster location.  
Table 2.2  
 
Studies of Disaster Events with Collective Behavior Related Findings 
Year Event Research Author(s) 
1973 Summerland Fire - Isle of Man Great Britain Sime, 1985 
1979 Who Concert Stampede - Cincinnati, OH Johnson, 1987a 
1987 Kings Cross Fire - London, Great Britain Donald & Canter, 1992 
1992 Gas Explosion - Guadalajara, Mexico 
Aguirre, Wenger, Glass, 
Diaz-Murillo, & Vigo, 1995 
1993 
World Trade Center (WTC)Bombing - New 
York, NY 
Aguirre, Wenger, & Vigo, 
1998 
1994 Sinking M/V Estonia - Baltic Sea 
Cornwell, Harmon, Mason, 
Merz, & Lampe, 2001 
2001 WTC Terrorist Attack - New York, NY 
Gershon, Magda, Reily, & 
Sherman, 2011 
2003 Station Nightclub Fire - Warwick, RI 
Aguirre, Torres, Gill, & 
Hotchkiss, 2011 
2005 
London Terrorist Bombings - London, Great 
Britain 
Drury, Cocking, & Reicher, 
2009 
 
Helping behavior.  
As described previously, panic behavior is rare. All studies note an absence or 
extreme limited occurrence of the Quarantelli conception of panic behavior. In the 
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absence of panic behavior, researchers generally observe helping behavior. Drury et al. 
(2009) define helping behavior as “anything done or said with the purpose of assisting 
another” (p. 75). Quarantelli and Dynes (1977) add that these actions “are not performed 
as a part of a normal occupational role in an everyday social organizational context” (p. 
4). Studies operationalize helping behavior to include: comforting others, physically 
helping people up, helping people walk or move, providing information or directions, 
providing first aid, providing survival provisions (life jackets, water, etc.) (Cornwell et 
al., 2001; Drury et al., 2009).  
Research findings in these studies result from mixed-methods or qualitative 
research methods. Quantitative results alone that show disparity in survival rates among 
gender and other groups may present prima facie evidence of social breakdown. 
However, Cornwell et al. (2001) present a strong argument for the importance of 
ecological factors. The factors may statistically mask helping behaviors and the 
maintenance of social roles. Cornwell et al. (2001) describe in the sinking of the M/V 
Estonia that “exceptional situational factors figured heavily into this interference, 
ultimately creating the appearance of selfish or maladaptive behavior to the outside 
observer” (p. 21). In this case, the speed of sinking, listing ship movement, unrestrained 
moving objects, and inclement weather affected the ability of victims and survivors to 
help others. Quantitative results showing disparities in survival rates among gender 
groups and crewmembers could provide evidence of panic non-social behavior. However, 
qualitative analysis of survivor accounts showed numerous examples of helping 
behaviors restrained by the ecological conditions of the event. Aguirre et al. (2011), also 
using a mixed methods approach in the examination of the Station Nightclub fire. They 
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describe that “many of the victims who died competed with each other for egress from 
the building, but our findings show that they were helping each other until the very end” 
(Aguirre et al., 2011, p. 114). The findings of Cornwell et al. (2001) and Aguirre et al. 
(2011) show the importance of qualitative crosschecks of quantitative findings.  
Pre-existing social relationships and collectivities.  
Individuals form collectivities in response to disasters for several reasons. 
Cornwell et al. (2001) identify that victims and survivors seek group affiliation in 
disasters for the purposes of (1) facilitating understanding of ambiguous cues and (2) to 
help decide a course of action and survival strategy for the group. Sime (1983) also finds 
that in fires victims and survivors develop a group, rather than individual survival 
strategy. The role of pre-existing relationships is an element of several studies. The 
influence on the specific dynamics of group formation is unknown. Several studies do 
identify pre-existing social relationships as building blocks for emergent social structures 
(Sime, 1983; Aguirre, 1995). Mack and Baker (1961) identify that “interpretation of the 
signal varies with the type of primary group within which the individual is situated at the 
time the signal is presented” (p. 47). Another known influence of pre-existing 
relationships is that victims and survivors will put themselves at risk to find and join 
members of their close social networks before evacuation (Sime, 1983; Aguirre, 1998; 
Gershon, 2011; Aguirre et al., 2011).  
Role enactment, maintenance, and extension.  
Role enactment is a defining characteristic of a collectivity (Merton, 1957). On a 
daily basis, individuals juggle many overlapping social roles (gender, familial, 
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occupational, etc.) and manage multiple-group memberships. Early disaster research 
identifies that strain develops between roles that could lead to abandonment of 
occupational and other non-primary group roles (Killian, 1952). Later research identifies 
that social roles simplify in disaster, minimizing conflict and strain (Dynes & Quarantelli, 
1986). Research also indicates the maintenance of gender and familial roles in disaster. 
Donald and Canter (1992) and Johnson (1987) report maintenance of gender roles in two 
different event types—fire and crowd incident. Others present findings related to the 
maintenance/extension of occupational roles. Several of the reviewed studies identify 
findings consistent with Johnson & Johnston (1989), regarding the maintenance and/or 
extension of employee roles (Cornwell et al., 2001; Drury et al., 2009; Aguirre et al., 
2011). These studies conclude that employees maintain and extend their occupational 
roles in disaster situation to assist other survivors. Gershon et al. (2011) also note the 
impact of emergent leaders as an extending role in the 2001 World Trade Center 
evacuation.  
Risk perception.  
Several studies identify aspects of risk perception in their findings. Describing the 
general role of risk perception, Slovic (1987) states:  
the ability to sense and avoid danger is necessary for the survival of all 
living organisms. Survival is also aided by an ability to codify and learn 
from past experiences. Humans have additional capability that allows 
them to alter their environment as well as respond to it. This capacity both 
creates and reduces risk (p. 28).  
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In the case of the disaster events examined in this chapter, Aguirre et al. (1998) and 
Gershon et al. (2011) both find that those who perceived danger more quickly started 
evacuating earlier than those who did not. Also noted within the general research on risk 
perception is the moderating effect of the group. Dozens of studies in both risk perception 
and disaster research on warnings show that evidence contrary to initial beliefs is often 
disregarded (e.g., Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Sime (1983) and Aguirre (2011) note 
delays in the recognition of ambiguous cues of danger when with a group when compared 
with those who were alone. The research is not conclusive as to whether the lack of 
recognition resulted from disregarding evidence or attention diverted to the group.  
Prior knowledge of the disaster location.  
Studies also find prior knowledge of the disaster location as a significant factor. 
Prior knowledge or limited knowledge can have differing impacts on response. The 
knowledge can be limited, such as experience with only a single entry or exit, or the 
experience can provide additional options to a group facing a risk. For example, Aguirre 
et al. (2011) find less risk of injury for those who had visited the Station nightclub prior 
to the fire. Although the finding does not explore this aspect in further detail, previous 
visits could provide information about the facility that informs options for action. Sime 
(1983) shows how knowledge and routine can also limit actions. He notes that if a 
“particular fire escape route is not in regular use and unfamiliar that it is less likely to be 
used in a fire” (Sime, 1983, p. 39). If they are unfamiliar with other options, many 
victims and survivors attempt to exit by the same method they used to enter (Sime, 1983; 
Aguirre et al., 2011). Others note the facility knowledge of employees in both directing 
others and taking routes known to them (Sime, 1983; Cornwell et al., 2001; Drury et al., 
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2009; Aguirre, 2011). Aguirre et al. (1995) also find that individuals with local 
knowledge about victims became keynoters in the development of emergent search and 
rescue operations during the response to the Guadalajara gas explosion.  
ASE Conditions: Disaster Warnings and Evacuations—The Research Findings 
The previous sections of this chapter examine specific empirical studies of human 
behavior in response to events when they are physically present in close proximity to the 
danger. Another major component of both disaster and campus ASE response is warning 
others not immediately present at the site of the danger. As a result, the body of disaster 
research focused on the response to warnings is also instructive with respect to the 
research questions. The paragraphs that follow review findings related to official 
warnings, but the role of unofficial warnings are also considered. The review also 
examines recent studies that link other event type research specifically to warnings in 
campus ASEs. 
This review does not specifically examine each of the volumes of empirical 
studies that exist on the warnings. It reviews findings replicated in numerous studies and 
captured in summary works. Key summative works by Mileti (1975, 1999), Drabek 
(1986), Quarantelli (1990), Mileti and Sorensen (1990), Lindell and Perry (1992), 
Sorensen (2000), and Sorensen and Vogt-Sorensen (2007) synthesize volumes of 
literature and distills them to identify key variables and processes. This research catalogs 
the reactions to official warnings received from a variety of sources, but generally 
initiated by response organizations. In campus ASEs, warnings may come through 
official sources, such as from universities, law enforcement, or alternative unofficial 
32 
 
sources such as social networks. Parker and Handmer (1998) define unofficial warnings 
as “processes whereby people warn those within their personal networks…passing 
messages by official sources; by actively seeking information from their networks; 
through personal observation of environmental precursors” (p. 47). The research findings 
in this section focus on the response to official warnings; however, as shown it is a 
socially mediated process. This makes it extremely difficult to separate official and 
unofficial warning processes.  
The research shows the reaction to official warnings as a several step process. 
Generally, the pattern includes hearing or receiving the warning message, understanding 
the message, believing the message, personalizing the message, deciding and responding 
to the message, and socially confirming the message (Mileti & Sorensen, 1990). Figure 
2.3 captures the process as conceptualized by Quarantelli (1990). These elements include 
the key aspects described above, focusing on the social and environmental confirmation 
aspects. The social mediation of warnings through the milling process is consistent with 
the ENT theory of collective behavior.  
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Figure 2.3. General Warning Message Reaction Pattern (Adapted from Quarantelli, 1990 
and others). Flow chart shows the reaction pattern to warning messages.  
In addition to the general warning reaction pattern above, Lindell and Perry 
(2004, 2011) advance the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM). The model 
captures the method that people use to make decisions for implementation of protective 
behaviors. Lindell and Perry (2011) describe the PADM process as:  
Environmental cues, social cues, and socially transmitted warnings initiate 
a series of pre-decisional processes that, in turn, elicit core perceptions of 
the environmental threat, alternative protective actions, and relevant 
stakeholders. These perceptions provide the basis for protective action 
decision making, the outcome of which combines with situational 
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facilitators and impediments to produce a behavioral response. In general, 
the response can be characterized as information search, protective 
response (problem focused coping), or emotion focused coping. In many 
cases, there is a feedback loop as additional environmental or social cues 
are observed or warnings are received. The dominant tendency is for such 
information to prompt protective action decision making, but information 
seeking occurs when there is uncertainty at a given stage in the protective 
action decision-making process. Once the uncertainty is resolved, 
processing proceeds to the next stage in the process. (p. 617) 
The model consists of a pre-decisional stage where environmental cues, social cues, 
information sources, the information channel, warning messages, and receiver 
characteristics feed into a pre-decisional process. Exposure to the hazard, attention and 
comprehension of the information feed into individual threat perceptions, protective 
action perceptions, and stakeholder perceptions to make decisions on the implementation 
of protective actions. Situational factors that facilitate and impede affect the behavioral 
response (information search, protective response, emotion-focused coping). The PADM 
model applies to pre-event hazard adjustment and the behavioral response to emergency 
period warnings.  
Sorensen (2000) cataloged variables influencing warning behavior from dozens of 
empirical studies. Table 2.3 details these variables categorized by level of empirical 
support and directional influence. Quarantelli (1990) captures many of these variables in 
the model above (Figure 2.3). Mileti and Sutton (2009) assert that not all warning 
variables are equal. They identify message content, repetition, confirmatory 
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environmental cues, and the social aspect of milling to confirm the message with others 
as most important (Mileti & Sutton, 2009). Mileti and Sutton (2009) find demographic 
variables as less critical. 
Table 2.3  
 
Variables Related to Warning Response  
Variable Direction of Effect 
Physical Cues Increase 
Social Cues Increase 
Knowledge of Hazard Increase 
Experience with the Hazard Increase 
Education Increase 
Family United Increase 
Kin Relations (number) Increase 
Community Involvement Increase 
Ethnic Group Member Decreases 
Age Mixed 
Socio-Economic Status Increase 
Personal vs. Impersonal Warnings Increase 
Message Specificity Increase 
Frequency Increase 
Message Consistency Increase 
Message Certainty Increase 
Source Familiarity Increase 
Note: Adapted from several sources including: Sorensen, J. (2000). 
Hazard warning systems: Review of 20 years of progress. Natural 
Hazards Review, 1, 123.  
 
Warning research directly applies to ASEs as warning is a function of incident 
response. Initial response to ASEs may include directions to lockdown or shelter-in place. 
Authorities broadcast directions through media, local alerting systems, and Computer 
Mediated Communication (CMC) applications to smart phones and cellular phones. The 
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findings of this specific research on campus warnings for ASEs are instructive for 
response. The research provides an understanding of the process and key conditions that 
affect the receipt, social interpretation and decision to action for warning messages in 
ASE events. The most important variables in ASEs are likely physical and social cues, 
proximity to threat, personal versus impersonal warnings, message certainty, message 
specificity, and source credibility and familiarity.  
Due to advances in personal communication technology, the Virginia Tech 
shooting provides one of the first opportunities to study the use of CMC in ASEs. The 
use of smart phones, social networking sites, and microblogging over the last decade 
emerged as  significant issues for research in emergency management under the area of 
crisis informatics (Palen, Vieweg, Liu, & Hughes, 2009). Several studies examine the use 
of CMC during ASEs. Single case studies include the Virginia Tech shooting (Vieweg, 
Palen, Liu, Hughes, & Sutton, 2008; Palen et al., 2009) and the University of Texas –
Austin (UTA) shooting (Li, et al., 2011). Two studies use multiple cases design. The first 
examined shootings at Johns Hopkins University Hospital, Middle Tennessee State 
University, and UTA (Heverin & Zach, 2012). The second examined the shootings at 
Virginia Tech and Northern Illinois University (Palen & Vieweg, 2008). The results of 
these studies show an on-line convergence (Fritz & Mathewson, 1954) and development 
of collective intelligence in closing gaps for unknown information. For example, Vieweg 
et al. (2008) show the construction of an accurate victim list online prior to the official 
information release.  
While the studies generally focused on the development of information in the 
period following the direct crisis and into recovery, the application for emergency 
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response is clear. Heverin & Zach (2012) describe the application, “as a crisis unfolds, 
communications among individuals are a way of providing the information needed to 
bridge the cognitive gaps” (p. 37). CMC provides information for that purpose. 
Essentially, CMC aids the process of sense making (Palen & Vieweg, 2008; Heverin & 
Zach, 2012 ) According to Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld (2005) sense making “involves 
turning circumstances into a situation that is comprehended explicitly in words and that 
serves as a springboard into action” (p. 409). Weick (1993) applied sense making to 
decision processes in emergencies in his research on the Mann Gulch fire.  
CMC provides information for decision-making for those that have time to access 
on-line sources during crisis. Palen et al. (2009) outline the process in the Virginia Tech 
shooting explaining that “it was not until news of the second shootings became known 
that the information seeking activities became more pressing—for some, this was during 
the time of the shooting when they heard gunshots, but for those removed from the site of 
the crisis, this was not until about 10:16 EDT when an e-mail advisory to stay inside was 
sent” (p. 8). In addition, they describe the use of CMC for information gathering 
“students who were told to stay inside (and found phone lines taxed from high traffic), 
turned to text and instant messaging (IM)…IM provided both concurrent and passive 
ways of communicating” (Palen et al., 2009, p. 8). Additional research by Sattler, 
Larpenteur & Shipley (2011) examines the use of email and text messages for campus 
alerts. They find that text and email messages are effective for notification and provision 
of instructions to affected populations during ASEs (Sattler et al., 2011).  
Overall, research shows that survivors will seek information in both the response 
and recovery period of ASEs. The advent of personal connectivity through the 
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proliferation of smart phones provides an opportunity for instant communication with 
survivors. Targeted communications can provide information to survivors to assist in 
decision-making during ASEs.  
Characteristics and Chronology of Active Shooter Events (ASEs) 
Empirical research on ASEs began in earnest following the 1999 Columbine High 
School shooting. These studies focused on school shootings in the Kindergarten-High 
School (K-12) environment. Following the Virginia Tech shooting, this expanded to 
studies of higher education campus settings. ASEs at locations beyond educational 
institutions also captured public attention. As a result, research developed more generally 
to include the phenomenon regardless of specific event location. Although presented 
chronologically above, the following review does not develop in the same manner. The 
review centers on the general topic of event location and then focuses down to the target 
location of this study, the campus environment. The goal of this section of the review is 
to understand the general characteristics and chronology of ASEs as they relate to the 
campus environment. The review first examines findings about ASE events across 
location types. The review then focuses  on K-12 schools and finally the higher education 
campus environment. Although limited in scope, the review provides an understanding of 
the basic characteristics and chronology of these events.  
In the post-Columbine period, disconnected research appeared in a number of 
academic fields. These include: criminology, medicine, education, political science, 
psychology, sociology, and media studies. Researchers sought to understand the basic 
characteristics of school based ASEs and devise methods for early detection, evaluation 
and pre-incident intervention of potential perpetrators. Many of these findings are not 
39 
 
specifically relevant to the research questions outlined in this study. The results, however, 
do provide context for research on ASEs.  
ASE research also suffers from definitional issues. Such issues affect other fields, 
such as described in the study of disasters. Over the course of more than fourteen years of 
ASE research, definitions abound. Definitions for ASE type events include those couched 
under the term (1) targeted violence (e.g. Vossekuil, Fein, Reddy, Borum, & Modzeleski, 
2002), (2) rampage shootings (e.g. Newman et al., 2004), (3) active shooter (e.g. DHS, 
2013; NYPD, 2012), (4) workplace violence (e.g. Baron & Neuman, 1998), (5) hybrid 
targeted violence (Frazzano & Snyder, 2014) and (6) public mass shootings (Bjelopera, 
Bagalman, Caldwell, Finklea, & McCallion, 2013). Definitions are critical for the 
inclusion and exclusion of cases (Quarantelli, 2001). These definitional differences 
influence the direct applicability of findings. Academic division and disparate definitions 
fragment ASE research and impact the generalization of findings.  
ASE Research across Location Types 
 Limited research focuses on ASEs across full the spectrum of attack locations. 
Following high profile shootings at locations other than educational institutions, research 
focused across event locations. Shootings at the Trolley Square Mall in Salt Lake City, 
Utah (2007), Fort Hood, Texas Army base (2009), a public interaction event for 
Congresswoman Gabrielle Gifford in Tucson, Arizona (2011), the Century 21 Movie 
Theater in Aurora, Colorado (2012), Los Angeles International Airport (2013), 
Washington, DC Navy Yard (2013) and Columbia Mall, MD (2014) focused public 
attention and fueled additional research.  
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Major reports by the NYPD (2010 & 2012), a book, and several reports by Blair 
and co-authors are the major works detailing the phenomenon across location types (Blair 
& Schweit, 2014; Blair et al., 2014; Blair et al., 2013; Blair & Martaindale, 2010). The 
reports focus on varying time-periods and present analysis regarding locations, 
frequencies and event characteristics including casualties and police response. The 
NYPD (2012) report develops its analysis based upon 324 identified ASEs that occurred 
between 1966 and 2012. Of the 324 events, 230 had sufficient information for specific 
analysis. The analysis revealed information about the shooters, incident locations, and 
casualties. The report identifies that 98% of ASEs were a single attacker and 36% used 
more than one weapon. A broad range of sophistication went into the attacks. Some 
included detailed pre-planning and defenses and others were impulsive. It also reports 
that active shooters are most often members of the communities they target. Seventy-four 
percent (74%) of the shooters had some type of relationship: 38% professional, 22% 
academic, 6% familial, and 8% other. Twenty-six percent (26%) had no known 
relationship. The per-event descriptive statistics include a median casualty number of two 
(3.1 casualty average) and median number wounded of two (3.9 wounded average). The 
event locations include: schools (24%), open commercial areas (24%), office buildings 
(11%), factory/warehouse (12%), and other (29%). These frequencies show that schools 
do not make-up the majority of ASE locations. The resolution of the events showed that 
they were resolved by (1) applied force (43%), (2) suicide or attempt (40%), (3) no 
applied force (16%), and (4) attacker fled (<1%).  
Analysis by Blair et al. (2014) included 110 ASE events that occurred in the 
United States. between 2000 and 2012. The sample is essentially a sub-set of the entire 
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body of shootings from 1966 examined in the NYPD report. Similarly, they find that 94% 
of the attacks were by a single shooter using pistols (59%), rifles (26%), shotguns (8%), 
and an unknown weapon (7%). The attackers used multiple weapons (33%), improvised 
explosive devices (3%), and wore body armor (5%). In 55% of the incidents, the shooter 
had some relation to the attack location. Although coded differently than the NYPD 
report, Blair et al. (2014) find ASEs located in businesses (40%), schools (29%), 
outdoors (19%), and other locations (12%). They also reported a median number of 
people shot per event as five. The median response time for law enforcement was three 
minutes.  
In addition to the contextual issues, Blair et al. (2014) provided deeper analysis of 
event resolution. The results show that 49% of the events (n=51) ended before the arrival 
of law enforcement. Of those, 17 ended through actions by the survivors. The survivors 
either physically subdued the attacker (n=14) or shot the attacker (n=3). This analysis is 
important to the research questions of this study. It shows previous actions by survivors 
in response to ASEs include physically attacking the shooter with or without weapons. 
The location of ASE events showed a similar distribution with educational environments 
ranking second in frequency (n=39–24%).  
Blair and Schweit (2014) examine active shooter incidents in the U.S. occurring 
between 2000 and 2013. They analyze 160 events in the period that shows an increase in 
frequency (6.4 incidents/year during the first seven years, 16.4 incidents/year in the last 
seven years) resulting in 1,043 casualties (486 individuals killed and 557 wounded). They 
identify 107 incidents (66.9%) that ended before law enforcement arrived and engaged 
the perpetrator. In incidents where specific timing could be determined, (n=64), 69% (44) 
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ended in 5 minutes or less (23 ended in 2 minutes or less). For event resolution, they find 
that in 65 incidents (40.6%), citizen action or shooter suicide ended the event. In 21 
incidents (13.1%), unarmed citizens restrained the shooter. Specific to the higher 
education environment, Blair and Schweit (2014) find 12 incidents resulted in 60 killed 
and 60 wounded. The incidents resolved through one of four methods: (1) apprehension 
at the incident site (n=5, 3 by police officers, 1 by off-duty officers, 1 by off-duty mall 
security), (2) the shooter committing suicide at the scene (n=4, 3 before police arrival, 1 
after), (4) the shooter killed by police at the scene (n=2) and (n=1) fled and was 
apprehended by law enforcement at a different location. The key finding of this study 
supports the overall goal of this research. Blair and Schweit (2014) advise that, “the 
active aspect inherently implies that both law enforcement personnel and citizens have 
the potential to affect the outcome of the event based upon their responses” (p. 7).  
The ASE research shows that events in general have fewer casualties than the 
largely known and publicized events like the 32 deaths at Virginia Tech and the 26 deaths 
at Sandy Hook Elementary School. Although examples from educational settings 
dominate public attention and discourse, the research also shows that ASEs occur more 
frequently in other location types (businesses). As shown, the limited research does 
provide the basic characteristics and chronology of ASEs across location types. Overall, 
the body of research shows little development in analysis beyond basic descriptive event 
statistics.  
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ASE Research and the K-12 School Environment 
More focused research developed on ASEs in the K-12 school environment. The 
first in a series of post-Columbine academic inquiries into the phenomenon came from 
social scientists within the United States Secret Service (USSS) National Threat 
Assessment Center (NTAC). The NTAC extended its focus from targeted violence and 
assassination to study school-based shooting events. The study resulted in a two-part 
comprehensive report. The first part known as the Safe Schools Report focused on 
analysis of perpetrator and event characteristics (Vossekuil et al., 2002). The companion 
document focused on the “how to” of identification and threat assessment process for 
potential perpetrators (Fein et al., 2002). The study examined 37 incidents of targeted 
violence at schools (K-12) between 1974 and 2000. Table 2.4 details the ten findings of 
the report. 
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Table 2.4  
 
Findings: The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative. 
Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States  
Finding Description 
1 
Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely are sudden, impulsive 
acts. 
2 
Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker’s idea 
and/or plan to attack. 
3 
Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing 
the attack. 
4 
There is no accurate or useful profile of students who engaged in 
targeted school violence 
5 
Most attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the incident that 
caused others concern or indicated a need for help. 
6 
Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal 
failures. Moreover, many had considered or attempted suicide. 
7 
Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the 
attack. 
8 Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack. 
9 In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity. 
10 
Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most shooting incidents 
were stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention. 
Source: Vossekuil, B., Fein, R., Reddy, M., Borum, R., & Modzeleski, W. (2002). 
The final report and findings of the safe school initiative: Implications for the 
prevention of school attacks in the united states. Washington, DC: U.S. Secret 
Service & U.S. Department of Education. 
 
The findings target the questions of “why did this happen?” and “how do we 
prevent future incidents?” This is the focus of much of the K-12 ASE research. Of 
interest to the research questions of this study are findings related to the resolution of 
events. The report identifies that most “school-based attacks were stopped through 
intervention by school administrators, educators, and students—or by the attacker 
stopping on his own” (Vossekuil et al., 2002, p. 27). Although these events are not 
campus ASEs as defined in this study, the results are of interest. The findings provide 
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some information related to the actions of survivors in these events. The report advises 
that “in about one-third of the incidents, the attacker was apprehended by or surrendered 
to administrators, faculty, or school staff (27 percent, n=10) or to students (5 percent, 
n=2)…just over one-quarter of the incidents were stopped through law enforcement 
intervention (27 percent, n=10) (Vossekuil et al., 2002, pp. 27-28). The findings do not 
elaborate, but the apprehension of the attacker as an action of survivors is important to 
the present study. Evidence related to incident duration supports the method of incident 
resolution. The report details that almost half of the incidents lasted fifteen minutes or 
less and one-quarter lasted five minutes or less. The findings conclude that “the fact that 
it was not through law enforcement intervention that most of the targeted school violence 
incidents studied were stopped appears in large part to be a function of how brief most of 
these incidents were in duration” (Vossekuil et al., 2002, p. 28). This conclusion links the 
method of resolution to the length of time of the incident. The incident timeline then also 
potentially influences the behaviors of survivors. 
One other major study marks the post-Columbine focus on the K-12 environment. 
A National Academy of Science (NAS) (2003) study presents seven case studies of ASEs 
in schools (Moore, Petrie, Braga, & McLaughlin, 2003). Newman, Fox, Harding, Mehta, 
and Roth (2004) use two of the cases from the NAS study and develop them in greater 
depth and detail. This study offers similar design to the larger NAS study. The cross-case 
analysis used in both studies reveals similar findings to the report by Vossekuil et al. 
(2002). Newman et al. (2004) do advance a theory of rampage shootings that consists of 
“five necessary, but not sufficient conditions” (p. 229). Table 2.5 details the conditions.  
46 
 
Table 2.5  
 
Conditions for Rampage Shootings  
Condition Description 
1 
Shooter perceives himself as extremely marginal in the social worlds 
that matter to him.  
2 Shooter suffers from psychosocial problems that magnify marginality.  
3 
Cultural scripts provide a model for problem solving where the shooter 
believes unleashing the attack will solve the dilemma. 
4 Surveillance systems intended to identify troubled teens fail.  
5 Weapons are available to the shooter.  
Source: Newman, K., Fox, C., Harding, D., Mehta, J., & Roth, W. (2004). 
Rampage: The social roots of school shootings. New York: Basic Books. 
 
The findings from these reports show the focus on prevention. While the research 
findings in the K-12 environment did not result in a shooter “profile,” it focused its 
prevention efforts on open communication in the school community to facilitate sharing 
information. The prevention goal asserts that known information and warning signs feed 
into the threat assessment process for analysis and evaluation of potential perpetrators.  
ASE Research and the Higher Education Campus Environment 
Following the Virginia Tech shooting, some limited research expanded to focus 
on ASEs in the higher education environment. The following review focuses on two 
specific topics: event context and mitigation. The joint USSS, DOE, and FBI report 
(Drysdale et al., 2010) on campus attacks provides context (herein referred to as the 
Campus Attacks Report). The Campus Attacks Report anchors research on the 
phenomenon in higher education settings, providing a broad overview of event 
characteristics. The second topic in the review is unique among ASE research, as it 
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focuses on mitigation through facility upgrades. Other studies in the post Virginia Tech 
shooting period examine legal issues related to liability, mental health issues, and 
changes in preparedness and planning aspects for ASE events (Fox & Savage, 2009; 
Greenburg, 2007). The following review focuses on general chronology and 
characteristics most relevant to the context and research questions of this study.  
The Campus Attacks Report provides context to the understanding of campus 
active shooter events. The report serves as an initial bridge between the intensive study of 
the K-12 environment in the Safe Schools Report and the problem presented by active 
shooters in the higher education campus environment. They note important differences 
between the K-12 and campus environment for prevention. The differences include 
campus size, number of buildings, irregular student schedules, faculty separated by 
departments, and differences in social setting (Drysdale et al., 2010). Newman and Fox 
(2009) also note that due to age, college shooters are typically in more advanced stages of 
serious mental illness. 
The Campus Attacks Report provides an overview and analysis of event 
characteristics with a focus on prevention. Table 2.6 details the major observations of the 
report. It does present some problems for direct application to ASE due to definitional 
issues. The report examines events defined as targeted violence and directed assaults. 
ASEs are inclusive of those events; however, the broad inclusion limits the direct 
applicability of findings. This illustrates the definitional issue for ASE research identified 
earlier in this chapter.  
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Table 2.6  
 
Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education 
Observation Description 
1 
Incidents of targeted violence are a year-round issue. Campus safety 
resources may be required throughout the calendar year, not just during 
the academic year. 
2 
On-campus targeted violence is not the only challenge, as 20 percent of 
the incidents took place off-campus or in non-campus IHE locations 
against targeted IHE members. This suggests that communication 
between campus safety professionals and municipal law enforcement 
agencies is essential. 
3 
Of those incidents that occurred at on-campus or non-campus sites (n = 
217), 36 percent took place in administrative/academic/services 
buildings, 28 percent took place in residential buildings, and 27 percent 
took place in parking lots or campus grounds. On campus mitigation 
plans should equally cover responses to IHE buildings, IHE operated 
residences, and IHE parking lots and grounds. 
4 
Only 3 percent of on/non-campus attackers (n = 217) moved between 
buildings. Of those that were carried out within the same building (n = 
159), only 4 percent of the attackers moved to different locales (e.g., 
classrooms, offices, hallways). Though much attention has been given 
to the phenomenon of the “traveling” attacker, in context, it actually is 
a rare event. This finding may have tactical and strategic ramifications 
for first responders and emergency management professionals. 
5 
Firearms and knives/bladed weapons were used most frequently (75 
percent) during the incidents. The remaining 25 percent of the incidents 
involved strangulation, blunt objects, poison, vehicles, explosives, 
incendiary/arson methods, or physical assaults without a weapon. 
Understanding the varied weapons used in these incidents may prompt 
investigators to look beyond whether a subject possesses or has access 
to a more traditional weapon (firearm or knife) when evaluating his or 
her risk. 
Source: Drysdale, D., Modzeleski, W., & Simons, A. (2010). Campus attacks: 
Targeted violence affecting Institutions of higher education. U.S. Secret Service, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, U.S. 
Department of Education, and Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of 
Justice. Washington, DC  
 
The report identifies descriptive statistics of the campus locations of ASEs, with 
the majority split between academic/administrative buildings, residential buildings, and 
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campus grounds/parking. This is of importance for the context of campus ASEs. Also of 
consequence is the fact that few of the events moved between locations on campus. The 
analysis shows most remained in the same building, and few (3%) moved to different 
areas within the single building. Therefore, most targeted violence and directed assaults 
occurred in a single building and single location within that building on campus. The 
broad scope of the definition used for case inclusion affects direct applicability of 
findings to this study.  
The final topic related to the campus environment is mitigation for ASE events. A 
unique study by Ergenbright and Hubbard (2012) examines factors influencing the rate of 
kill of active shooters with a focus on the campus setting. They define the rate of kill as 
the “rate at which victims are killed by an active shooter during a given incident” 
(Ergenbright & Hubbard, 2012, p. xx). The study examines 14 U.S. campus ASE cases to 
identify facility upgrades that improve survivability. Ergenbright and Hubbard (2012) 
recommend a five-element Victim Initiated Mitigation (VIM) system. A VIM system is: 
A mechanism by which a victim or potential victim can initiate a 
combination of immediate mechanical lockdown responses accompanied 
with a standardized emergency response resulting in the containment and 
control of Target Areas and Threat Zones, as well as activation of a 
standardized Emergency Action Plan. (Ergenbright & Hubbard, 2012, p. 
xxi) 
The elements of the system include: (1) an emergency call box that is centrally located in 
all public areas of the university (e.g., classrooms, lecture halls, hallways, meeting rooms, 
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outdoor areas, and offices), (2) electromagnetic door releases, (3) a staffed Incident 
Command Center, (4) A handheld device that is capable of being directly networked to 
any emergency call box located within the ICC, (5) RFID (Radio Frequency 
Identification) key fobs and proximity card readers (both are methods for rapid building 
entry without the requirement of keys) to allow responder access (Ergenbright & 
Hubbard, 2012). The recommendations do not clearly describe how this system would 
function within existing requirements for fire egress. Regardless of the practical ability 
for implementation, the study shows the first departure in focus from prevention and 
response to mitigation. The research is of interest as it offers the opportunity to link 
mitigation measures to the impact of ecological factors on behavioral response (Cornwell, 
200; Cornwell et al., 2003).  
Research Questions and Propositions from the Literature  
The literature review develops an understanding of human behavior in response to 
a number of other specific event types. The review shows the limited specific research on 
ASEs in general and an absence of findings beyond the warning function. Using other 
event types as a proxy, the literature review develops the following propositions from the 
literature related to the research questions. The research questions and propositions from 
the literature for this study include: 
1. What are the processes involved in collectively defining the socio-behavioral 
response to ASEs? 
Propositions from the literature: 
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P.1.1. The response is social rather than asocial with an absence or isolated 
incidence of panic behavior.  
P.1.2. The response includes helping behavior among survivors. 
2.  How do social interactions and social organization emerge among survivors 
in a campus ASE? 
Propositions from the literature: 
P.2.1. The survivor response includes information seeking behavior to 
interpret environmental cues and warning information through 
interactions with others present and those in other social networks. 
P.2.2. The survivors socially organize to deal with a new problem and decide 
on protective behavior implementation. 
P.2.3. The survivors show maintenance and extension of social roles.  
3. What type of protective behaviors do survivors of campus ASE exhibit? 
Proposition from the literature:  
P.3.1. The survivors exhibit a range of behaviors appropriate to the situation, 
which include evacuation, shelter, and information seeking behavior.  
4. How do decisions for protective behavior arise among survivors in ASE? 
Propositions from the literature: 
P.4.1. The survivors show interaction for social confirmation of environmental 
cues. 
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P.4.2. The social interaction between survivors leads to decisions and division 
of labor for implementation of protective behaviors.  
Summary 
This chapter examines the theory that informs specific research on behavioral 
response to disaster events. The emergent norms approach forms the theoretical basis for 
the behavior-based studies of disaster. The review also examined limited existing 
research on ASEs for the purposes of establishing basic chronology and characteristics of 
ASEs. As shown, the fragmented research extends little beyond simple descriptive event 
statistics. ASE research extends to many issues unrelated to the research questions of this 
study, specifically to issues of prevention. Due to an absence of research on the specific 
research questions of this study, the review uses the findings from other disaster events as 
a proxy to understand the conditions of ASEs. The review examines several studies of the 
landmark fire at the BHSC. Those studies, which employ different methodological 
approaches, provide a basis for understanding the human collective reaction to disasters. 
In addition, the review examines findings in nine other studies of disaster events for 
themes in human behavior. The themes include, helping behavior, pre-existing social 
relationships, role maintenance/ extension, risk perception, and prior knowledge of the 
disaster site. Finally, the review examines research on warnings as an element of the 
response to ASEs. The review shows the warning process as socially mediated with 
important variables identified as message content: repetition, confirmatory environmental 
cues, and the social aspect of milling to confirm the message with others as most 
important. The review of the literature develops basic propositions from the literature for 
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the identified research questions. This review forms a basis of knowledge concerning 
both ASEs and the human reaction to disaster events and warnings of impending events.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
 As previously described, the reaction of survivors to campus ASEs has not been 
the subject of empirical research. The literature review in Chapter II presents studies 
related to the research questions using mostly other event types as a proxy for campus 
ASEs. The review shows that these are generally studies of single events. Broader 
understanding derives from the analysis of multiple studies of different event types with 
varying research designs, but overlapping findings. In general, the various research 
designs and diverse construction of dependent variables in deductive studies present a 
fragmented understanding of the immediate emergency period.  
Disaster studies that target social organization, which were reviewed in the 
previous chapter, proceed from three basic research designs. The first is a deductive 
approach that tests hypotheses based on the identified theoretical approaches to social 
organization and collective behavior (e.g., Emergent Norm Theory, etc.) within the 
context of a single event. The second is an inductive approach that generates theory out 
of the data within the context of a single event. Among the reviewed studies, Johnson 
(1987, 1988) and Aguirre et al. (1995) use an inductive approach to the research. 
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The third is a mixed methods approach that uses qualitative methods to check 
quantitative findings (Cornwell et al., 2001). 
 This chapter describes the research design and methodology for this study. It first 
reviews the research issues specific to the study of ASEs. Second, it details the basic 
research design and approach. Third, it presents an overview of the case study approach 
and the selection of cases for examination. Fourth, it provides a survey of data sources 
and procedures for data analysis and cross-case analysis. Finally, it addresses ethical 
issues, credibility, and trustworthiness of the findings.  
Active Shooter Events: Challenges for Research 
No perfect design exists for research. Design issues compound when conducted 
outside of controlled laboratory settings. Studying events that generate intense national 
interest and present civil and criminal legal ramifications creates additional challenges. 
Just as in any research project conducted outside of the lab setting, both event specific 
constraints and limited research resources influence study design. Both issues affect this 
study.  
Several event specific constraints affect the study of ASEs. Disaster research 
recognizes that much of the key study data is perishable (Bourque et al., 1997; Phillips, 
2002; Quarantelli, 2002; Michaels, 2003; Stallings, 2007; Phillips, 2014). The situational 
constraints posed by ASEs affect the ability to conduct quick-response research in the 
field. A concurrent criminal investigation and research inquiry are not likely due to the 
nature of the event. Early research action could interfere with the criminal investigation 
unless researchers embed with law enforcement agencies. Due to the nature of criminal 
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investigations, this is an unlikely scenario in any crime-based event. Access at this stage 
of an event is essentially impossible. If researchers later seek assistance from law 
enforcement agencies to gain access to personnel for interviews and collection of archival 
data, the start of an academic inquiry before the conclusion of the criminal investigation 
would be unlikely to secure cooperation. Also, examining events where the criminal 
investigation has not concluded increases the potential that researchers may become part 
of criminal or civil litigation related to the event. These situational constraints preclude 
early entry into the field for intrusive data collection.  
In active shooter events, the situational constraints can carry on for many years 
after the incident. As reviewed in Chapter II, Newman et al. (2004) conducted one of the 
few comprehensive studies of school active shooter events in Jonesboro, Arkansas and 
Paducah, Kentucky. The U.S. Congress commissioned and financially supported the 
study. Despite having both the financial support and the prestige of a congressionally 
mandated study, the authors faced several issues with respect to design and 
implementation due to situational constraints. Newman et al. (2004) describe several 
issues with data and data collection. First, they show the difficulty in obtaining interview 
participation even three years removed from the incident. They write that “civil litigation 
naming many of the people we interviewed was still pending on appeal at the time of our 
fieldwork, which discouraged the participation of a number of key figures who may 
someday be able to contribute their perspectives” (Newman et al., 2004, p. 321). Second, 
Newman et al. (2004) outline potential problems with collected interview data. The 
authors describe complications with informant recall due to four issues: (1) inconsistent 
or inadequate memory, (2) the traumatic nature of the event, (3) substitution of media or 
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information heard around town for what they actually knew, and/or (4) the content of 
what they shared is affected by a vested interest in a particular characterization of the 
event (Newman et al., 2004). The study by Newman et al. (2004) demonstrates the 
impact of situational constraints on ASE research. These support Killian’s (2002) 
assertions about interview data for disaster research in general. Killian (2002) explains 
that “interview responses of disaster victims may be especially subject to faulty and 
retrospective distortion and reconstruction” (p. 53). These distortions can come from the 
influence of the media, community action and discussion, and litigation. In this specific 
example, despite both the prestige of a Congressional mandated study and adequate fiscal 
and personnel resources, the situational constraints of ASEs limits access to informants 
and raise questions about the reliability of retrospective interview data.  
The research design described in the following section develops with an 
understanding of these limitations. The design uses approaches by Johnson (1988), 
Johnson and Johnston (1989), Johnson et al. (1994), Feinburg and Johnson (2001), 
Cornwell (2003) and Aguirre et al. (2011), originally established in studies of similar 
event types and using similar data. These established methods, coupled with non-reactive 
measures (Webb et al, 1966, 1981) work to minimize identified methodological 
challenges.  
Research Design 
The situational constraints of ASEs and limited available research resources affect 
the research design. As this is study is only nominally funded, resources for significant 
engagement with field interviews is impossible. In addition, the length of time since the 
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events presents many potential issues with interview data as described above. Within 
these constraints, this study design seeks to answer the following research questions:  
1. What are the processes involved in collectively defining the socio-behavioral 
response to ASEs? 
2.  How do social interactions and social organization emerge among survivors 
in a campus ASE? 
3. What type of protective behaviors do survivors of campus ASE exhibit?  
4. How do decisions for protective behavior arise among survivors in ASE? 
As these questions have not been the subject of previous research, the study 
employs a qualitative inductive design using grounded theory methodology (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Strauss and Corbin (1998) describe the 
qualitative method as a “nonmathematical process of interpretation, carried out for the 
purpose of discovering concepts and relationships in raw data and then organizing these 
into a theoretical explanatory scheme” (p. 11). This description shows the method is 
particularly useful to study areas where “little is known” or to obtain “intricate details 
about a phenomenon” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 11). Both elements apply to these 
research questions. As Chapter II demonstrates, the reaction of survivors in other event 
types has been the subject of previous empirical study. The transferability of these 
findings to campus ASEs is an underlying assumption of this study. This occurs within 
the framework examined in Chapter II through the discussion of Quarantelli’s (1993) 
comments on crises of conflict and consensus.  
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 Strauss and Corbin (1994) define grounded theory as “a general methodology for 
developing theory that is grounded in data systematically gathered and analyzed. . . . 
Theory evolves during actual research, and it does this through continuous interplay 
between analysis and data collection” (p. 273). Grounded theory has a long tradition 
within disaster research. Quarantelli (2002) advises that what early studies of disaster 
developed through trial and error at the Disaster Research Center (DRC) is similar to 
what became the grounded theory methodology.  
 Within the qualitative inductive paradigm, this design employs a multiple case 
study strategy (Yin, 2009). Yin (2009) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident” (p. 18). This study examines the reactions of survivors within the context of the 
campus ASE. ASEs provide an appropriate contextual setting for the use of the case 
study strategy. The design combines the qualitative inductive approach, case study 
strategy (Yin, 2009), and grounded theory methods (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998). Eisenhardt (1989) argues that the strategy applies best to the early stages 
of research on new topics or for fresh perspectives on existing topics. This study 
potentially provides both. The survivor reaction to ASEs is an unexplored area, but 
occurs within the context of existing theory and research findings in other event types.  
Several of the studies outlined in Chapter II examine a single event type “case 
study” and employ a deductive approach based upon existing theory. This research 
design adds to the literature through the examination of multiple cases simultaneously 
and inductively in order to derive theory on human behavior in response to campus 
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ASEs. Multiple case studies, with each serving as a “distinct experiment”, provide a 
strong foundation for the development of theory (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 25). 
Hancock and Algozzine (2006) and Stake (1994) refer to this design as a collective case 
study. Miles and Huberman (1994) refer to this as cross-case analysis. The landmark 
study by the National Research Council (2003), Deadly Lessons: Understanding Lethal 
School Violence uses a multiple case study design to examine school shootings. Sullivan 
and Fullilove (2003) argue that school shootings provide a “textbook example of a 
research situation in which case studies are not merely a default position but the proper 
tool for the job at hand” (p. 353). This shows strong support for the use of the multiple 
case study approach for the empirical examination of ASEs.  
The presentation of cases in Chapter IV develops using the Disaster Research 
Center (DRC) C-Model as a framework (Quarantelli, 1987; 2002; Phillips, 2014). The C-
model developed from disaster fieldwork and efforts to build complete case studies of 
events. This study uses the C-model for the same outcome. Table 2.1 in Chapter II of this 
study outlines the specific elements of the C-model. The four elements--conditions, 
characteristics, consequences and chronology—form the basis of each case. The 
development of cases in Chapter IV begins with the chronology of the event (Phillips, 
2014). It then proceeds through the remaining elements of the model. 
Existing theories of collective behavior and human behavior in disaster inform, 
but do not drive research and analysis in this study. Strauss and Corbin (1994) explain “if 
existing theories seem appropriate to the area of investigation, then these may be 
elaborated and modified as incoming data are meticulously played against them” (p. 273). 
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The deductive tests of ENT in studies described in Chapter II are relevant and provide 
context. However, ENT does not drive design or analysis.  
Case Study Strategy and Selection of Cases 
The selection of campus ASEs occurs within a historical and policy context. 
Although mass shootings occurred before the Columbine High School shooting in 1999, 
it stands as a watershed event. Due to the historical and policy implications of the ASE at 
Columbine, it serves as a time boundary for case selection. As a result, the selection of 
cases is time limited to the period after the Columbine High School shooting (April 20, 
1999). The policy changes enacted in response to the ASE at Virginia Tech provide the 
second time boundary for this study. The legal changes imposed by the modification to 
the Clery Act by Congress in 2008 vastly changed the policy and preparedness landscape 
for college campuses. The modification of the law mandated new preparedness activities 
including publishing plans and the conduct of exercises on all U.S. campuses. This 
sweeping change presents a tremendous shift in requirements for U.S. colleges and 
universities. In order to examine events within the same policy context, the selection 
events is from the period between the Columbine High School ASE and the 
implementation of the Clery Act modifications in 2009 following the Virginia Tech ASE.  
Within those time boundaries, eight cases for study remain for potential selection. 
Table 3.1 details the date, location, numbers of deaths and injuries, and specific campus 
location of the shooting. This case list originates from the NYPD (2012) report that 
examines 324 active shooter events since 1966.  
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Table 3.1  
 
U.S. College Campus Shootings 1999-2009 
Date Campus 
Dea
d Injured Location 
February 14, 
2008 
Northern Illinois University: DeKalb, 
IL 5 21 Classroom 
February 8, 
2008 
Louisiana Technical College: Baton 
Rouge, LA  2 0 Classroom 
September 21, 
2007 Delaware State University: Dover, DE 1 1 
Outside 
Dining 
Hall 
April 16, 2007 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute: 
Blacksburg, VA 32 20 
Dorm/ 
Classroom
s 
May 9, 2003 
Case Western Reserve Univ: 
Cleveland, OH 1 2 
Classroom 
Building 
October 29, 
2002 University of Arizona: Tucson, AZ 3 0 
Office/ 
Classroom 
January 16, 
2002 
Appalachian State School of Law: 
Grundy, VA 3 3 
Offices / 
Outside 
May 18, 2001 
Pacific Lutheran University: Tacoma 
WA 1 0 Dorm 
List derived from: New York City Police Department. (2012). Active Shooter: 
Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation. New York: NYPD 
Counterterrorism Bureau. 
 
The selection of cases is crucial for successful case study research. Stake (1994) 
describes this approach as an instrumental case study. In an instrumental case study “a 
particular case is examined to provide insight into an issue or refinement of theory . . . . 
The case is often of secondary interest; it plays a supportive role, facilitating our 
understanding of something else” (p. 237). Stake (1994) further describes that 
instrumental case studies come together into the collective case study. According to 
Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2011) cases are “chosen for the ability to address research 
questions and purposes” (p. 264). Given unlimited time and resources, studying all eight 
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events would provide a full range of possibilities. Within the resource limitations of this 
study, it is impossible to examine all eight events.  
The ability to address the research questions guides the selection of cases for 
study. Each of the incidents has specific and unique characteristics. The nature of ASEs 
does not provide for the “typical” case. Introducing and explaining each of the potential 
cases for selection would result in dozens of pages of content. The key characteristics of a 
case that provides data for analysis are the length of the event in time and the number of 
affected students and staff. These event characteristics are more likely to result in 
interaction and organized behavior among survivors. In addition to event chronology, the 
richness of available data is a key element of case selection. Public information access 
laws limit the availability of critical data from agency response and investigation of ASEs 
in some states. Access to and the richness of available raw data influences the selection of 
cases for study.  
The time factor and number of affected students increase the likelihood that the 
chronology of the event will provide data to address research questions related to social 
interaction and social organization. Affected students in this sense, does not directly 
equate to injuries and deaths. For example, the North Illinois University shooting is not a 
selected case. Despite a large number of injuries and deaths relative to the other cases, the 
incident was contained to a single classroom and law enforcement officers arrived within 
a minute of the initial radio call. In addition, the Delaware State University incident 
occurred outside of a building at 1:00 am. This event involved a small number of people 
and occurred when many others were asleep. As a result, this incident is not likely to 
contain data to address research the questions. The Pacific Lutheran University shooting 
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is also not likely to produce substantive data as the perpetrator randomly killed a 
professor on a walkway outside a dormitory and immediately turned the weapon on 
himself (KOMO News, 2001). This incident involved a minimal number of victims and 
ended quickly. It is unlikely to provide useful data.  
The two ASEs from the State of Virginia, while consisting of chronology likely to 
address research questions, suffer from severe limitations on access to data. The state of 
Virginia limits access to criminal investigation files. Under Virginia public information 
laws, access to files is at the discretion of the investigating agency. The Virginia State 
Police (VSP) is the investigating agency for both the Virginia Tech shooting and the 
Appalachian School of Law shooting. VSP consistently denies access to information 
related to ASE events, even for scientific study. Due to a lack of sufficient data theses 
case are not included for analysis.  
The remaining ASEs at the Louisiana Technical College and Case Western 
Reserve University serve as cases for this study. In both cases, the states in which the 
events occurred have favorable public information laws for access to data. The researcher 
received responses to public information inquiries from only the Baton Rouge (LA) 
Police Department and the Cleveland (OH) Police department. As such, the two cases 
form the basis of the collective case study. The cases provide an avenue to examine the 
behavior of survivors in response to the ASE. Complete descriptions of the cases follow 
in Chapter IV.  
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Data Sources 
Non-reactive measures are research data obtained by means other than direct 
interview or questionnaire by the researcher (Webb et al., 1966; Webb et al., 1981). 
Unobtrusive measures for social inquiry assume “that we can learn about our society by 
investigating the material items produced within it” (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011, p. 227). 
This approach is consistent with naturalistic theory because it eliminates the reactivity of 
researchers (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011). Although reduced reactivity is a benefit, this 
does not mean these material items are both accurate and without bias (Plummer, 2001; 
Yin, 2009). 
This study primarily uses law enforcement investigative materials that include 
descriptions of actions by responding police officers, audio-recorded interviews with 
witnesses, written witness statements, 9-1-1 call recordings, recordings of police radio 
transmissions, and any available surveillance video. Those studies introduced in Chapter 
II by Johnson (1987), Johnson (1988), Johnston and Johnson (1989), Johnson et al. 
(1994), Cornwell et al. (2001), Cornwell (2003), and Aguirre et al. (2011), use similar 
data from law enforcement agencies as primary data. As this study employs a multiple 
case study approach, the available materials will vary by location based upon many 
factors. These factors include: (1) differences in state public information laws, (2) 
variation in law enforcement investigative procedure (3) records retention schedules, and 
(4) number of survivors and responders involved in the event. In general, law 
enforcement agencies conduct investigations in similar fashions guided by judicial rules 
of evidence. Slight variation in procedure may exist.  
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Due to these factors, each of the cases develops on slightly different data sources. 
The primary data from law enforcement agencies results from requests for available 
information under the Freedom of Information Act. In one case, this took months of 
exhaustive efforts to retrieve information. After receipt and analysis of initial 
information, the researcher made additional requests for items. Table 3.2 provides a 
summary of data used in each case. It details the general category of data sources and 
number of sources. An example of difference is in law enforcement investigative practice 
is the manner in which detectives collected witness statements. The Baton Rouge Police 
Department (BRPD) chose to audio record interviews with witnesses (24 total witnesses) 
and the Cleveland Police Department (CPD) conducted interviews where detectives filed 
reports on the content of their interviews and collected written statements from witnesses 
(93 witnesses). Generally, the data is consistent between the two sites other than the 
availability of police radio recordings from BRPD and the lack of recordings from CPD. 
As the case studies will show, the scope of the events is different. This results in 
disparities between the number of involved witnesses and the number of pages of police 
reports.  
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Table 3.2  
 
Case Study Data Sources 
Data Source 
Case Western Reserve 
University 
Louisiana Technical 
College 
Police Reports 356 pages 183 pages 
911 Call Recordings 
55 minutes 33 seconds of 911 
call recordings  
12 minutes 21 seconds of 
911 call recordings 
Witness Statements 
103 Witness (both reports by 
detectives and written 
statements)  
4 hours 03 minutes 19 
seconds of recorded 
witness interviews 
Site Observations & 
Photographs 
On-site walkthrough, 
observations and 24 photos 
Onsite walkthrough, 
observations and 36 
photos 
Police Radio Recordings Unavailable 
10:12 of radio 
transmissions  
Media Reports 25 media reports 30 media reports 
 
Johnson (1988) provides a succinct statement on the limitations of these materials 
from his landmark study of the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire. He notes, “investigating 
detectives were not testing social theories that inform this research; they asked many 
questions not related to sociological interest, and when they asked questions directly 
related, they often did not ask them of all respondents” (Johnson, 1988, p. 11). This study 
benefits from advances in technology that make additional data available to the 
researcher. Johnson (1987) did not have the availability of 9-1-1 call recordings, recorded 
witness statements provided within hours of the incident, and radio transmissions to 
support the development of his landmark work. This research advances the work of 
Johnson and others with additional data sources available for analysis.  
A second source of data is local and national media reports. Killian (2002) warns, 
“newspaper accounts of disaster are one of the most accessible, but they must be used 
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with caution…because of the many uncontrolled biases . . . [and] tendencies to over 
emphasize the dramatic” (p. 81). In addition to routine bias, these are subject to an 
additional layer, as many of these incidents become the centerpiece for national calls for 
reform in gun control and mental health policy. Reports are subject to influence from 
both sides of the debate. Media reports will be subject to rigorous crosschecking 
described below. The two cases also differ in media interest and depth of materials. In the 
Louisiana Technical College case, the suspect did not survive. As a result, media 
coverage was limited to the few days surrounding the incident. In Case Western Reserve 
University shooting incident, the suspect survived. This resulted in months of media 
coverage and investigative reporting as there was tremendous national interest in the 
event, the judicial proceedings, and the bizarre courtroom behavior of the defendant.  
The third source is internet and other documentary sources. In some cases, 
survivors of these events provide information related to their experiences in public 
venues other than the media. These sources include interviews that may appear in books 
and/or personal or other websites dedicated to the events. Some survivors decide to self-
publish and share their accounts in blogs, recorded public appearances, or on video 
hosting sites such as YouTube. Evidence provided by survivors located in publically 
available locations on the internet will also be subject to rigorous cross checking 
described below.  
The researcher used several overlapping methods to identify media and internet 
sources. Lexis Nexis Academic was the primary tool used for the identification of print 
and broadcast media information. Search terms for each case included: “Case Western 
shooting,” “CWRU Shooting,” “Louisiana Technical College shooting,” “LTC shooting,” 
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and more generally “campus shooting” for the period of six months following the event. 
The researcher also searched Lexus Nexis Academic for regional areas including Ohio 
and Louisiana. Traditional internet search engines also provided sources. Media sources 
do not include blog posts or other items not from print, radio, or television media outlets, 
unless they were self-published accounts from survivors. The researcher also identified 
local and regional media outlets in each area and searched available digital archives for 
sources. The researcher also inquired by email with media outlets whose available 
archives did extend back to the time of the shootings. Sources that presented reprinted or 
duplicate information from wire services (such as AP and Reuters) were not included for 
analysis. This vastly reduced the number of sources to those that provide substantive 
information pertinent to analysis. In the Louisiana Technical College example, relatively 
few sources provided additional substantive information. The few sources listed are not 
due to a lack of research, but the exclusion of many duplicate news items that do not 
substantively add additional information to the development of the case study or research 
questions.  
The fourth source is site observations. The researcher conducted a site visit, with 
site approval for access, at each location. The site visit allowed for the review of the 
chronology of the event and the observation of key incident locations. When possible, the 
researcher photographed key incident locations. The site visits occurred following the 
receipt and review of data from law enforcement agencies. The visits allowed to the 
researcher to observe in order to gain better understanding and validation of the data. 
Visiting the locations where survivors made decisions for action during the event is 
instructive. This allows for first-hand examination of the physical structures of the 
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facilities for an overall understating of the ecological constraints faced by both survivors 
and responders.  
The final source of information is other available digital information and 
documents related to the site and involved organizations. The researcher used these 
sources to understand characteristics of the organizations and the context for the event. 
They are not included as elements in Table 3.2 as an identified data source, as they 
provide only background and context. These do not provide substantive data to address 
the research questions.  
Essentially, these sources are documentary data sources. In addition to the 
specific limitations described above, documentary sources have a few general limitations. 
A document is “any symbolic representation that can be recorded and retrieved for 
description and analysis” (Altheide, Coyle, DeVriese & Schneider, 2008, p. 127). 
Documents are “accretion measures” where “the research evidence is some deposit of 
materials” (Webb et al., 1966, p. 36). Police reports are “archival records,” a running 
account of “data periodically produced for other than scholarly purposes, but which can 
be exploited by social scientists” (Webb et al., 1966, p. 53).  
 Several issues arise in using documents as research data. Webb et al. (1966) 
identify that documents and other unobtrusive measures are “attractive if one wants to 
compensate for the reactivity which riddles the interview and the questionnaire” (p. 53). 
The benefit of non-reactivity does not always outweigh the other issues that come with 
the use of document-based data. These issues include scientific value, potential bias, 
accuracy, and problems in the interpretation of context. In the case of this research, the 
71 
 
documents both eliminate reactivity and decrease other potential errors, including 
reconstruction errors, memory decay, and enhancement.  
 Blumer (1979) describes the “problem of documentary materials that do not meet 
the rigid application of scientific canons” (p. 36). He outlines four test considerations for 
documentary data. These include (1) representativeness of the data, (2) adequacy of the 
data, (3) reliability of the data, and (4) validity of the interpretation of data (Blumer, 
1979). Representativeness refers to the method of document selection in relation to the 
full spectrum of available documents to inform the research question. Adequacy refers 
the background of the documents. This includes chronology, position of the author, and 
other factors in relation to the ability to inform the research question. Reliability is the 
“honesty or truthfulness of the account” (Blumer, 1979, p. 36). Finally, the validity of the 
interpretation of the data refers to the conclusions reached by the researcher based upon 
the data. This element is subjective; Blumer (1979) identifies an absence of “rules which 
would permit determination as to whether the interpretation is correct or erroneous or the 
extent to which it is so” (p. 36-37). The primary data source is police reports. As these 
documents must withstand legal scrutiny in the prosecution of crimes, they are 
representative, adequate, and reliable.  
 The second issue in using documents as a data source is the potential for bias. The 
issue of reliability is closely associated. Plummer (2001) warns that “official records are 
often unreliable” and cautions about the “politics of perspective” consistent with critical 
and feminist approaches to research in that these records may not reflect 
underrepresented group perspectives (p. 158). This also links to theory concerning the 
search for an objective reality or the view that reality is subjective and thus defined by the 
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author of the document (Plummer, 2001). Hodder (1994) also describes another avenue 
of potential bias, arguing, “the writing down of words often allows language and 
meanings to be controlled more effectively, and to be linked to strategies of centralization 
and codification” (p. 394). The use of all available documentary data from multiple 
sources controls for bias. Sources are not subject to exclusion unless issues arise in the 
crosschecking process.  
Accuracy is the third issue for documents as a data source. In addition to the 
criteria and actions discussed in the scientific issues above, Scanlon (2002) adds several 
questions designed to test the validity of personal stories. Scanlon (2002) asks researchers 
to add the following questions: “(1) Does the material have internal consistency? (2) Is 
there any corroboration? (3) Is the account something that reasonably could have been 
known to the person who created the record? and (4) when reading a written account, 
“How would the person have known that?” (p. 297). Yin (2009) cautions against viewing 
official documents as the “unmitigated truth.”(105). He states that it is “important in 
reviewing any document to understand it was written for some specific purpose and some 
specific audience other than those of the case study to be done” (Yin, 2009, p. 105). 
Obtaining data from multiple sources and crosschecking allows for the establishment of 
accuracy.  
 The interpretation of context is the final issue for documents as a data source. The 
researcher who uses documents is often disconnected in time and space from the author 
who wrote them. As a result, Hodder (1994) describes the solution, stating, “material 
traces thus often have to be interpreted without the benefit of indigenous commentary” 
(p. 393). The problem of interpretation for researchers then becomes explaining the 
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contextual elements that led to the creation and the meaning behind the document. This 
results in the potential for multiple interpretations. Hodder (1994) writes, “as text is 
reread in different contexts it is given new meanings, often contradictory and always 
socially embedded” (p. 394). As described by Blumer (1979), no objective standards 
exist for evaluating interpretation. The events in this case are recent and occur in the 
current social, political, and historical context. As such, the interpretation of context is 
not problematic for this data.  
 In light of these general and specific limitations, the data is subject to crosschecks 
with other identified sources prior to analysis. Law enforcement data serves as the 
primary source for comparison. Aguirre et al. (2011) outline a similar process. Aguirre et 
al. (2011) explain that, “multiple organizations collected the information for their own 
different purposes…allowed us to contrast, verify, and correct when necessary the 
information we ended up using, adding to its validity” (p. 103). Media and internet 
sources are subject to the validation test outlined by Scanlon (2002) and crosschecked 
against law enforcement investigative sources. The analysis excludes sources that cannot 
pass validation. Phillips (2002) advises that documents “can be used creatively as the sole 
data sources or as part of a triangulated strategy” (p. 206). In this study, documentary 
data from multiple sources (establishing data triangulation) is subject to crosschecks for 
accuracy before analysis. These procedures ensure that data is representative, adequate, 
and reliable, without bias and understood within its context prior to analysis.  
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Data Analysis Procedures 
Grounded theory differs from other methodologies in its emphasis on coupling 
data collection, analysis, and additional sampling for theory development. Theory results 
from an analytical process that may or may not proceed sequentially. Data analysis in 
grounded theory generally moves between the data, analysis (coding, memoing, and 
diagraming), use of additional literature sources, and finally interpretation and the 
production of theory. The following paragraphs examine this process and its use in this 
study.  
The previous section discusses the sources of data for this study. A preliminary 
step in analysis is the preparation of data for analysis (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011). Data 
preparation with mostly documentary sources and electronic analysis tools includes 
digitizing data in paper form. It also includes transcription of some recordings of 9-1-1, 
radio transmissions and other audio and video sources. This study uses QSR international 
NVIVO (version 10) analytical software, which allows for the transcription and/or direct 
coding of audio and video sources (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). Discussion of the specific 
use of NVIVO 10 software for analysis follows.  
Following data preparation is analysis. Generally, it consists of the steps of data 
exploration and data reduction (Hesse-Biber& Leavy, 2011). Data exploration generally 
consists of reading and/or listening to or viewing the data and beginning the thought 
process by highlighting important elements as an initial review (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 
2011). In this step, coding data begins. Corbin and Strauss (2008) describe coding as: 
more than just paraphrasing…more than noting concepts in the 
margins…it involves interacting with the data (analysis) using techniques 
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such as asking questions about the data, making comparisons between 
data…in doing so, deriving concepts to stand for those data, then 
developing those concepts in terms of their properties and dimensions (p. 
66).  
In grounded theory, coding can be open, axial, or selective. Corbin and Strauss’ (2008) 
description illustrates the three coding types. The process begins with open coding. Open 
coding is “breaking data apart and delineating concepts to stand for blocks of data” and 
“qualifying those concepts in terms of their properties and dimensions” (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008, p. 195). Axial coding is “the act of relating concepts to each other” 
forming categories (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 198). Selective coding is “the process of 
integrating and refining categories” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 143). The integration of 
categories into a larger theoretical scheme results in the research findings generating 
theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). In this study, analysis begins with the use of a semi-
structured coding scheme as a basic framework. Bogdan and Biklen (1998) provide a 
framework of ten basic codes as a starting point for analysis. The researcher uses this 
framework as a starting point, but its implementation is flexible to capture emergent 
elements in the same manner as open coding. Figure 3.1 shows coding example from the 
research data for this study. Analysis continues with axial coding, linking the identified 
concepts in open coding to one another to form categories. Finally, selective coding leads 
to the integration of categories and the production of theory.  
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Figure 3.1. Data coding example. Shows coding example from Baton Rouge and 
Cleveland Police Department data sources.  
The analytical process uses memos and diagrams as tools to take the thought 
process to a higher-level as codes emerge into categories. Memos are “theoretical notes 
about the data and the conceptual connections between categories” (Holton, 2007, p. 
281). Memos capture elements for further analysis and then continue higher-level 
analysis to develop theory. Generally, grounded theory uses three types of memos. 
Memos can be descriptive (summarizing data), analytical (analysis of data), or theoretical 
(writing theory) (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011). A second analytical tool is the diagram. 
Lempert (2007) argues that “diagrams and memos are conjoined; both are necessary and 
simultaneous to the research process” (p. 254). Memo writing and diagram development 
occur throughout the analytical process and forms the link between analysis and the final 
stage of interpretation (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011). This study uses both memos and 
diagrams to further analysis. Memos further conceptual analysis and diagrams develop 
sequential process elements and activities in reaction to ASEs.  
The use of additional literature sources is a subject of debate within the grounded 
theory approach. Corbin and Strauss (2008) describe the potential problem for analysis 
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because “the researcher does not want to be so steeped in the literature that he or she is 
constrained, even stifled by it” (p. 36). The literature has utility for the examination of 
emerging issues. Lempert (2007) writes that the utility of, “comparisons from the 
literature alerts me to gaps in theorizing, as well as the ways in which my data tells a 
different, or more nuanced story…it does not however define my research” (p. 254). In 
this study, existing literature assists in sharpening the analysis and refinement of 
concepts. Existing theories and concepts from the literature provide a point of 
comparison as the interpretations emerge from the data. The existing literature is 
complementary to the process and not a driving force behind analysis. The analysis 
remains seated within the data consistent with the grounded theory approach.  
The final step is interpretation. Strauss and Corbin (1994) explain that 
“interpretations are sought for understanding the actions of individual or collective actors 
being studied” (p. 274). Essentially, what occurs in the description above is the constant 
comparative method. Glaser (1965) outlines the constant comparative method in four 
steps: “(1) comparing incidents applicable to each category, (2) integrating categories and 
their properties, (3) delimiting the theory, and (4) writing the theory” (p. 439). This 
occurs through the outlined coding, analysis, memoing, and diagraming process. The 
analysis continues until reaching saturation. According to Glaser and Strauss (1967), 
analysis reaches saturation: 
After an analyst has coded the incidents for the same category a number of 
times, he learns to see quickly whether or not the next applicable incident 
points to a new aspect. If yes, then the incident is coded and compared. If 
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no, the incident is not coded, since it only adds bulk to the coded data and 
nothing to the theory. (p. 111)  
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) describe theory development in collective case studies. 
Theory is “emergent in the sense that it is situated in and developed by recognizing 
patterns of relationships among constructs within and across cases and their underlying 
logical arguments” (p. 25). This study uses the constant comparative method to develop 
interpretations. This method informs the development of memos and diagrams that lead 
to interpretation and theory development.  
Qualitative Analysis Software 
 This study uses the computer-aided qualitative analysis software NVIVO (version 
10 - QSR International). Use of software for analysis has become nearly universal and 
recommended for qualitative research (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011). Most basic texts 
include references to or specifically integrate examples from qualitative software 
packages. For example, Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2011) discuss a range of software 
options while Strauss and Corbin (2008) develop their text with assistive screenshots of 
the MAXQDA software. Many qualitative researcher use NVIVO. This research uses 
Bazeley and Jackson’s (2013) Qualitative Data Analysis with NVIVO for reference and 
guidance in application of the software throughout the analytical process. This research 
uses NVIVO to store digital data, link internet sources, and import audio files for total 
project data storage. Coding and memoing functions of NVIVO serve to develop and 
refine codes. It allows linkage through diagrams, and the development of categories 
leading to theory.  
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Trustworthiness of the Research 
 Lincoln and Guba (1985) outline criteria for establishing trustworthiness in 
qualitative research. The elements involved in establishing trustworthiness include (1) 
credibility (2) transferability (3) dependability, and (4) confirmability. The following 
paragraphs review these elements and the techniques used by the researcher to establish 
the trustworthiness of this study. 
 Credibility is the overall confidence in research findings. The researcher uses 
several techniques to enhance the credibility of the study. Documentary data serves as the 
sole source of evidence for this project. The analysis uses three separate document types 
with different creators and purposes, subject to crosschecking for validation. The multiple 
documentary data sources, from different origins (9-1-1 calls and recorded statements 
directly from survivors, radio dispatch recordings from responders, reports from law 
enforcement agencies, media reports, site observations, and internet sources), establishes 
method triangulation (Denzin, 1978). In addition, the researcher applies established 
techniques for data analysis (grounded theory - constant comparative method), using 
similar, but more robust data in a manner employed previously by other researchers 
(Johnson, 1987a; Johnson, 1988; Johnson & Johnson, 1989; Aguirre et al, 2011). The 
author also tests rival explanations and uses negative cases to enhance analysis. In 
addition, the study uses referential adequacy to check the credibility of research findings. 
The researcher set aside a portion of witness data for later review. For the Louisiana 
Technical College event, 4 out of 23 witness recordings, transcripts and associated 
narrative police reports about witness interviews were set-aside for later analysis. For the 
Case Western Reserve University event, reports and statements from nineteen witnesses 
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were set aside for later review. The review of set-aside witness materials confirms the 
findings from the larger data. Moreover, the researcher has previous research and 
publication using similar methods and NVIVO software for data analysis.  
 Transferability refers to the applicability of the research to other events or 
contexts. Lincoln and Guba (1985) identify thick descriptions as a technique to ensure 
transferability. Generally, this develops through interviews, observations through 
prolonged engagement with informants, and the research location. The retrospective 
nature of the study, with some events occurring as many as ten years prior, limits options 
for sources of data and the ability for engagement. As such, the researcher conducted 
preliminary review and analysis of available data before site visits. Site visits allow the 
researcher to validate data and review the chronology of the event on-site. In addition, as 
described previously, this research is limited by the traumatic nature of the event, 
methodological issues exposed in previous research on similar events (Newman et al., 
2004), and research resource limitations. This research uses multiple sources of data to 
provide understanding of the events. In addition, the professional background of the 
researcher as a career law enforcement officer with experiences as a trainer and responder 
to a shooting at an educational institution provides understanding to incidents as they 
develop.  
Dependability refers to the ability to replicate the process and findings of a study. 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) identify external audits as a technique to address dependability. 
To establish dependability, an outside researcher conducted an external audit of the 
process and product of this research.  
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Confirmability is the neutrality of the researcher in the conduct of the study. It 
ensures that no bias went into the conduct of research or development of findings. The 
researcher uses an audit trail to ensure confirmability. In addition, the researcher 
identifies his fourteen years of law enforcement experience including credentials as a 
trainer for the response to active shooter events, and experience as a responder to an 
actual shooting on a school campus. The researcher’s involvement in the field does not 
bias the analysis or findings, but provides additional depth of understanding to the role of 
law enforcement officers in active shooter events.  
Ethical Issues 
 This study has approval of the Oklahoma State Institutional Review Board. 
Appendix A contains the approval documentation. This study does not list the names of 
survivors or law enforcement officers in the report of findings. A reference to individuals 
is generally by category of affiliation and or background, such as student, professor, etc. 
Despite this safeguard, it may be possible to identify survivors based upon public 
reporting, statement and interviews provided by survivors, and the fact that media 
reporting is one source of data for this study. The retention of data collected is for a 
period of three years following the conclusion of the study.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
ACTIVE SHOOTER EVENT CASE STUDIES 
 
This chapter presents the case studies of active shooter events (ASEs) on college 
campuses, specifically, the May 9, 2003 ASE at Case Western Reserve University in 
Cleveland OH and the February 8, 2008 ASE at Louisiana Technical College in Baton 
Rouge, LA. The case studies provide a mechanism to examine survivor behavior in 
response to the ASEs. Each case study uses the framework provided the C-Model 
(introduced in Chapter II: Table 2.1) for organization and presentation. Using the model, 
each case develops by examining the characteristics, chronology, conditions, and 
consequences of the event.  
The case presentation begins with the characteristics of the event location. The 
description of characteristics section includes a synopsis of the background information 
of the campus, victims and survivors, and the description of the physical environment 
where the event takes place. Again, this study focuses on the behavior of survivors. As a 
result, the background, motivation, preparation and actions of the perpetrator, other than 
during the timeframe of the active event are irrelevant. The chronology section 
establishes the timeline of the event and the actions of survivors, perpetrators, responders, 
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and organizations as the event unfolds. The conditions section examines the core 
independent variables related to survivor behavior. These are the central elements of the 
survivor behavior focused research questions. Finally, the consequences section examines 
the outcomes of the event. In addition to overall event outcomes, the examination focuses 
down to the results of protective behavior choices.  
The research questions and propositions from the literature for this study are:  
1. What are the processes involved in collectively defining the socio-behavioral 
response to ASEs? 
Propositions from the literature: 
P.1.1. The response is social rather than asocial with an absence or isolated 
incidence of panic behavior.  
P.1.2. The response includes helping behavior among survivors 
2.  How do social interactions and social organization emerge among survivors in 
a campus ASE? 
Propositions from the literature: 
P.2.1. The survivors response includes information seeking behavior to 
interpret environmental cues and warning information through 
interactions with others present and those in other social networks. 
P.2.2. The survivors socially organize to deal with a new problem and decide 
on protective behavior implementation. 
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P.2.3. The survivors show maintenance and extension of social roles.  
3. What type of protective behaviors do survivors of campus ASE exhibit? 
Proposition from the literature:  
P.3.1. The survivors exhibit a range of behaviors appropriate to the situation 
to include evacuation, shelter, and information seeking behavior.  
4. How do decisions for protective behavior arise among survivors in ASE? 
Propositions from the literature: 
P.4.1. The survivors show interaction for social confirmation of environmental 
cues. 
P.4.2. The social interaction between survivors leads to decisions and division 
of labor for implementation of protective behaviors.  
The case description developed through the framework of the C-model elements 
allows for both the examination of research questions and presentation of emergent 
elements from the data. The framework allows the researcher to create a detailed 
narrative of events, the analysis of which leads to the development of a fresh theoretical 
perspective. The presentation of case studies begins with the examination of the ASE at 
Case Western Reserve University and concludes with the ASE at Louisiana Technical 
College. This chapter presents observations and findings within each case. Chapter V 
presents the cross-case analysis and findings.  
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Case Study 1: Case Western Reserve University Shooting: May 9, 2003 
The following sections detail the C-model elements for the ASE on the campus of 
Case Western Reserve University on May 9, 2003. Examination of the data, described in 
Table 3.2 (Chapter III), revealed 103 individuals who fit the study definition of a 
survivor. The experience of the survivors, as captured in the data, provides the basis for 
understanding human behavior in response to ASE within the context of this case. The 
case study presentation begins with examination of the characteristics. The characteristics 
section of the study includes brief overviews of the organizations involved in the initial 
response to the incident: Case Western Reserve University, University Circle Police 
Department and city of Cleveland Department of Public Safety agencies Police, Fire and 
Emergency Medical Service. As the incident developed, additional law enforcement 
mutual aid resources including the Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s Office Special Weapons 
And Tactics (SWAT) team, Euclid Police SWAT, and Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) SWAT responded to the incident. The characteristics section does not examine 
mutual aid elements as separate organizations. The second section presents the 
chronology of the event, providing a narrative description of how the event proceeded 
over time. The description of the event uses the trace-forward technique beginning with 
the first shots fired. As key elements unfold in the description, the explanation infuses 
related conditions, additional specific characteristics, and consequences. The final section 
examines overall event consequences, to include the outcomes and resultant change.  
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Characteristics 
Organizations. 
Case Western Reserve University (CWRU) is a private, non-profit, four-year 
institution of higher education. CWRU offers Bachelor’s degrees, Post baccalaureate 
certificates, Master’s degrees, Doctoral degrees (PhD), and Doctor’s degrees (MD - 
professional practice). In the 2002-2003 academic year, CRWU had a total enrollment of 
9,097 students (3,457 undergraduate, 2,169 graduate, 3,471 professional). Precise 
historical data related to faculty employment during the 2002-2003 year is not available. 
Data for the 2007-2008 academic year indicate 1,264 CWRUfaculty. Available 2012-
2013 data also shows 2,963 paid staff and 4,356 (faculty and staff) total employees. In 
2002-2003 academic year, the CWRU employed unarmed security officers. The 
University did not employ armed uniformed police officers capable of armed emergency 
response.  
The 550-acre university campus of more than 120 buildings is geographically 
located in the eastern portion of the city of Cleveland, OH. In 2003, CWRU received law 
enforcement services from both the University Circle Police Department and the city of 
Cleveland Police Department. The University Circle Police Department is a small 
department of 25 officers that services a one square mile area that includes parts of the 
CWRU campus. The CPD consists of over 1,600 police officers (1,560- 2004 Law 
Enforcement Census) and is one of the fifty largest police departments in the United 
States. As such, CPD has a range of available specialized resources to support full 
spectrum emergency incident response and investigation. CRWU is geographically 
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located in the CPD Third District. The Cleveland Division of Fire (CDF) and Cleveland 
Division of EMS (CEMS) provide emergency medical and fire services to the campus. 
Cleveland Fire Station #10 is located less than one mile from CWRU. The campus is also 
located in close proximity to East Cleveland and Cleveland Heights Fire Department 
stations. The CEMS consists of over 200 EMS providers working 15 Advanced Life 
Support (ALS) ambulances. CEMS provides pre-hospital emergency care within the city 
of Cleveland.  
Peter B. Lewis building - CWRU.  
The shooting took place within the Peter B. Lewis (PBL) building on the campus 
of CWRU. The PBL building is a non-conventional modern architecture building located 
at the intersection of Bellflower and Ford Roads on the CWRU main campus. The 
building is home to the Weatherhead School of Management and other campus programs 
and offices. Renowned architect Frank O. Gehry designed the building. Gehry designs 
incorporate curves and rounded shapes that appear as waves. As a result, both the interior 
and the exterior of the building are shaped or accented with curves, resulting in few if any 
right angles. Traditional building design for institutional structures usually includes 
square corners and open spaces minimally opening to a second floor or atrium. The PBL 
design is very different, incorporating open spaces spanning several floors with window, 
walkway, and balcony overlooks that allow for observation of the central area of the 
building from dozens of locations. The building also includes curved interior walls with 
many at non-traditional vertical angles.  
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The first floor of the PBL building contains a cafeteria and administrative offices. 
Figure 4.1 shows the floor plan of the first floor of the building. As the incident took 
place throughout the building, the first floor serves as an example of the unique features 
of the interior floor plan. Due to the complexity of the incident, a map is unable to 
display the full details of the incident across the several floors of the building. The floor 
plan does show many of the non-traditional features of the building. The second through 
fifth floors consist of classrooms and administrative offices and contain similar non-
traditional characteristics. Many of the classrooms are theater style rooms with center 
stairs between the two halves of the room. Many have small projection A/V rooms 
behind the presentation area at the front of the room. The basement contains computer 
labs, administrative offices, and classrooms.  
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Figure 4.1. Peter B. Lewis Building First Floor Map. The map illustrates the unique 
interior architectural characteristics of the building. 
Chronology: Initial Minutes of the Incident 
 The shooting at the CWRU PBL building start just prior to the first 9-1-1 call 
received by Cleveland Police Department (CPD) dispatch at 1557 hours on Friday May 9, 
2003. At the time of the shooting, the final exam period ha already concluded, leaving 
few students on campus and in the PBL building. It  a Friday afternoon, nearing the 
closure time for many campus offices. The shooter approaches the northwest entrance of 
the building wearing an army style helmet, tactical vest (flak jacket) that includes body 
armor and a black backpack. He uses a mallet from his backpack to break the glass in an 
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entrance door to gain entry to the building. Once in the building, the shooter removes a 
9mm Cobray semi-automatic pistol from the backpack and moves toward the central area 
of the building.  
The only fatality during the incident occurs with the first gunshots. A student, 
who was talking with a small group of other students outside the café, moves toward the 
shooter. The shooter fires at the student at close range striking him in the chest. With the 
initial shots, students and staff begin to react to the incident.  
Conditions: Definition of the situation in the initial seconds.  
Students and staff based on the first floor of the building are the first to recognize 
the event as a shooting and are therefore the first to react. They u direct audio and visual 
observation of the shooting. One student recalls the initial moments of the shooting:  
A few seconds after (student name) walked away from us, I heard a loud 
bang. I then saw (student name) running back in front of us. Then I did not 
see (student name), and I think he collapsed…the male fired one time at 
us, then (student name) and I fell to the floor (Cleveland Police 
Department [CPD] Report, 2003). 
Students continue to react as the shooter targets them, relying on both audio and visual 
cues. The primary importance of such cues cannot be overstated. For example, a student 
who had entered the building after the initial shots and therefore did not hear them, walks 
directly toward and within a few feet of the shooter. Without direct audio and visual cues, 
the student does not realize what has happened and only runs when the gunman points his 
weapon at him. The weapon fails to fire and the shooter cycles the bolt of the weapon, 
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apparently to clear a misfired or jammed round. Another student just entering the 
building quickly recognizes the danger and runs.  
The survivors in the first floor area who do not have direct visual observation of 
the initial incident respond to audio environmental cues with a secondary action to gather 
additional information. One states: “I heard a loud bang sound. I proceeded to the front 
door of the cafeteria, and I witnessed (student name) falling to the floor that’s when I 
heard two more bang sounds” (CPD Report, 2003). Another survivor recalls: 
I heard a loud bang from behind me. So, I turned to look what the noise 
was and I saw a man about 20 feet away from me falling forward and he 
seemed to be holding his stomach. I looked behind him and about 20-30 
feet behind the guy lying on the floor was another man and I saw he was 
holding a gun…I got scared and (staff name) was starting to run towards 
the main entrance and I took off behind him (CPD Report, 2003). 
In the absence of direct visual observation of the shooter, survivors rely on audio 
environmental cues in order to gather the information necessary to ffect action. Two of 
the most prominent and consistent secondary actions include recognizing the abnormality 
of the loud, bang noises and identifying the potential meaning of other students falling 
around them. Others on the first floor follow the pattern, with some keying on additional 
environments (audio and visual cues) and others on the social observations of the 
behavior of others to define the situation.  
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Conditions: Direct contact protective actions. 
Students and staff in direct contact with the shooter  protective actions once they 
recognize the incident as a dangerous and problematic situation. One survivor describes 
his/her actions: 
Then immediately (student name) and I took the table we had and flipped 
it forward. We kind of backed it up towards the wall to provide protection 
for the both of us. We realized the gunman was right in front of us, and we 
flipped the table vertically to better protect us and backed toward the wall 
again…(student name) ran out the out along the edge of the wall and 
started heading down the stairs. He was using the half-wall to protect him. 
I stayed under the table for what seemed 10 to 15 seconds more. I 
followed along the same way and headed down the same stairs (CPD 
Report, 2003). 
Another seeks help, remembering that: “At this time I was already on the floor, so I just 
crawled to the phone located to behind the counter in the Café. I called 911, and while the 
phone was ringing, I heard another bang, and that’s when I dropped the phone, and 
proceeded to run out of the building” (CPD Report, 2003). Yet another survivor recalls 
how environmental cues and social observations directed protective actions: “I got scared 
and (staff name) was starting to run towards the main entrance and I took off behind him” 
(CPD Report, 2003). Protective actions develop in concert with environmental options. 
Those in the shooter’s immediate area, relying on direct audio and visual cues, take 
protective actions according to their availability. These range from dropping to the floor 
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and barricading themselves from the shooter, using ordinary environmental items like 
tables, to ducking and running for shelter, again using whatever was available in the 
environment to increase their protection as they ran to evacuate the building.  
Chronology: Shooter Moves to the Basement 
Before the arrival of the officers, the shooter moves to the basement of the 
building. Students and staff in the basement begin to react to the noise from the first 
floor. Two of the students from the first floor, who initially took cover behind a table, 
flee to the basement before the shooter moves there. Another student who was ascending 
the stairs from the basement heard the noise and saw the “sparks” from the gunfire also 
flees back to the basement.  
Conditions: Proximity and definition of the situation.  
Survivors in the basement who heard the noise initially misdiagnose the shots as 
other potential issues. One survivor describes the confusion: “He was in the basement 
when he heard shots. He thought that they were tables falling over, then he saw two 
people running and both looked terrified” (CPD Report, 2003). Another survivor: “She 
heard what sounded like a table being dropped. She then heard three more loud sounds” 
(CPD Report, 2003). Loud noises the first environmental cue with which the survivors 
work, and they consistently misidentify them in the moment. It is not until survivors pick 
up on either the social behaviors of others or the continuation of the loud noises that they 
recognize the noise as gunshots and not tables falling.  
With environmental cues of the loud noise, survivors begin to gather information 
through movement. They move to gather additional environmental information by 
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interacting socially or milling with other survivors. Information and observations before 
the arrival of the shooter lead to protective active decisions that escalate with the arrival 
of the shooter. Information that informs protective action decisions include direct 
interaction (milling), additional environmental cues, and social observations of the 
behavior of others. Survivors describe the ways they gathered information. One says: “I 
saw a number of students in the Audio Visual room. I knocked on the window, and they 
let me in the door. I told them what was happening. We switched off the lights and hid 
behind computer servers for five hours” (CPD Report, 2003). An interview with the CPD 
reveals another survivor’s accounting:  
At this time, he along with (3) other males went to investigate. They 
walked up the stairs to the first landing, and they heard another gun shot. 
At that time from where he was standing he observed a male with what 
appeared to be a green helmet on his head on the main level…At this time 
they ran down stairs, and back into the room where he and the others work 
(CPD Report, 2003). 
The police record yet another survivor’s description, yielding additional information: 
“(Survivor name) said (employee survivor #1) and (employee survivor #2) went out to 
check. She said that they and another male came running past them fast. (Survivor name) 
said she believed that something was wrong because of how fast they were running” 
(CPD Report, 2003).  
Survivors fleeing from the first floor warn others in the basement, either directly 
through verbal contact or by the keynoting of their actions that others observed. These 
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observations combined with the previous audio environmental cues lead to action for 
many. For others, the shooter arrives before they can define the situation as requiring 
protective action.  
Conditions: Protective actions – Shooter moves to the basement.  
For many, the environmental cues, social cues, and social interaction lead to 
protective action before the arrival of the shooter. Police record one survivor’s 
recollection: “He was in the basement when he heard shots. He started to run up the 
stairway half way when someone above him said someone is shooting, so he went back 
downstairs and into the Video Visual room and locked himself in” (CPD Report, 2003). 
A different survivor tells police that, “Another employee then told everyone in the room 
to go to the server room, that someone was shooting a gun” (CPD Report, 2003). Both 
the sound of gunshots and word of mouth lead some survivors to take immediate 
protective action, running to avoid the oncoming shooter and locking themselves in 
rooms to keep the shooter at a distance. For those who do not take action on the basis of 
environmental cues, social observations, and social interactions, the arrival of the shooter 
in the basement provides additional immediate cues, as police record one survivor’s 
experience: 
One of his co-workers came in to the computer lab, said she did not like 
the sound of the banging, and said it sounded suspicious, like gunfire. 
(name) decided to call security…He went out in the hallway to see if he 
could see anything. He was conferring with co-workers (name #1) and 
(name #2)…he saw a figure standing in the hallway…the male started to 
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raise the gun…they ran through the computer lab as shots were fired. 
(name #1) had his swipe card ready to use…they entered the room and 
shut the door…they scrambled for cover as he shot through the wall (CPD 
Report, 2003).  
The loud noises only raise suspicion for the survivors above. Upon further investigation, 
during which time the survivor utilizes milling, the shooter arrives, clarifying the 
situation and forcing the survivors to take protective actions. Students and staff prior to 
and during the shooter’s arrival hide and/or flee to areas behind locked doors. The 
shooter fires shots, but does not hit any of the survivors in the basement. The shooter 
proceeds back to the main floor after attempting to make entry into locked spaces 
occupied by survivors.  
Chronology: Initial Responders Arrive 
 CPD dispatch reports show the first units arriving at 1602 hours. The first police 
officers to arrive on the scene are from the University Circle Police Department (UCPD). 
The two officers, traveling together, immediately make entry into the first floor of the 
building. They report noticing the victim on the floor before the gunman begins firing at 
them. The officers exchange gunfire with the suspect using issued handguns and a 12-
gauge shotgun. The volume of fire from the suspect forces officers to a small entryway 
near the doors. Due to the volume of gunfire and poor cover position, the officers back 
out of the building and radio for assistance.  
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Chronology: Initial CWRU Response 
An unarmed CWRU security officer is making rounds of the campus on foot near 
the PBL building when he hears noises and sees survivors fleeing the building. The 
officer relays observations and remains in the area, providing access cards and keys to 
police. Within the building, information spreads among survivors and an email comes 
from the administrative offices of the Dean located on the first floor. The Dean’s Office 
sends the email to the PBL building staff just as police arrive at 1603 hours. The email 
notifies the employees that there is a shooter in the building. It also instructs them to lock 
doors and remain in their offices.  
Conditions: Proximity and definition of the situation – Beyond the basement. 
Students and staff on the remaining floors of the building who heard the noise 
from the first shots also initially misdiagnose the shots as other potential issues. A 
survivor on the second floor tells police: “Sometime before 4 PM I heard a noise that 
sounded like books being dropped or a table falling. I remember thinking at the time that 
if I lived in a more dangerous environment, I would be worried about that noise” (CPD 
Report, 2003). This survivor’s past experiences directly impacts his/her ability to identify 
the sound as gunshots.  
Many who hear the initial shots take action to gather additional information to 
determine the source of the noise. One survivor describes his/her actions: 
I was in my office which is (second floor room #), when I heard the shots 
ring out. It sounded like they came from the Atrium because of the way 
they reverberated through the building. They sounded like gunshots, but I 
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could not believe I was hearing that. I thought I had better look into this. I 
looked out the window…I saw a police car heading toward the Lewis 
building on the sidewalk. There were emergency vehicles on Ford Road 
(CPD Report, 2003). 
Most of the survivors interact with others in their area, gathering information about the 
nature of the noise. This information gathering includes moving to other areas to make 
additional visual observations. Others observe keynoting behavior of survivors in 
response to additional social and environmental cues. One survivor describes such 
behavior: 
I heard the gunshots and just thought they were general noise. Then (staff 
name) came in and said you could see someone lying on the ground. We 
ran to her office. I could see the lower half of someone on the 
ground...while we were looking we saw the gunman walking in the 
direction of us, about the time when he got parallel to the body on the 
floor we realized it was the gunman…we went in office (number) with 
(staff name). We turned off the lights and sat on the floor until SWAT 
came (CPRD Report, 2003). 
Police reports consider another survivor’s actions: “She went to the interior hallway of 
her office, and observed everyone running into the office saying to get in the room and 
lock the door. At this time everyone went into different rooms” (CPD Report, 2003). 
Police report on yet another interviewee: 
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(Name) reports being in a co-worker (name) office when she heard a loud 
bang sound. She thought it was a table falling to the floor, and didn’t pay 
much attention. Moments later a female (name) name ran through the 
hallway and said there was a male with a gun. She then observed a male 
and a female running towards the back door of the office (CPD Report, 
2003). 
The sound of gunshots, either identified as such or misidentified, prompts survivors to act 
in order to gather more information. They begin moving around their immediate areas to 
determine what is happening, and they pool information with other survivors they 
encounter. With enough information, survivors act, locking themselves in rooms or 
running from the shooter.  
In addition to environmental cues, face-to-face social interaction, and social 
observation, many also see an email sent by the Dean’s Office. This interaction from an 
institutional entity also serves as a key confirming source for staff. One account explains, 
“(Survivor) reports an E-MAIL came over informing individuals to ‘GET IN 
OFFICE...GUNFIRE.’ He stated he went directly to his office and locked the door” (CPD 
Report, 2003). For those not in an area where direct visual or audio clues could be used to 
affect protective behavior, survivors rely on the authority of the Dean’s Office. 
Conditions: Proximity and protective actions – Beyond the first floor and 
basement. 
As occur on the main floor and in the basement, survivors identify the situation as 
problematic and take action individually or collectively to protect themselves from the 
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hazard. Several previously described survivor experiences present such protective 
actions. As the survivor descriptions indicate, defining the situation as problematic 
quickly lead to the implementation of protective action. Police record one survivor’s 
experience: 
He stated he was on the second floor and was walking towards the Map 
Room when he heard gunshots and looked across the window and saw a 
male firing a gun towards the front of the building. He could not make him 
out very well, but believed he had a green jacket on, some kind of hat and 
was not very tall. He said he ran down the hall yelling someone is 
shooting and ran to (room #) where they locked themselves in (CPD 
Report, 2003). 
Once this survivor realizes a shooter is in the vicinity, he/she runs away, alerts others, and 
hides behind a locked door, thereby protecting him/herself and others. Those further 
away from the initial hazard engage in social interaction and discussion to confirm the 
hazard and define the situation as one requiring protective actions. Survivors also engage 
in milling to determine initial protective actions and re-evaluate those actions. A call to 9-
1-1 from a survivor illustrates such actions:  
DISPATCHER: We don’t know how many people were shooting we don’t 
know if we have all of them, so if you guys figure out a safer room that 
you can go to call us back. To let us know where you are at.  
CALLER: Okay, I will relay the information. Wait a minute, let me 
ask…(voices in the background) (to others) Do you want to go next door? 
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It’s safer; it’s bigger; we can get away from the glass door (voices in the 
background). 
DISPATCHER: Okay, there is no glass door on that room? 
CALLER: There is, but we can get further away from it, right now we are 
in a little room that no matter what happens with this glass door someone 
is going to…get hurt. 
CALLER: It is right next door 
DISPATCHER: okay, I want to stay on the phone while you transfer over 
there… 
CALLER: Okay we are going to send someone out to unlock the 
doors…(talking in background) be careful…he is going to… so he can 
unlock the door…All right…we are going now…  
CALLER: and we are all in and the door is shut… (CPD 9-1-1 Recording, 
2003) 
Survivors group together, relay information to the appropriate authorities, and attempt to 
protect themselves in the best way possible, going so far as to transfer rooms once they 
identify a potential hazard in the first shelter. Survivors constantly evaluate and 
reevaluate their actions, altering course as necessary. Protective action taken by survivors 
outside of the basement and the first floor include hiding, moving to sheltered areas, and 
locking doors. Survivors also continue to gather information to reassess protective 
behavior choices.  
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Conditions: Division of labor.  
A number of experiences described thus far in this case illustrate division of labor 
among survivors in information gathering. The previous 9-1-1 call, for instance, 
illustrates division of labor in information and protective actions. The description shows 
how one survivor maintains communication with 9-1-1 while another goes out first to 
unlock a door and the others follow. Survivors report to police similar examples of 
division of labor in information and protective actions. For example:  
She heard what sounded like something dropping. (Name #1) went out in 
the hall, and returned a few minutes later, saying someone was in the 
building shooting. (Name #2) said she went to the front door and locked it, 
and (name #3) locked the back door (CPD Report, 2003). 
Police report regarding another survivor: “While attempting to get through to the 9-1-1 
operator, someone in the office yelled they got through, and she hung up the phone” 
(CPD Report, 2003). The responses of survivors to the incident reveal a division of labor 
in addressing information gaps and implementing protective actions.  
Conditions: Role enactment/extension.  
A number of the preceding examples also show evidence of role enactment and 
role extension. The roles present in the event are as an employee/ professor, co-worker, 
and student. The data do not show any other identifiable relationships with consequence 
for the description. The strength of relationships between co-workers cannot be 
determined.  
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Although not many students are in the building because classes have ended, 
faculty and staff take responsibility for the students who remain. This action shows both 
maintenance and extension of the professor-student relationship, even though classes 
where a professor would have responsibilities in an emergency are not in session. Police 
report one student survivor’s accounting: “A female professor came to the room he was 
in, and he followed her to a 5th floor room where they locked themselves in until the 
police came” (CPD Report, 2003). Despite the fact that classes are not in session, the 
female professor seeks out the male student to ensure his safety, demonstrating one of the 
myriad ways professors and other employees extend their roles to help students.  
Other employees maintain and extend roles during the emergency to warn others 
and engage protective behaviors that help others find safety. Perhaps most importantly, 
employees in the Dean’s Office located on the first floor send an email message to staff 
in the building during the shooting to confirm the incident and instruct them to take 
protective actions. Another employee with responsibilities for the facilities extends his 
role to warn employees and to provide additional information to responders while putting 
himself at risk. A segment of his conversation with 9-1-1 dispatchers shows the role 
extension: 
CALLER: Now I don’t see him, he was on the second floor we are on the 
third floor now calling you. I can see the front door entrance. I see the man 
down in front of the café he is about 100 yards in from the front entrance. 
I think there is more, I think the person up front at the secretary desk 
possibly got shot and is possibly down. Yep, I’ll be right back; standby . . . 
all right I am back. We need somebody in here.  
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DISPATCH: We have got police and EMS on the way, can you stay on 
the phone with me for a while? 
CALLER: I’ll try, but I am like a sitting duck here 
DISPATCH: Okay, then I want to you to lay down on the floor, hang up 
the phone and get down on the floor. 
CALLER: All right, I will get on the floor.  
DISPATCH: Get down on the floor try and protect yourself, you can hang 
up the phone. 
CALLER: I am going to keep it open just in case.  
DISPATCH: Okay, get on the floor, let me know if you hear anything.  
CALLER: Another shot fired . . . . 
DISPATCH: Another shot fired . . . . 
CALLER: Sounds like he is he is still on the second floor . . . don’t lay in 
front of that door (to another person). I see two people down now I moved 
up to a higher perch. A student is down . . . . 
CALLER: (to someone else in the room) Call on the walkie-talkie tell 
them to stay down and tell him to lock themselves in. . . (to Dispatch) you 
got it? 
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DISPATCH: Can you get on that walkie-talkie and tell everyone to lock 
themselves down? 
CALLER: We just did. (CPD 9-1-1 Recording, 2003)  
The call shows how the employee remains on the phone with the 9-1-1 operator and 
moves to a position to better see what is happening to relay the information to responders 
rather than take protective action advised by the dispatcher. The employee also provides 
instruction to another employee to warn others over the walkie-talkie system. This shows 
maintenance and extension of the employee role during the shooting.  
Finally, a group of employees who work in the building, but are not in it at the 
time of the shooting set up an emergent ad-hoc information center by emailing their 
contacts within the building to establish location and welfare. The long-time employees 
know most of the other employees in the building. They set up in an adjacent building, 
working the phones and emailing those they can contact. One of the employees first 
attempt to approach a plain-clothes police officer to propose the idea and the officer takes 
his name and information, but is not interested. Undeterred, the employee finds a willing 
detective who accompanies them to another building while they work. The detective 
states: 
I arrived at Dively…where we met (female employee). (male employee) 
asked (female employee) if it would be okay to use one of the computers 
to make e-mail contact with those who remained in the Lewis building, 
(female employee) granted permission. (female employee) worked the 
phones into the Lewis building while (male employee) typed a request for 
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information to all persons inside Lewis. Within a matter of minutes the 
information began to flow (CPD Report, 2003). 
The detective relays the information they develop together to law enforcement 
commanders. The insistence of the group of employees in the face of institutional 
disinterest demonstrates extension of work roles during the emergency. That the 
employees persist and find ways to gain information and offer it to police on the scene 
proves to be an essential extension of their expected roles as university employees.  
Conditions: Helping behavior.  
The cited statemens provided in prior sections of this case study illustrate several 
examples of helping behavior among survivors. The most common behavior is warning 
others of the danger. As described, helping behavior includes one of the first survivors in 
the immediate area of the shooting who flees to the basement and warns other students. 
Another example of warning others includes the following recollection by a survivor, 
who writes: “(Name) ran into (name’s) office and back and said, ‘He’s on the bridge. 
He’s on the second floor. He might be on the way to the third floor’ He told everyone to 
go in their office and turn the lights off” (CPD Report, 2003). A second example also 
describes warning behavior: “Someone yelled out ‘GET ALL THE SECRETARIES IN A 
ROOM.’ Immediately after this statement was made, she heard a gunshot. She (professor 
name) next locked her office door and got under her desk with (student name)” (CPD 
Report, 2003). 
Helping behavior also includes physical intervention with others to protect them. 
One survivor recalls that, “I don’t know who it was, but someone grabbed me and pulled 
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me into a closet” (CPD Report, 2003). Another example also illustrates physical 
intervention between survivors. A survivor explains, “(Name) was in a meeting in Room 
(number) when (name #1) attempted to walk out of the room and they heard shots. (Name 
#2) pulled (name #1) back into the room and locked the door” (CPD Report, 2003). The 
survivor response to the shooting shows evidence of helping behavior, which include 
verbally warning others of the danger in the area, and/or running to other areas to warn 
people, and physically intervening to protect them.  
Chronology: Shooter Moves to Other Areas of the Building 
 Following the initial contact with officers, the gunman’s exact path over the 
several hours of the incident is uncertain. He does then proceed to the second floor, 
possibly by way of the third floor, to the office area of several professors. These instances 
of contact with survivors on the second floor and one professor on the fifth floor later are 
his last contacts with survivors. The remaining several hours include only contact 
between the shooter and law enforcement SWAT teams while survivors remain in 
secured areas or hidden from the shooter.  
Three professors in this area are milling in the hallway, discussing next steps 
when the shooter comes to the area of their offices. Earlier, when the staff in the area 
come together after the initial shots, a staff member locks the outer doors that provide 
access to the area of the offices. Other staff in the area lock themselves into adjacent 
offices, some individually, many together. The thought among them is that the outer door 
provides them general protection. The locked door does not prevent access to the suite of 
offices from the area of the elevator. One of the professors sees the shooter and dives into 
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an office and closes the door; the other two professors initially do not see the shooter. 
The other two professors, one in an electric wheel chair, starts toward one of their offices. 
The first professor enters the office when the shooter appears. Police report the 
professor’s description of the scene:  
A look of panic came over (name) face. He froze for a second, then took 
off . . . . The next thing I knew the shooter was standing in my doorway, 
his back against the opposite wall . . . I saw . . . the barrel of the . . . gun . . 
. and thought . . .really bad things can happen to me. And then I thought, 
but he is not going to get me. So I closed the door quickly, as he fired . . 
.the bullet went through the door (mostly through wood, but partly through 
smoked class), struck me in the sternum (CPD Report, 2003). 
The bullet hits her in the chest, but it does not incapacitate her. She manages to lock the 
door, call 9-1-1, CWRU security, and others for help. She eventually hides in her closet. 
The second professor attempts to exit the area in his wheelchair when the suspect also 
fires at him. Police report the professor’s description of the events: 
(Name) next reports it was at this time he slightly looked back and saw the 
shooter come up behind him and shoot at him. He reports this shot missed 
him and hit the window and into the closet…he pretended to be struck by 
the fired gunshot, by lying limp in his wheel chair. After the shooter 
walked away from him, (name) wheeled himself into his office and locked 
the door. Once inside his office he indicated he wanted to get out of the 
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shooter’s line of fire and crawled underneath his desk to hide until the 
police came (CPD Report, 2003). 
A graduate student on the second floor also comes across the shooter as he looks 
to see what is happening. He runs as the gunman raises his weapon. The gunman shoots 
at him once, hitting him in the lower back. The student continues to run to the stairwell, 
down the stairs, and outside to police, who place him in an ambulance for transport. The 
final contact, this one with a professor, comes over an hour later on the fifth floor. The 
professor leaves his office to use a fax machine. Police report the professor’s experience 
of the incident: 
(Name) stated as he looked at this male, the male glanced back at him and 
began pulling the slide back on the weapon. At this point, (name) reports 
he quickly jumped back into his office to avoid from being shot or hurt 
(CPD Report, 2003).  
In each of the locations where the shooter makes contact with survivors, students and 
professors evaluate environmental cues—both audio and visual—in concert with social 
cues, and attempt to take protective action for themselves and those around them.  
Conditions: Direct contact protective actions.  
As described above, after receiving email and/or numerous environmental and 
social cues, some survivors do not initiate protective actions, leave from protected 
locations, or—apparently—think that broader protective actions might be effective. The 
survivors’ actions previously described in response to the shooter include closing the 
door on the shooter, pretending to be dead, and jumping back into an office.  
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Consequences: Protective Actions 
 The actions taken throughout the incident protects students and staff from the 
shooter, resulting in fewer deaths and injuries. Actions in the basement, including hiding 
behind locked doors while being shot at, prevent further injury and death. Staff report that 
the shooter tests door handles on multiple floors. When the shooter finds them locked, he 
does not try any additional measures to breach the doors. As a result of the actions of the 
shooter, injuries could have been minimized to just the initial victim, if appropriate 
protective actions were implemented and maintained.  
Chronology: SWAT Officers Enter the Building  
At approximately 1630 hours, eight members of the CPD SWAT team enter the 
building. One SWAT officer attempts to describe the scene, writing that, “The silence 
when we first went into that building, I cannot even describe” (Kuriloff, 2006). The 
SWAT team proceeds to the body of the first victim in the first floor open area of the 
building. Two members of the team begin to drag out the victim when they take fire from 
the gunman from a second floor balcony. One team member explains their actions: 
At this time we attempted to reach this male in attempts to rescue him. As 
we made it . . . the male appears to have died . . . myself and (Officer 
name) then began to drag the male back to the east door . . . . (Officer 
name) and myself then carried the male to that east entrance door at which 
time the suspect opened fire on our entry team, and myself and (officer 
name) were forced to leave the body at that east entrance and take cover 
(CPD Report, 2003). 
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Two CPD SWAT officers return fire. This action forces members to leave the body of the 
student near the door and seek cover, an occurrence which prompts one SWAT Officer to 
say that, “My heart was beating so hard I could feel it bouncing off of my tactical vest” 
(Kuriloff, 2006). 
CPD SWAT locates a receptionist hiding behind the main desk and escorts her 
from the building. The suspect appears two more times from the second floor balcony, 
with CPD SWAT officers returning fire each time. Reports estimate that the exchange of 
gunfire from the balcony occurs over a 45-minute period. As SWAT officers continue to 
organize and secure the first floor, the suspect points his weapon at officers twice from a 
third floor walkway; each time officers fire on him. He appears on the third floor two 
more times with officers firing at him each time.  
 By this time, mutual aid SWAT teams are arriving. The Cuyahoga County 
Sheriff’s Office (CCSO) SWAT team and Euclid PD (EPD) SWAT teams show up for 
support. CCSO replaces CPD on the first floor, giving them a chance to rest and 
reorganize. EPD SWAT secures the basement and removes sheltered occupants. In this 
period, FBI SWAT also arrives with information about an injured professor in room 275.  
 A combined group of SWAT officers moves to the second floor. They locate and 
evacuate the injured professor and all others on the second floor using master keys 
provided by CWRU security. The team attempts to move up to clear the third floor when 
the suspect begins firing at them. They initially back out of the stairwell, but the 
remaining cover officer engages the suspect, which forces the suspect to retreat up to the 
fifth level of the building. FBI SWAT remain on the second floor coving the evacuation 
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of survivors from the upper floors while CPD SWAT move to clear the third and fourth 
floors of the building. Of the police response, a professor evacuated from the second floor 
says: “I was amazed at how fast the police got there. I am very grateful for the 
professionalism and the manner in which we were treated” (CPD Report, 2003).  
Conditions: Environment/architectural elements. 
 As described through the words of survivors previously in this chapter, the 
architectural elements of the PBL building allows for easy observation of the main areas 
of the building. Figure 4.2 shows an interior picture of some of the unique interior 
windows that enable observation of the main floor from different floors and several 
points. Police report on a survivor’s description of the sightlines’ utility:  
(Staff name) walked to her office window and was able to look down to 
the first level. (Staff name) saw a pair of legs, in blue jeans below her 
window . . . . (Staff name) then saw a male on the 1st floor walking 
towards the front entrance, and it looked like he was holding a gun. (CPD 
Report, 2003) 
The interior architecture consisting of multiple observation windows, balconies, and 
walkways allow survivors to view activities on lower floors from areas of relative safety. 
The availability of safe observation points combine with the fact that the initial victim of 
the shooter remains in an observable area assists survivors throughout the building in 
defining the situation as problematic.  
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Figure 4.2. Peter B. Lewis Building Interior Windows. This picture shows some of the 
interior observation points that allow visual observation of the main floor atrium.  
The same observation points on the balconies and walkways that provide 
advantages to survivors, offer the shooter ample shooting positions and disadvantage 
responders. The shooter uses these walkways and balconies to fire on law enforcement 
responders. The architecture provides challenges to SWAT teams and delays response.  
Chronology: Ending the Incident 
After clearing and evacuating the third and fourth floors, the initial officers 
securing the fifth floor are awaiting additional officers when one hears what sounds like 
the chambering of a round in room 501. CPD and FBI SWAT converge on the room. 
They take three rounds of fire from the suspect who is in a small room behind the main 
room projection screen. The officer gives the suspect verbal commands to which he 
complies. Officers handcuff and transport the suspect for treatment of gunshot wounds 
sustained during the event. The suspect is in custody at approximately 2257 hours, ending 
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the seven-hour incident. Following his arrest, SWAT teams conduct a second sweep of 
the building to ensure that it is clear of survivors and suspects before declaring an end to 
the emergency phase of the incident.  
Conditions: Shooter actions, capability, and intent. 
 The irrelevance of the shooter’s motivation is a fundamental assumption of this 
study. However, the actions of the shooter as they affect outcomes are of importance. In a 
statement to detectives, the shooter describes his intent to limit casualties: 
Yesterday morning when I work up I was upset and planned on going over 
to Case Western Reserve, but I didn’t go until later in the day because I 
didn’t want much casualties. Most of the students would be gone on 
Friday because the semester was over on Thursday (CPD Report, 2003). 
By deliberately timing the shooting to occur at the end of the day after the conclusion of 
the semester, the shooter reports that he does not intend mass casualties in the incident. 
Although he does shoot his weapon and attempts to shoot his weapon at many more 
people than actually are hit, the shooter does not attempt to force access to any locked 
areas. This action could have changed the success of protective actions. He also wears 
body armor, showing that he intends to exchange gunfire with law enforcement.  
A second issue is the capability of the shooter and his equipment. The shooter 
visited a gun shop the day before the shooting, requiring assistance to reassemble the 
second weapon that was with him during the shooting. In addition, several potential 
victims, including one in the first few seconds, report the shooter unable to fire. In several 
instances, survivors report that the shooter must cycle the action of the weapon. As a 
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result, they are able to escape or, in one instance, suffer less severe injury. Law 
enforcement evidence reports catalog numerous unexpended rounds throughout the 
building. This indicates that either the shooter has difficulty in the operation of the 
weapon or the weapon is malfunctioning. These shooter-based issues affect incident 
outcomes.  
Consequences: Overall Event 
The immediate consequences of the event were that one person was killed 
(student) and two were wounded (one student, one professor). The event timing, early 
recognition of the event as a shooting facilitated by social interaction, architectural 
advantages for survivors, early protective actions, helping behavior, role maintenance and 
extension by employees, and the potentially limited intent of the shooter led to few 
casualties. The event was covered by national media for a period of time in the immediate 
aftermath and beyond as the suspect was tried and convicted.  
The event resulted in long-term changes in CWRU organization and policy. 
Following the event, CWRU developed its own police department. It replaced unarmed 
security guards with armed sworn law enforcement officers. In 2004, students formed a 
student-run, on-campus basic life support volunteer ambulance service. In the aftermath, 
the campus also adopted—and CWRU police teach—the ALICE (Alert, Lockdown, 
Inform, Counter, Evacuate) active shooter training program to assist students and staff. 
CWRU also made some interior modifications to the PBL building to include additional 
walkways to adjoin stairwells.  
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Case Study 2: Louisiana Technical College Shooting: February 8, 2008 
The following sections detail the C-model elements for the ASE on the campus of 
Louisiana Technical College on February 8, 2008. Examination of the data, described in 
Table 3.2 (Chapter III), revealed 23 individuals who fit the study definition of a survivor. 
The experience of these survivors, as captured in the data, provides the basis for 
understanding human behavior in response to ASE within the context of this case. The 
case study presentation begins with examination of the broad characteristics. The 
characteristics of the event include brief background overviews of the organizations 
involved in the response to the incident: Louisiana Technical College (LTC), the agencies 
of the city of Baton Rouge. These include; the Police Department (BRPD), Fire 
Department (BRFD), and Department of Emergency Medical Services (BREMS). 
Different from the previous case, this event did not include responses by mutual aid 
resources or require extensive involvement by Fire or EMS resources.  
The second section presents the chronology of the event, providing a narrative 
description of how the event proceeded over time. The description of the event uses the 
trace-forward technique beginning with the first shots fired. As key elements unfold in 
the description, the explanation infuses related conditions, additional specific 
characteristics, and consequences. The final section examines overall event 
consequences, which include the outcomes and resultant change.  
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Characteristics 
Organizations. 
At the time of the shooting, Louisiana Technical College (LTC) located in Baton 
Rouge, LA was part of the Louisiana Community and Technical College System. 
Historically, the site has been in continual use for the same educational purpose, but 
under different organizational names. Although the site of the shooting exists as it did in 
2008, LTC no longer exists as “LTC.” Since the shooting, it became the Capital Area 
Technical College, and recently it was joined with the Baton Rouge Community College 
(BRCC) as a campus within that system. Because LTC is no longer a functioning entity, 
certain information about the operation of the site in 2008 is unavailable. As part of 
BRCC, the site continues many of the same technical (leading to certificates of technical 
studies) and applied academic programs (leading to Associates Degrees). In 2014, the site 
serviced approximately 1300 students through its academic and certificate programs and 
employed approximately 50 full-time and part-time staff.  
Returning to the time of this case, in 2008, the LTC received primary law 
enforcement services from the Baton Rouge Police Department (BRPD). The BRPD 
divides the city geographically for separate precincts for uniformed operation. The LTC 
site was located in the BRPD District One service area, approximately one mile from the 
District One Precinct building. The BRPD is a full-service law enforcement agency that 
employs approximately 789 police personnel (i.e., uniformed officers, dispatchers, 
specialty police positions). It is a large modern metropolitan police department that 
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maintains a full spectrum of specialized law enforcement units, including a tactical (SRT) 
team for high-risk situations.  
The Baton Rouge Fire Department (BRFD) and Baton Rouge Department of 
Emergency Medical Services (BREMS) provide fire, rescue, and emergency medical 
response to the site. The BRFD provides primary fire and rescue response for the facility, 
and it has 582 employees, located in 19 stations throughout the city. The nearest facility 
is Fire Station No. 2, located seven-tenths of a mile from the site. The BRFD also has a 
full range of special capabilities including hazardous materials response. The BREMS is 
mostly collocated with BRFD stations and is responsible for all pre-hospital care within 
the city. It operates 13 transport units from 12 stations. Two paramedics staff each 
transport unit. As a result, a minimum of 26 paramedic/EMTs work on any given shift 
within the city.  
LTC building. 
The LTC site is a two-story building located at the corner of North Accadian 
Thruway and Winbourne Avenue in Baton Rouge, LA. The site is northeast of the 
downtown area of Baton Rouge. It is located in a mostly residential area and adjacent to 
Dalton Elementary School and Istrouma High School, which are local public schools.  
The building is a traditional institutional layout with halls at right angles with 
offices and classrooms. It contains areas that serve as classrooms, offices, and large 
indoor and outdoor spaces that support technical programs such as welding and auto 
repair. The first floor consists of both administrative offices and instructional spaces for 
many programs. Several of the first floor classrooms lead to outdoor spaces that support 
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technical programs. The second floor consists of mostly classroom space and offices that 
support specific educational programs. The second floor also has exterior stairwells that 
allow direct entry to program and instructional spaces from the outside.  
The incident began in a Nursing Program classroom, room 283. The classroom 
has three entry doors, two to the adjacent hallway and one into a large instructional space 
identified as a student activity center. The orientation of desks and tables in the classroom 
were with students faced to the west for instruction. The classroom is located near the 
atrium that features a curved stairway and open area allowing observation down to the 
first floor.  
Chronology: Initial Moments 
The shooting at the LTC building starts just prior to the first 9-1-1 call received to 
BRPD dispatch at 0835 hours on Friday February 8, 2008, a day of regularly scheduled 
classes at LTC. The facility has classes in progress in several programs although exact 
numbers of students and staff at the facility at the time are unknown based upon available 
data. The shooter, a student who recently has left the accelerated nursing program 
(cohort) before completion, enters the building and goes to the Accounting Office 
seeking copies of her transcript. Accounting Office staff sends her to the Student Services 
Office on the second floor of the building. From there she visits the Nursing Program 
Office, also on the second floor, contacts staff and arranges to pick up her transcripts on 
the following Monday. The shooter leaves and proceeds to the Nursing program 
classroom, room 283. Several students talk to the shooter in the hallway outside the 
classroom, as she has been part of the program until a few weeks prior. The professor 
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also talks with the shooter and advises her to wait in the hallway until students finish a 
timed test.  
At the time of the incident, a female professor and 14 students (12 females and 2 
males) are in the classroom, and the students are taking the test. During the test, the 
shooter enters the classroom and sits quietly in the back of the room. She then fires a six-
shot Taurus .357 Magnum revolver, which is still inside her purse, at two students sitting 
in desks in front of her. She shoots each student three times in the back and head. As the 
shooter starts firing, students in the classroom, and those learning and working in other 
parts of the campus, begin to react.  
Conditions: Definition of the Situation.  
The students initially define the situation as something other than a shooting. 
When they later talked to police, the students within the room reported delays in 
recognizing the incident as a shooting. One students says: “I thought it was a light 
blowing out. I didn’t know what it was” (Baton Rouge Police Department Interview 
[BRPD], 2008). Another states, “Everyone did not really know what it was we did not 
expect anything, so I thought something fell on the building” (BRPD Interview, 2008). A 
third student expands on the confusion:  
I was facing forward and all I can kind of remember was that I heard this 
loud bang…and my ears started ringing and I looked back, . . . [the 
professor] had always said about our old . . . projectors that we had and I 
thought that the projector . . . something had blown or busted in the 
projector . . . when I saw smoke rising, from the angle that I was at it 
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looked as if it was coming up from the projector and then I heard it again 
(BRPD Interview, 2008). 
Students located in the same room as the shooter consistently misidentify the noise they 
hear, believing something in their classroom environment has malfunctioned. Even the 
sight of smoke does not help survivors recognize the event as a shooting.  
Within the classroom, the incorrect initial recognition of the event also follows 
with misidentification of the hazard location. Even though directly in the room with the 
shooter, survivors do not identify the location of the incident before additional 
environmental and social cues allow them to redefine the situation. One student explains, 
“I didn’t know it was in the room; I thought it was in the hall because I didn’t look back” 
(BRPD Interview, 2008), while another student introduces timing, noting, “not at the first 
moment I was like . . . thought that is kind of weird and my ears kind of popped, so never 
once did I think it was coming from inside of that classroom” (BRPD Interview, 2008). 
A few key environmental and social factors lead to problems in survivor 
recognition of the event and its location. The first key factor is environmental. The 
shooter positions herself at the back of the classroom, which does not allow for direct 
visual observation by survivors. The second is the social factor of familiarity with the 
shooter. The shooter has entered the classroom without cause for concern among 
students, as she was formerly in the program and has a conversation with the professor 
immediately before entering the room. Although the door slam behind as she enters, 
many described an apologetic look on the face of the shooter. The shooting does not 
begin for several minutes after she enters the room, so the students’ attention refocused 
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on the test. In fact, many survivors saw or talked with the shooter outside the classroom 
earlier, and/or heard the prior conversation with the professor and the shooter. At that 
time, the professor instructed her to return to the room following the test. A second key 
environmental factor is that the shooter fires the first volley of shots from inside her 
purse. When combined with her location behind the students facing the front of this class, 
it masks the initial visual cue of a weapon. Here, the environmental factors of location of 
the shooter and concealment of the weapon combined with the social factor of familiarity 
with the shooter affect initial recognition of the incident as a shooting.  
Conditions: Protective actions.  
The survivors in the classroom initially associate the noise of the gunshots with 
other possible explanations and then incorrectly identify the location of the hazard. This 
lasts only briefly as analysis of additional environmental or social cues result in a 
redefinition of the situation as dangerous and thus requiring protective action. Survivors 
describe social cues that lead to initial protective actions. One survivor explains that: “By 
that time, I realized I was seeing a shooting and everyone was hitting the ground. And 
there was an open door not far from me, and I could not go under the desk I was at, so I 
pushed them apart” (BRPD Interview, 2008). Another survivor says, “I didn’t even 
realize to move until I saw everybody in front of me go on the ground because I am in the 
back of the class so I didn’t see anything going on in the front” (BRPD Interview, 2008). 
Yet another survivor recounts the initial confusion, saying, “Everyone was screaming 
‘get down,’ so I got down, and I crawled like closer to the wall and (student name) was 
here; someone else was here” (BRPD Interview, 2008). One survivor pinpoints an 
important social cue, noting, “I was up there in the front and I saw the teachers face, she 
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was real scared” (BRPD Interview, 2008). These survivors’ recollections indicate the 
vital role the observation of social cues play in enacting protective behavior. Only once 
survivors notice others falling to the ground or recognize the fear in other survivors’ 
voices or on their faces, do they act to engage in initial protective behavior. 
Survivors also describe environmental cues that lead to redefining the situation 
and initial actions: “I didn’t know what it was, I looked at the roof, because I guess the 
ceiling tile shattered, sprinkling and then it happened again and again. The third time I 
could smell it and I knew exactly what it was” (BRPD Interview, 2008). Another survivor 
describes his/her reaction: 
This eye had a blurred vision and I turned to see, so I was trying to turn 
right here with this eye to try to see was it an electrical something and then 
I heard BOOM, BOOM I said . . . Oh my God, I know what that is and 
that is not electrical (BRPD Interview, 2008). 
Here, the survivor descriptions portray the collective behavior process of milling and 
keynoting leading to a definition of the situation, emergent norms, and protective action. 
Conditions: Helping behavior.  
Survivors process the cues differently, although the event happens in seconds. 
Initial protective actions, such as dropping to the floor, occurs at different speeds and, in 
some cases, with assistance from other survivors. In the initial period after the shots, the 
survivor behavior is social and helping. For example, one survivor explains, “I was 
scared to death, the projector’s gone crazy, finally I saw people getting down on the floor 
and I was kind of in shock . . . and someone pulled me down to the floor” (BRPD 
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Interview, 2008).Another survivor also remembers helping behavior, saying, “I hurried 
and got under the table with them and (student name) covered me and (student name) up” 
(BRPD Interview, 2008). Still another survivor says, “(Student name) pulled me under 
the desk because I was still sitting there kind of looking around” (BRPD Interview, 
2008).  
Helping behavior also includes other kinds of direct physical contact as one 
survivor explains, “I remember I was laying on the ground, my classmates (student name) 
was just rubbing my arm and she said ‘It’s okay’ and I was just praying” (BRPD 
Interview, 2008). Another survivor notes, “I got down and I put my hand on (student 
name) head and I just heard her praying” (BRPD Interview, 2008). In the immediate 
threat period, survivors display helping behavior, including pulling other students to the 
ground, students covering one another, yelling to get down, and comforting other 
survivors. During the initial threat period, survivors exhibit no instances of panic 
behavior.  
Chronology: End of the Initial Threat Period 
Following the initial six shots, the shooter empties four shell casings and inserts 
one live round from her purse into one of the cylinders. She then places the weapon under 
her chin and pulls the trigger several times before it fires, killing her. Reports indicate 
that the time from the first shot to the final shot is just more than one minute.  
Conditions: Secondary Protective Actions.  
Survivors describe reassessment of initial actions with the analysis of additional 
environmental and social cues that serve as keynotes leading to secondary protective 
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actions. Some students directly observe the shooter fire the final shot, while others take 
action based upon the keynoting behavior of others. One survivor recounts his/her 
thought process, saying:  “When she was reloading, I was contemplating should I run, 
should I stay here? If I stay here, what is going to happen? If I get up, am I going to draw 
her attention to me?” (BRPD Interview, 2008). Another survivor describes the conclusion 
of the events, stating, “I heard a thump and she dropped to the floor. That is when the 
whole class ran out because everyone was relieved” (BRPD Interview, 2008). Another 
survivor reiterates the previous survivor’s thinking: “I felt and heard around me people 
getting up to run; I thought to myself, it must be safe to run” (BRPD Interview, 2008). 
Survivors reassess their actions even without seeing the shooter. As one survivor 
explains, “I did not know she shot herself, all I knew was that people were leaving, so she 
must have either left the room, you know, giving us a chance to get out or something” 
(BRPD Interview, 2008). Another survivor notes the importance of the crowd: “After that 
I got up, and I kind of ran to the back of the room a little bit, and everybody was running 
to the front, so that is when I turned around and ran out the front and we went to 
(Program Director) into her office” (BRPD Interview, 2008). The crowd helps another 
survivor, who says, “I saw everyone running this way and I thought I better follow the 
crowd” (BRPD Interview, 2008). Whether or not survivors could see the shooter’s 
suicide, they recount assuming safety based upon the crowd’s reaction and acting to 
emulate its behavior.  
The authority of the professor also is a critical social cue as one survivor explains, 
“Our teacher—everyone was saying ‘get out, get out’ . . . (Professor) was saying ‘get 
out’” (BRPD Interview, 2008). In conjunction with the crowd, professorial behavior 
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helps to initiate secondary protective actions. Here, survivors again described the milling 
and keynoting process leading to a re-definition of the situation for secondary protective 
action. Secondary protective actions in this case consist of evacuating from the room to 
other shelter. 
Conditions: Proximity and definition of the situation. 
Students and professors outside the classroom in other parts of the facility also 
experience delays in recognizing the incident as a shooting, noting, “I walked into my 
secretary’s office and bent over on the floor, I was working on, going to work with 
something and we heard the noise, which we thought something had fallen off the wall” 
(BRPD Interview, 2008). Another says, “We heard a noise, and he said it was a door 
slamming, and I went just want to make sure it wasn’t a fight” (BRPD Interview, 2008). 
Yet another survivor states: “We heard screams and started hearing the instructor that 
was in the room beside of us say ‘get down.’ There was just a lot of screaming” (BRPD 
Interview, 2008). 
The initial inability to recognize the incident as a shooting extends beyond the 
classroom. Students and employees in other parts of the building do not hear the noise of 
the shots due to the size of the building. Data limitations do not allow for deeper 
explanation of processes for those not interviewed by BRPD detectives, who interviewed 
only a few students and staff outside of the immediate area of the shooting.  
Chronology: Initial LTC Responders Arrive 
LTC staff members are the initial responders to the classroom. The initial 
organizational response by the LTC begins with the actions of the professor in the 
classroom:  
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I started to see people ducking, getting down, and that’s when it dawned 
on me . . . a gun . . . and I went, “Get the hell down!” or “Get down!” . . . 
something like that to the students. I can remember I screamed it, and I hit 
the ground and that stopped. . . . So I kind of looked up like this and as I’m 
looking up, she’s spinning that thing on the gun (BRPD Interview, 2008). 
Of the shooter, the professor says: 
She was either trying to put a bullet in or doing something. Well, I didn’t 
play around then. I just grabbed the front door, opened up the door, and I 
said, “Get out!” and so that way everybody would kind of be able to get 
out of the room (BRPD Interview, 2008). 
The professor takes charge of the classroom once she recognizes the danger, maintaining 
her role as an authority figure—a fact that survivors note. Of the professor’s actions, one 
survivor says: 
The teacher told us to turn off the lights and close the door. We didn’t 
know it was inside, we thought it was outside and it was her. . . . I was up 
there in the front and I saw the teacher’s face, she was real scared and she 
got on the ground and crawled out and I followed right behind her (BRPD 
Interview, 2008). 
Further, one survivor states, “Our teacher—everyone was saying ‘get out, get out.’ . . . 
(Professor) was saying ‘get out’” (BRPD Interview, 2008). Yet another survivor states: “I 
was laying under the table, toward the door, when my teacher said to get out. I did not see 
them because they were behind me” (BRPD Interview, 2008). 
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The Nursing Department Program Director is located in an office just down the 
hall with her administrative assistant. She responds to the noise and realizes it is a 
shooting. She remains and directs students out of the classroom and into her office. She 
says: 
I saw all of them and I saw (student name) was crawling on his belly out 
the door, and I motioned for him to go down the hallway. I could see the 
majority of the students, but not (shooter’s name) she went in the back 
door. I was at the front door (BRPD Interview 2008).  
She further explains: “They were all huddled together, I got . . . (student name) out she 
went down the hallway and then the students just kind of jumped up huddled each other 
and were saying she shot herself” (BRPD Interview, 2008). Finally, she says, “I gathered 
them all up and took them and put them in my office behind closed doors, to protect 
them” (BRPD Interview, 2008). The Nursing Department Program Director, much like 
the professor in the classroom with the shooter, identifies the event as a shooting and 
takes protective action on behalf of students, maintaining her role as a teacher and leader. 
Similarly, the Nursing Department Administrative Assistant gathers the students and 
locks the door. The Administrative Assistant describes her actions: 
At that point, there were about seven of them in my office, I closed the 
door back because I did not know what was going on. But (Program 
Director) has a key, so she opened the door and let the rest of them in and 
told them to stay here. They stayed until the officer brought them 
downstairs. (BRPD Interview, 2008)  
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An LTC maintenance staff member is working in a restroom on the second floor 
near the classroom. He responds to the noise and arrives before the shooter’s final shot, 
and then uses his radio to call for a campus lockdown. The facilities supervisor follows 
the initial radio call by the maintenance worker with a second radio announcement 
confirming the need for a lockdown. He calls administrative staff in the Chancellor’s 
office by radio. After the event, he explains: “I heard (maintenance staff member) sound 
excited over the radio, just talking loud. I heard (facility supervisor) say ‘where are you?’ 
and then I heard (facility supervisor) later call to me and said . . . ‘there is a lockdown, 
call a lockdown’” (BRPD Interview, 2008). Staff attempt to initiate a building-wide 
announcement calling for a lockdown. The announcement only reaches a portion of the 
campus classrooms. An unarmed LTC security guard arrives shortly after the initial radio 
call and enters the classroom with the maintenance worker. They check the condition of 
the survivors and wait for responders to arrive. 
Conditions: Staff role enactment/extension.  
The LTC staff roles in the initial response include those of professor, program 
director, maintenance worker, facilities supervisor, and security guard. The classroom 
professor maintains a leadership role, follows protocol, and directs students to take 
protective action. After initially recognizing the incident as a shooting, but not 
recognizing the exact location, the professor directs students to turn off the lights, close 
the door, and get down. These instructions show maintenance of role expectations in 
extraordinary circumstances. Although not enacted by students, the instructions are 
appropriate to the hazard. From student statements, it does not appear that these initial 
directions affected student actions until the professor provides secondary instructions. 
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The professor does not lead in the recognition of the incident as her statement indicates 
that keynoting behaviors of others in the room assist in her definition of the situation as a 
shooting. The professor gives secondary instructions to students to get out of the room 
and opens the door once she observes the shooter reloading. Many students report hearing 
the professor say “Get out!” Those instructions, coupled with observations and other 
keynoting student behavior, lead to the classroom evacuation.  
The Nursing Department Program Director and maintenance worker respond to 
the classroom before the final shot. The Nursing Department Program Director motions 
to students from the hallway and brings them back to an office for shelter. She recognizes 
the incident as a shooting and engages in role extending behavior to help protect students. 
The maintenance worker also recognizes the incident as a shooting as he directly 
observes the final shot. He provides information over the radio to others in order initiate a 
campus lockdown and enters the room in an effort to assess the survivors’ conditions. In 
the case of both employees, these are functions beyond the scope of basic job 
expectations and reveal role extension to deal with a problematic situation.  
The facilities supervisor, who has oversight over both security and maintenance, 
and the unarmed security guard both respond to the incident. The information the 
maintenance worker provides as the event unfolds allows them to understand it is a 
shooting before they respond. They continue to the site and extend their roles to check the 
condition of the survivors and relay additional information.  
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Conditions: Other social roles.  
The available data does not provide much information about other relationships 
among survivors. The reports identify one set of siblings and one heterosexual dating 
relationship in the classroom. The reports do not describe any specific actions taken 
because of the sibling relationship, other than the fact that they are sitting together.  
During interviews with three students, the dating relationship is discussed. The 
male states: “My girlfriend was sitting next to me; I jerked her arm and we got down” 
(BRPD Interview, 2008). The female says, “(Boyfriend name) pulled me under the desk 
because I was still sitting there kind of looking around, didn’t know what was happening” 
(BRPD Interview, 2008). A third survivor states, “I hurried and got under the table with 
them and (boyfriend name) covered me and (girlfriend name) up” (BRPD Interview, 
2008). The interviews indicate that the boyfriend initially pulls his girlfriend to the 
ground and then covers both the girlfriend and her friend with his body to protect them. 
Following the last shots, the boyfriend ensures both his girlfriend and friend leave the 
classroom. These examples also show the maintenance of traditional gender roles during 
the shooting.  
Chronology: Calls to 9-1-1 
BRPD receives nine calls to 9-1-1 from the incident, the majority (six) from 
faculty or staff at LTC. The precise moment-by-moment timing of 9-1-1 calls in relation 
to the previously described activities is not clear. Two calls come from students and one 
from the sister of a student, who has received a call from her sister at the LTC site. The 
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calls are instructive, as they show developing social organization in dealing with a 
problematic situation by both student and staff. Call number one states: 
DISPATCHER: “Did you see anybody?”  
CALLER: “I haven’t seen anyone. . . . Ms. (Faculty name), is anyone in 
the hallway?” “I have another instructor here with me, she is looking out 
in the hallway”  
DISPATCHER: “How many shots did you hear?”  
CALLER: “I heard at least 5 or 6” . . . . Is anyone in the hallway Ms. 
(Faculty name) (to a different name than previous)?” (BRPD 9-1-1 
Recording, 2008) 
A second call illustrates the way survivors work together to gather information: 
CALLER: A shooting, I believe on Campus of Louisiana Technical 
College; we think she shot herself. We all ran out of the room. . . . Seven- 
to-eight shots fired here in the classroom.”  
DISPATCHER: What classroom is that?  
CALLER: “Ugh (student name) find out (discussion in the background 
with a number of voices). What is the room number? (to another group 
present) “What’s the room number? They don’t know the number” (from 
the background, a female voice says “248, room 248”) (BRPD 9-1-1 
Recording, 2008) 
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A third 9-1-1 call reiterates the social behavior of survivors: 
DISPATCHER: “Do you’ll see anybody out there?”  
CALLER: Umm . . . hold on . . . Ms. (Faculty name) (sounds as if she is 
asking about hallway) . . . no there I don’t see anyone that has been shot.” 
(BRPD 9-1-1 Recording, 2008) 
Those survivors who called 9-1-1 rely on the assessment of others to better relay 
information to 9-1-1 operators, asking questions about the shooter, the location, and the 
number of shots fired—all useful information for responding law enforcement.  
Conditions: Division of Labor.  
The calls show the exchanges happening in the background and coordination 
between students and staff to provide basic information to 9-1-1 dispatchers. These 
exchanges result in a division of labor between the person on the phone with 9-1-1 
dispatchers and those who gather additional information. Also, as the majority of the calls 
(six) come from LTC faculty and staff, it is also an extension of their work roles.  
Chronology: Response Organizations Arrive  
The BRPD Dispatch broadcasts the shooting at 0837 hours. The first Unit arrives 
at 0840. BRPD Officers make immediate entry into the building and move toward room 
283. They enter the room with LTC staff and determine that there is no additional threat. 
The BREMS arrive and declared the subjects dead. The initial response phase of the 
incident concludes before the arrival of specialized tactical units. The tactical unit (SRT) 
arrives later and conducts a search of the building. The team locates survivors locked in 
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classrooms and offices and moves them to holding areas for interview. The incident 
moves quickly from response to investigation of the crime scene and witness interviews. 
One professor describes the process: 
I think, I can’t remember if that was the minute, shortly after that police 
were here almost immediately, it was a good feeling. They told us to stay 
in the rooms—security guard was there; he told us to stay in the rooms; 
the police told us to stay in the office (BRPD Interview, 2008). 
Conditions: Shooter Actions & Intent.  
Although the focus of this research study is not the motivation of the shooter, the 
shooter’s actions and intent during the event are critical. In this case, the shooter has the 
opportunity and means to inflict more injury with the availability of additional 
ammunition, a functioning weapon, and remaining potential victims within the classroom 
and throughout the facility. The shooter simply chooses to end the attack. Based on these 
facts, the intent of the shooter in this case is not mass casualty. Categorizing the active 
shooter as an individual who intends to inflict injury on as many people as possible is too 
broad a generalization. The variable presented by the choices and intent of the shooter 
affects outcomes and the evaluation of protective action decisions.  
Consequences: Overall Event 
The event resolves with three deaths—two students killed at the scene by the 
shooter and the shooter taking her life occurring over approximately one minute. The 
nature of the event does not allow for the evaluation of protective actions for the 
survivability of an ASE. In this event, the shooter shoots two victims before they can 
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react to any cues that the incident is about to start. The event does allow for the 
explanation of reactions and interactions during the emergency period of an ASE, as 
traced above.  
The event results in policy changes at the LTC campus. The second floor doors, 
previously open for student access from the exterior, are now locked. Access is now only 
through the main entrance of the facility. Certified police officers now serve as security 
for the facility, replacing unarmed security guards. The classroom where the shooting 
took place is in use for the Spring 2015 semester, which is the first time it has been used 
for instruction since the shooting. The entire facility is set for renovation over the next 
several years to modernize the structure. Other than some of the same staff working in the 
building, the only reminder of the shooting is a small stone marker in the front garden 
dedicated to the victims of the shooting.  
The LTC shooting is not the subject of sustained national media attention like 
many other shootings, including the CWRU case. The main factor is the timing of 
another campus shooting. Six days after the shooting at LTC, the shooting at Northern 
Illinois University dominates headlines and national attention. 
Summary 
 This chapter has reviewed the chronology and key themes of two campus active 
shooter events. In the CWRU and LTC events, key themes include recognition and 
definition of the event, protective behaviors, division of labor, social role maintenance, 
organizational role extension, helping behavior, shooter capability and intent, and 
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ecological characteristics. Chapter V examines these themes across cases and develops a 
model of survivor behavior in response to campus active shooting events.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
 
 This chapter presents the analysis across the Case Western Reserve University 
(CWRU) and Louisiana Technical College (LTC) cases examined in the previous 
chapter. The goal of this analysis is to “deepen understanding and explanation” of the 
behavioral response of survivors to active shooting events on college campuses (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994, p. 173). In order to achieve the understanding and explanation, this 
chapter explores the common themes across the cases.  
 The cases reveal common themes in survivor behavior. Table 5.1 details the 
themes from each case. The analysis of cross case themes begins with an examination of 
the recognition of the incident and advances through to protective action by survivors. A 
model of response behavior develops as the explanation proceeds. Following the 
examination of the themes that serve as process elements of the model, discussion moves 
to overarching factors that affect, enable, and inhibit the process. The following section 
of this chapter examines the theoretical implications of the model and advances a 
theoretical model considering the application and limitations of existing theories. The 
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final section of this chapter answers the research questions and reviews the propositions 
about the data. 
Table 5.1  
 
Themes Across Active Shooter Event Case Studies 
Theme LTC CWRU 
Definition of the Situation X X 
 -Delays in Recognition X X 
 -Social Interaction X X 
 -Social Observation/ Cues X X 
 -Environmental Cues X X 
Protective Behaviors X X 
Division of Labor X X 
Social Role Maintenance X X 
 -Organizational Role Maintenance X X 
 -Other Social Role Maintenance X 
 
Organizational Role Extension X X 
Helping Behavior X X 
Shooter Capability & Intent X X 
Ecological Characteristics (Environmental / 
Architectural) 
X X 
 
Defining the Situation to Protective Action:  
A Model of Active Shooter Behavioral Response 
 The explanation of the definition of the situation by survivors begins with the 
receipt of information concerning the event. The following discussion focuses on the 
initial receipt of information by survivors in the opening seconds of the incident. 
Information about the situation reaches survivors by one of three routes. Information 
reaches survivors by (1) incident environmental cues (sensory – seeing, hearing, feeling, 
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and smelling), (2) social observations (seeing and hearing the behavior of others), and (3) 
social interactions with others. Survivors may initially receive one or more of these cues, 
particularly those present at the site of the initial shots fired and positioned to hear the 
shots and make immediate initial visual observations of both the shooter (environmental 
cues) and the behavioral reactions of others (social observations). This group takes in the 
most information about the incident by the fastest method. Other survivors receive 
information of the event by environmental cues that do not include visuals observations, 
essentially hearing the sounds of shots fired. Those in close enough proximity may 
receive environmental audio cues (shots) that include other audio cues such as screams or 
yelling of others (social observations). Survivors at further distances may only receive the 
audio cues of the shots (environmental cues). Finally, the last group of survivors receives 
information of the shooting from social interaction; essentially they are told by someone 
else, absent any environmental cues or social observations. Figure 5.1 details these routes 
of information flow to survivors.  
Survivors who receive only environment audio cues of gunshots misdiagnose 
these as other possible causes. They identify initial shots as something falling (books, 
tables, scaffolding), firecrackers, equipment failures, etc. In the LTC example, the 
misattribution of the sound occurred within the same room as the shots. Confirmation 
required additional environmental cues (additional shots, smell of gunpowder), social 
observation of the keynoting behavior of others, or secondary action to confirm. This 
leads to the next segment of the model. In the CWRU example, few of the survivors were 
in the same area as the shooter. Most received the first cue as the sound of gunfire, which 
was also misattributed. In both examples, survivors without direct initial visual 
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observation took additional actions to gather information. This again leads to the next 
segment of the model detailed in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.1. Active Shooter Information Flow to Survivors. Figure shows how 
information of the events flows to survivors. 
Both cases provide broad examples of delays in recognition of the incident as a 
shooting. The survivors with multiple immediate information sources (i.e., those present 
for the initial shots) define the situation quickly and initiate protective behaviors. The 
most critical aspect is immediate visual environmental cues coupled with audio 
environmental cues and social observations. The LTC examples provides the limitations 
of simple proximity (in the same room), as the situation was not immediately defined due 
to the lack of visual observation (shooter in the back of the room and students facing 
front). Those with multiple cues, including visual, quickly moved to protective actions. 
The two cases show numerous immediate protective behaviors including dropping to the 
141 
 
floor, running to evacuate, running to shelter, using available objects for shielding, 
hiding, pretending to be deceased, locking doors, and barricading doors.  
 
Figure 5.2. Initial Active Shooter Cues Lead to Action. Figure shows initial cues leading 
to protective action or information gathering activities. 
Those without visual cues move to secondary actions to gather additional 
information. Figure 5.2 captures information-gathering activities that focus on seeking 
additional information in three areas: (1) environmental cues (see, hear, smell, and feel) 
(2) social interaction, and (3) social observations. Survivors may seek or receive 
information in all three areas simultaneously. In the case studies, information gathering 
activities included those as simple as looking to the source of the noise, moving to see the 
area of the noise, moving to observe the behavioral cues of others, and/or moving or 
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using technology (telephone, cell phone, email) to interact with others. This leads to 
explanation of the final process elements of the model outlined in Figure 5.3.  
 
 
Figure 5.3. Active Shooter Survivor Response Process. Figure shows process of survivor 
behavior in response to active shooting. 
 As Figure 5.3 shows, information gathering is not necessarily a singular activity. 
For some, the additional information received from one activity may lead them to action. 
For others it may take many. Moving to the right on the figure shows that these activities 
may take place several times before the implementation of protective actions. In both 
cases, survivors used information gathering activities singularly, or multiple times to 
move to protective actions. Also indicated by the diagram, once survivors undertake 
protective actions they will reassess them by engaging more information gathering 
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activities. The reassessment may also lead survivors to modify or discontinue protective 
actions.  
The final aspect of the process requiring explanation is the element showing 
social interaction leading directly to protective action. Both cases provide examples 
where survivors received information about the shooting through social interaction. 
These survivors were not in position to receive environmental cues or observe behavior, 
but took protective action when prompted through social interaction. The data did not 
allow for further examination of other factors, such as the nature of the relationship 
between the people providing information and the survivor. The model does show how in 
many of these cases social interaction alone moved to survivors to take protective actions.  
Active Shooter Behavioral Response Model: Enabling and Inhibiting Factors 
The preceding section explains the themes in a process model as developed 
through the two cases. This section completes the model, detailing the factors that affect 
the process elements. These factors constitute the remaining broad research themes and 
include: (1) division of labor, (2) social role maintenance, (3) organizational role 
extension, (4) helping behavior, (5) shooter capability and intent, and (6) ecological 
characteristic (environmental and architectural). These factors function within and affect 
the overall process to protective action. Figure 5.4 shows the full Active Shooter 
Behavioral Response Model with the factors identified as enabling or inhibiting the 
process. Many of the factors are closely related and not mutually exclusive, as the same 
action may exemplify multiple factors. The following sections explain each of these 
factors. 
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Figure 5.4. Active Shooter Behavioral Response Model. Figure shows full model of 
survivor behavior in response to active shooting. 
Maintenance of social roles.  
The data from the two cases show the continuity of social roles. To determine 
this, the data shows the actions of survivors. The data also reveals the general role of the 
survivor. The data allows the tracing of observations of actions back to the social context 
and expectations of their positions. The general roles during the event are employee 
(professor or staff), student, co-worker, friend, and dating relationships. The data did not 
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allow for establishment of many of these relationships beyond employee, student, and co-
worker. Among the limited number established, roles remained intact. Employees on both 
campuses (professors and other staff) enacted roles fitting their positions in the face of 
the threat of an active shooter. Employees continued appropriate organizational functions 
including enacting general response protocols for active shooter events. Other personal 
relationships that could generally be determined between students and staff remained 
intact during the event. The cases show no examples of social breakdown in the response 
to the active shooter. This factor enables the survivor response process.  
Organizational role extension.  
During the event, survivors with campus organizational roles adapted their 
activities to changing conditions, thereby extending their roles. The focus here is to 
identify the behavioral responses of individuals during the event in the context of their 
roles within the organizations. In the response to both events, data shows key employees 
taking new actions as extension of their organization role based upon the changing 
conditions of the event. The events provide numerous examples. Four key examples are:  
(1) The maintenance employee at CWRU who responded to the noise of 
the shooting, recognized the event, and gave radio direction to lockdown 
the building.  
(2) The employee at CWRU who sent an email message to building 
employees to warn them of the shooting while the event was in still in 
progress.  
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(3) The employees at CWRU who established an ad hoc information 
center to communicate with employees sheltering in the building. 
(4) A facilities employee at LTC who relayed visual observations of the 
shooting to dispatchers from a desktop while at risk.  
Employees extending occupation roles enable survivor responses to the active shooting 
by using available organizational resources in unplanned ways to affect positive 
outcomes.  
Division of labor.  
The two cases show evidence of division of labor in the process leading to and 
enacting protective action. The data show survivors divide responsibility for a range of 
tasks during the process. These include division of tasks for information gathering. In 
both cases, survivors organized around those in contact with 9-1-1 operators to gather 
additional information for the caller to provide to dispatchers. Other examples include 
those who gathered additional information, individually or as a small group and returned 
to the group. Examples also show a division of tasks for protective actions between 
survivors, such as dividing to lock multiple doors. Survivors quickly working together to 
divide and accomplish tasks related to information gathering and protective actions 
enables the response process by more rapidly completing necessary steps.  
Helping behavior.  
The cases show numerous examples of helping behavior among the survivors. 
The most prevalent example is warning others of the event. The data show numerous 
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other examples of survivors physically protecting others and comforting them. This 
provides additional evidence of pro-social behavior and lack of social breakdown during 
the shooting. The data illustrate helping behavior occurring between students, between 
employees and students, and between students and employees. Helping behavior by its 
nature enables the response process during active shooting events the lack of competition 
and efforts to help others positively affects outcomes.  
Ecological characteristics.  
The cases show mixed effects of the physical environment on the protective 
behavior process. In the CRWU case, the architecture of the building was a key enabling 
factor in information gathering for survivors. Those not located in the general vicinity of 
the shooter could observe the main area of the building from dozens of observation areas 
including interior windows (Figure 4.2), walkways, and balconies. These observation 
points allowed for rapid confirmation of the event, due to both the location of the lone 
casualty of the event in an observable area and the availability of the observation points. 
In the LTC example, the location of the shooter, behind students facing toward the front 
of the classroom delayed initial recognition of the incident. The physical environment 
was also enabling due to two other possible exits from the room, enabling a few students 
to exit the room before the final shot. In these cases, the ecological characteristics of the 
physical environment may either enable or inhibit the survivor response process.  
Shooter capability and intent.  
The capability and intent of the shooter is a factor driving the behavioral response 
process. Within the context of the event, the actions of the shooter can enable or inhibit 
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the survivor response process. Most active shooter protocols assume the perpetrator is 
intent on mass casualties and will kill with impunity until survivors or response 
organizations exert pressure on the shooter. In these cases, the shooters, by action in the 
case of LTC, or by admission in the case of CWRU, were not intent on mass casualties. 
In the LTC case, the shooter had additional ammunition and access to survivors, but 
chose to end the attack. The shooter statement to law enforcement following the CRWU 
attack indicated that he chose the timing of the attack on a Friday afternoon after final 
exams to minimize casualties. In addition, the CRWU shooter did not attempt to breach 
doors into occupied spaces. Reports indicate that the shooter attempted doorknobs, but 
did not attempt to force entry into locked spaces. The choices of the shooter in these and 
other cases affect evaluation of protective action decisions.  
In addition, the capability of the shooter influences the behavioral process. In the 
CWRU case and the LTC case, the capability of the shooter influences protective action 
decisions and ultimately survivability. In the LTC case, survivors reported that it 
appeared the shooter had trouble reloading the weapon, which could have led to the 
decision to stop the attack. In the CWRU, the shooter cycled new rounds into the weapon 
at several points, some resulting in the escape of potential victims due to a lack of ability 
with the weapon or its malfunction. Neither the capability nor the intent is discernable by 
survivors or responders during the event, however, these factors do affect the process.  
The Active Shooter Behavior Response Model develops directly from the data of 
the two active shooting events. The behavioral path traced in this data results in a model 
similar in structure to the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) (Lindell & Perry, 
2004) and models of human behavior in fires (e.g. Canter & Tong, 1985) . The PADM is 
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the result of testing and retesting using data from dozens of disaster events, but these do 
not include an active shooting event. The resultant model from these active shooting 
cases shows similar patterns of reaction to warning messages and behavior in response 
other hazards. This provides evidence confirming both the structure of this model based 
on the data and the consistency of the general pattern of behavior for active shooter 
events with that in other disaster event types.  
Theoretical Implications 
 Taking a step back from tracing the actual behavior of survivors grounded in the 
data in response to the shooting events allows for examination of the theoretical 
frameworks that may fit the data. The literature review introduced the emergent norm 
theory as a basis for most behavior based disaster research. The emergent norm theory 
also forms the basis for the PADM. The data supports the application of the emergent 
norm theory to survivor responses in active shooter events. Figure 5.5 shows the 
applicability of the emergent norm theory with a previously suggested caveat. The model 
below shows environmental cues and social interaction feeding into a definition of the 
situation as information gathering and protective behaviors take place within the 
establishment of new norms. These elements are consistent with the classic description of 
collective behavior and the emergent norm theory.  
The model also shows consideration of the ecological factors of the event. 
Cornwell et al. (2001) in the study of the sinking of the M/V Estonia and Cornwell 
(2003) in the reexamination of the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire suggest integration of 
the ecological context and ecology theory with the emergent norms theory for the study 
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of disaster behavior. Cornwell (2003) describes the necessity in the context of the 
Beverly Hills Supper Club fire:  
If we argue that strong social bonds somehow pattern the evacuation 
process and likelihood of survival, we must estimate the effects of social 
bondedness and ecological constraints simultaneously. That is, we must 
separate the effects of physical constraints from those of social constraints 
(bond strength) (p. 621). 
Although beyond the scope of this research, the same constraints can apply if we were to 
attempt to determine if protective actions are implemented with the same speed due to 
social interaction or the facilitation of information gather through multiple available 
points of observation in the PBL building. The ecological context is of importance in the 
response process and considered here as well.  
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Figure 5.5. Theoretical Model of Active Shooter Behavioral Response. Figure shows 
theoretical elements of survivor behavioral response to active shooter events.  
Research Questions and Findings 
The preceding sections of the chapter implicitly answer the posed research 
questions of this study. The following section explicitly answers the questions and 
addresses the propositions about the data. The discussion of the themes, the presentation 
of the response behavior model above, and the direct evidence provided in the previous 
chapter makes the need for extended discussion unnecessary. The following focused 
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discussion proceeds with the goal of explicit answers to the research questions, 
addressing the propositions from the literature and reseating the findings of this study 
within the existing literature. 
Research Question 1: What are the processes involved in collectively defining the 
socio-behavioral response to ASEs? 
Propositions from the literature: 
P.1.1. The response is social rather than asocial with an absence or isolated 
incidence of panic behavior.  
P.1.2. The response includes helping behavior among survivors. 
The Active Shooter Behavioral Response Model in Figure 5.4 shows the social 
nature of the behavioral response of survivors to active shooting events. The survivor 
behavioral response to active shooter events is consistent with 60 years of behavioral 
research of other disaster event types. The summary statement by Goltz, Russell and 
Bourque (1992) from their study of earthquake behavior is also applicable to this study. 
They write that “behavior in rapid on-set disaster is controlled rational and adaptive” (p. 
65). Evidence of role maintenance, division of labor, and social interaction for 
information gathering and protective action implementation show the social nature of the 
response by survivors. This evidence confirms P.1.1. The cases also show numerous 
examples of helping behavior among survivors of active shooter events consistent with 
research based findings of behavior in other event types (Dynes & Quarantelli, 1977, 
1980; Johnson, 1987a; Cornwell et al., 2001; Drury et al., 2009; Aguirre et al., 2011). 
This evidence confirms P.1.2. The data from these events also presents more evidence on 
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the debate concerning panic behavior in extreme events. Johnson (1987b) rejects the idea 
of panic as conceptualized by Quarantelli (1954; 1957). Johnson advances the concept of 
unregulated competition, as a function of a rational rather than irrational response to the 
conditions of the incident. While this research focuses on the Quarantelli (1954; 1957) 
conception of panic, the results do not help to settle this debate. The data does not show 
evidence of either conception of competitive or asocial behavior in these events.  
 Finding 1. The survivor response to campus active shooter events is social rather 
than asocial and includes helping behavior between survivors consistent with research 
findings in other disaster event types.  
Research Question 2: How do social interactions and social organization emerge 
among survivors in a campus ASE? 
Propositions from the literature: 
P.2.1. The survivors response includes information seeking behavior to 
interpret environmental cues and warning information through 
interactions with others present and those in other social networks. 
P.2.2. The survivors socially organize to deal with a new problem and 
decide on protective behavior implementation. 
P.2.3. The survivors show maintenance and extension of social roles.  
The evidence in these cases shows (Figure 5.4) that survivors seek interaction 
with others to gather and process information and establish a course of protective action. 
The explanation above describes the patterns of behavior observed in these cases and 
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generally follows established behavioral models in other event types (Canter & Tong, 
1985; Lindell & Perry 2004). The data also show that visual cues are most important to 
survivors because these cues lead to early recognition of the incident and rapid 
implementation of protective action. This is consistent with findings from other event 
types that identify visual cues as the most important factor for implementing protective 
behaviors (i.e. Perry, 1994). Survivors more distant and/or without direct visual 
observation of the shooting scene, will misdiagnose initial environmental cues. Survivors 
attribute the noise to other possible events until additional environmental cues, social 
observations, or social interactions define the situation as a shooting. This is consistent 
with volumes of disaster research on other event types noted early by Fritz and Marks 
(1954) who describe, “the marked tendency of people to interpret disaster cues in normal 
terms” (p. 35). Survivors more distant from the site of the initial event, but within the 
building and able to hear the initial environmental cues were more likely to engage in 
multiple social interactions to confirm the interpretation of cues and decide on a course of 
action. The data also shows that survivors may contact others within their social 
networks, but not present through phone and email. This data also support findings by 
(Sattler et al., 2011) that show email messages as effective for notification and provision 
of instructions to affected populations during ASEs.  
The themes related to social interaction to define the situation and division of 
labor provide evidence to confirm P.2.1 and P.2.2. The evidence shows that survivors 
will maintain social roles and extend organizational roles in the response to active shooter 
events consistent with findings in other disaster event types (Johnson, 1987a; Johnston & 
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Johnson 1989; Donald & Canter 1992; Cornwell et al., 2001; Drury et al., 2009; Aguirre 
et al., 2011) , confirming P.2.3.  
Finding 2: Survivors of active shooter events will process environmental cues, 
social cues, and engage in social interaction to define the situation, gather information 
and implement and reassess protective behavior choices within a framework that 
maintains and extends social and organizational roles.  
Research Question 3: What type of protective behaviors do survivors of campus 
ASE exhibit? 
Proposition from the literature:  
P.3.1. The survivors exhibit a range of behaviors appropriate to the situation 
to include evacuation, shelter, and information seeking behavior.  
 Across the two cases, survivors implemented a number of protective actions. 
When in direct contact with the shooter, survivors used available resources to barricade 
themselves from the shooter, take cover on the floor, hide, run to evacuate, run to shelter, 
and lock doors and turn off lights. Survivors continually process environmental cues, 
social observations, and engage in social interaction to assess and reassess protective 
behavior options. Survivors without immediate visual observation of the shooting scene 
took action to gather additional information, and then implemented protective actions. 
These actions also include running to shelter, running to evacuate hiding, locking doors, 
turning off lights, and barricading doors. The data confirms P.3.1. 
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Finding 3. Survivors gather additional information and process environmental 
cues, social observations, and social interactions to determine protective action behaviors 
that include taking cover on the floor, running to evacuate, running to shelter, hiding, 
using available resources to barricade themselves, locking door, turning off lights, and 
barricading doors.  
Research Question 4: How do decisions for protective behavior arise among 
survivors in ASE? 
Propositions from the literature: 
P.4.1. The survivors show interaction for social confirmation of environmental 
cues. 
P.4.2. The social interaction between survivors leads to decisions and division 
of labor for implementation of protective behaviors.  
The process in Figure 5.4 shows how social interaction for information gathering 
moves to protective action decisions. The data shows that survivors interact for the 
confirmation of environmental and other cues. The explanation of research question two 
above also describes these as social interactions and social organization process lead to 
decisions for protective action. The data also reveal that survivors divide the tasks of 
information gathering and the implementation of protective actions. One example from 
the data is the coordination among survivors to lock several entrance doors to office 
areas. Consistent with the findings of studies in other disaster events, in this event 
survivors sought interaction with others collect and process information and to decide a 
course of protective action (Sime 1983; Sime, 1985; Cornwell et al., 2001). Consistent 
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with findings by Sime (1983), here survivors develop a group, rather than individual 
survival strategy. Survivor descriptions often referred to “we” instead of “I” explaining 
protective actions. The role of pre-existing relationships is an element of several studies. 
The findings here are also consistent with the propositions from the literature (P.4.1 & 
P.4.2). 
Finding 4. Survivors show group level interaction for confirmation of 
environmental cues and processing of additional incident cues that lead to 
implementation and reassessment of protective actions many times with a division of 
tasks amongst the group. 
Summary 
This chapter presents the cross- case analysis for the active shooting events at 
Case Western Reserve University and Louisiana Technical College. The analysis of 
available data allowed for the construction of a model of survivor response behavior. The 
model, presented in this chapter shows the sequenced actions of survivors in the path 
from incident recognition to protective action. The chapter also discusses the theoretical 
implications of the model focusing on the emergent norm theory with the consideration 
of ecological factors of the event location. The final section of this chapter re-introduced 
the research questions and developed four findings based on cross-case data analysis. The 
following chapter examines the implications of these findings for policy, the limitations 
of the research and issues for future research. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The key overarching finding of this study is that the empirically evidenced 
behavior pattern of survivors in active shooter events on college campuses are similar to 
that of research findings derived from other disaster event types. Survivors do not panic. 
They observe environmental and social cues, and socially interact to evaluate information 
and enact protective behaviors. Survivors organize and make decisions. They help each 
other, and many times do extraordinary things in dangerous conditions.  
The study of disasters in the United States began with these natural and 
technological events serving as proxy for the expected behaviors following nuclear war. 
As new hazards develop, a tendency appears to dismiss the sixty years of research into 
human behavior in disaster and extreme events to say that these events are somehow 
different. More than forty years ago disaster researcher Allen Barton wrote: 
One of the major contributions of the last twenty years of disaster studies 
both qualitative and quantitative has been the exposure of widely held 
stereotypes as untrue, through careful observation and interviewing. We at 
least know that certain things both the public and the experienced
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professionals in the field believed – such as the generality of panic, 
“shock” anti-social behavior- are not true. (Barton, 1969, p. 61) 
The events of 9/11 saw a renewed effort to dismiss the findings of disaster research and 
revive the myths of disaster behavior. The narrative is that the problem of terrorism is 
“different.” Tierney (2003) notes, “following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, 
these myths are again gaining wide currency even though actual individual, group, and 
organizational behavior in the World Trade Center disaster directly contradict those 
assumptions” (p. 33). As Tierney states, research on behaviors in terrorist events show 
consistency in the hallmark behaviors from other disaster events. This study reviews 
several studies that confirm similar behavior in terrorist events with conclusions 
consistent with researched behavior in disaster (Aguirre et al, 1998; Drury et al., 2009; 
Gershon et al., 2011). As 9/11 gripped public attention, what Tierney dubbed the “9/12 
syndrome” took hold. In the wake of the 9/11, the myths of disaster (massive panic, 
requirement for command and control orientations for response agencies, anti-social 
behavior, etc.) found the front of public and institutional perceptions of behavior.  
Although disaster researchers warn of the potential that findings may not translate 
between conflict-crisis events (Quarantelli, 1993; Quarantelli, 2008), both in incidents of 
terrorism and ASEs as researched here, behavior patterns do apply. The public narrative 
of the active shooter hazard follows a similar path to the 9/11 narrative in the wake of 
increased shooting events and increased lethality. The line of reasoning follows the same 
logic in that active shooting events are different and therefore, the behavioral response is 
different. Some of the active shooter reference material cited in this study and many 
professionals in the field associate panic in the response of survivors to active shooter, 
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whether it is because of the use of an ill-defined term or a judgment about the response of 
survivors is unknown. In the case of the later, because of this research it is no longer an 
unknown, but now a notion that does not have empirical support. The following section 
of this chapter reviews the policy implications of this and other findings of the research. 
The chapter concludes with recommendations for future research and concluding 
remarks.  
Implications for Policy and Practice 
This section reviews the study findings and explores relevant issues for policy and 
practice for campus active shooting events. 
Finding 1 
The survivor response to campus active shooter events is social rather than asocial and 
includes helping behavior between survivors consistent with research findings in other 
disaster event types. 
The view that active shooter and other events results in anti-social behavior calls 
for response models that take a command and control view of emergencies (Waugh, 
1993). The underlying view is that response organizations will need to control the 
behavior of survivors, as they are unable to control themselves. This view also permeates 
early research driven by the military focus of response as Chapman (1964) describes the 
goal of research and modeling of disaster behavior is to “draw conclusions useful for 
controlling behavior in times of emergency” (p. 305). The application of command and 
control models is appropriate to the view of emergency event behavior as anti-social. As 
a result of this finding, collaborative and network response models are more appropriate 
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to the social behavioral response that actually occurs in active shooter events on college 
campuses (Waugh & Strieb, 2006). 
Finding 2 
Survivors of active shooter events will process environmental cues, social cues, and 
engage in social interaction to define the situation, gather information, implement, and 
reassess protective behavior choices within a framework that maintains and extends 
social and organizational roles. 
In their study of the response of the Flint-Beecher tornado, Form and Nosow 
(1958) find that “an examination of the activities of the organizations that arrived on the 
scene soon after the impact reveals that they were successful to the degree to which they 
fitted themselves into the rescue pattern already established by local groups” (p. 112). 
This finding is so critical, but remains rarely implemented and generally not understood 
by responders and response organizations. The campus active shooting case shows that 
survivors organize, solve problems, and many times, do so creatively. Response 
organizations that understand the human behavioral processes underway at the time of the 
event can integrate into these processes and use them for developing situational 
awareness, exploit critical local knowledge and continue problem-solving efforts already 
started by survivors.  
The recognition that survivors are not helpless and that many with organizational 
roles will be extending them to address unmet needs is critical. Responders should look 
for ad-hoc efforts that yield results and plug into them. The prime example from this 
research is the ad-hoc information center that developed among long-time employees at 
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CWRU with local personal knowledge of both the facility and the employees within the 
building. In short, response organizations should prepare to improvise and be flexible in 
response to use the opportunities that present themselves to enhance the response (Webb 
& Chevreau, 2006).  
Finding 3 
Survivors gather additional information and process environmental cues, social 
observations, and social interactions to determine protective action behaviors that 
include taking cover on the floor, running to evacuate, running to shelter, hiding, using 
available resources to barricade themselves, turning off lights, and locking and 
barricading doors.  
Colleges and universities must assess facilities to ensure sufficient areas for 
shelter. Facilities must have the ability for students and staff to lock doors and turn out 
lights. The active shooter discussion should be as institutionalized as discussions about 
fire exits and fire egress. Students, faculty, and staff should have a general idea about 
their protective behaviors options in the common places that they work, learn, teach, and 
attend class. The shootings at libraries at Santa Monica College (2013) and Florida State 
University (2014) show the classroom is not the only vulnerable higher education facility. 
Tough questions for higher education settings include how many students know where 
they can shelter in libraries, student unions, and other public spaces in addition to 
classrooms? This presentation is made with the understanding that it is much simpler to 
say than implement, but they are real and present challenges.  
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Finding 4 
Survivors show group level interaction for confirmation of environmental cues and 
processing of additional incident cues that lead to implementation of protective actions 
and the division of tasks for information gathering and implementation and reassessment 
of protective behaviors.  
The study shows that survivors will reassess protective behavior options based 
upon additional information. Colleges and universities must have an avenue to 
communicate with survivors who have taken protective action to provide sheltered 
survivors with focused information. Mass warning systems alone may not be as effective 
for this focused purpose. A mechanism for reliable two-way communication with 
sheltered students and staff is important for survivors to continue behaviors that protect 
them and facilitate response efforts. Minimally, methods to communicate with staff, 
including part-time faculty with student responsibility, is necessary. Colleges and 
universities should be prepared to establish situational awareness with understandings of 
which affected facilities are in use, and what staff and students are likely to be in them. 
The technological capabilities exist, the question must be addressed: Are systems 
accessible for this purpose? Minimally, colleges and universities should be able to 
communicate reliably with sheltered staff for personal and student accountability and 
status.  
Issues for Future Research 
Although this study concludes that survivors in campus active shooting events 
behave in a manner consistent with behavior in other event types, this is not an ending 
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statement for the study of active shooter events, but a beginning with broad possibilities 
for future research. The central issue for research of active shooter events is access to and 
reliability of data. Newman et al. (2004) provide a number of limitations in studies of 
these events including access to survivors, impact of civil litigation even years after the 
incident, the traumatic aspect of the event, memory enhancement or decay for distant 
events, and an interest in certain characterizations of the event. These are problems 
endemic to retrospective studies seeking to capture new data a significant time after the 
event. This study uses primary data essentially frozen in time, collected in the immediate 
aftermath of the event by response organizations. This assists in removing many of the 
biases and reliability issues, but presents others. The main limitation is that researchers 
cannot ask new questions to survivors to obtain data of interest to study questions. The 
data essentially is as it appears, limiting deeper analysis in certain key areas. This 
presents issues with differences in local investigative methods, data retention for distant 
events, and state public information laws that may limit access to key information. This 
introduces many issues for researchers. Overall, a conflict exists between science and 
learning for the prevention of future loss of life and the privacy protections of the victims 
of the past. Data for other ASEs of interest during the time-period selected for the study 
was inaccessible due to exceptions in public information laws. Privacy won this battle, 
but raises the question, what would the victims want? The media exploitation of events 
makes the immediacy of strict privacy laws unavoidable, but with the understanding that 
they are a detriment to non-invasive scientific discovery.  
The following paragraphs present several issues for future research in the area of 
campus active shooter events. The list is not exhaustive nor does it intend to describe all 
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aspects of the identified issues. The issues stem from the key findings of this research that 
require additional study. As this study is the first to examine many of the issues, the area 
is wide open for research in any aspect. The issues for future research include (1) incident 
recognition and (2) mitigation measures.  
The most critical issue for future research is how to affect the incident recognition 
gap. This, as well as research on many other hazards, finds that truth in the adage that 
“seeing is believing.” This research shows that visual cues are critical to survivor 
definition of the situation as a shooting. Questions for future research emerge: How can 
we close the incident recognition gap for campus ASEs? How do demographics and 
personal experiences factor into the recognition process? Are there reliable and cost-
effective technologies that can identify a noise as shots fired and alert building 
occupants? If, so can they be as minimally effective as a fire alarm in alerting potential 
victims to the hazard?  
A second issue that arose from the review of the literature is potential mitigation 
measures for campus ASEs introduced by Ergenbright and Hubbard (2012). The issue for 
research comes together with the impact of architectural characteristics as an enabler of 
survivor observation in the CWRU case. The potential inclusion of survivor initiated 
mitigation measures is worthy of future study. If the measures are effective, it creates 
larger construction and building code policy issues for study. What is the potential 
content of building codes that would require active shooter mitigation measures? 
Opportunities abound for research in this area. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 Unfortunately, the active shooter phenomenon is one aspect of American society 
that does not appear to be in decline. Research based empirical support for policy, 
programs, and response protocols are necessary now more than ever. Currently, debates 
rage on the practitioner side of the phenomenon about policy, best practices, and tactics 
for response. The role of research is to improve practice that can translate into saved 
lives. Research pushes beyond after-action reports and single case studies to get to 
understandings of phenomenon from the experience of multiple events. As shown here in 
the process of this research, we as first response organizations may hold many of the keys 
to understanding that we are prohibited to open to researchers. This is problematic for the 
academic role to help improve practice.  
A multitude of professional disciplines are involved in preventing, protecting, 
mitigating, preparing for, and responding to active shooters on college campuses. On the 
practitioner side, the shared responsibility extends from those responsible for campus 
facilities to campus administrators to the field level emergency responders to the trauma 
surgeons who receive the victims and survivors in hospitals. In the scope of the problem, 
this research is a small swipe from one academic vantage point at one tiny aspect of a 
large problem in desperate need of continued research. 
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